Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Science

Author(s):  
José Luis Bermúdez

Taking as point of departure a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) that appears to block philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, this paper illustrates how highly conceptual forms of self-consciousness emerge from a rich foundation of nonconceptual forms of self-awareness. Attention is paid in particular to the primitive forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness manifested in visual perception, somatic proprioception, spatial reasoning and interpersonal psychological interactions. The study of these primitive forms of self-consciousness is an interdisciplinary enterprise and the paper considers a range of points of contact where philosophical work can illuminate work in the cognitive sciences, and vice versa.

Author(s):  
Marek Jakubiec

AbstractAlthough much ink has been spilled on different aspects of legal concepts, the approach based on the developments of cognitive science is a still neglected area of study. The “mental” and cognitive aspect of these concepts, i.e., their features as mental constructs and cognitive tools, especially in the light of the developments of the cognitive sciences, is discussed quite rarely. The argument made by this paper is that legal concepts are best understood as mental representations. The piece explains what mental representations are and why this view matters. The explanation of legal concepts, understood as mental representations is one of (at least) three levels of explanation within legal philosophy, but—as will be argued—it is the most fundamental level. This paper analyzes the consequences of such understanding of concepts used in the field of legal philosophy. Special emphasis is put on the current debate on the analogical or amodal nature of concepts.


2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 61-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Henrich ◽  
Steven J. Heine ◽  
Ara Norenzayan

AbstractBehavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obviousa priorigrounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions ofhumannature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.


Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (8 (106)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Lidia Sofronova

The article presents an analytical review of the recent literature on cognitive history, especially the Russian collective monograph “Cognitive Sciences and Historical Cognition”, published in 2020. It traces the patterns typical for interdisciplinary research not only within the humanitarian disciplines, but also at the “borders” between the humanities and the “natural sciences”. The article highlights the paradoxical and productive nature of the “mutual interventions” of cognitive science and the humanities, which contribute to overcoming “atomism” both within the humanities and at the “frontier” between them and the natural science disciplines.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 450-476
Author(s):  
Flavio A. Geisshuesler

AbstractThis article proposes a 7E model of the human mind, which was developed within the cognitive paradigm in religious studies and its primary expression, the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). This study draws on the philosophically most sophisticated currents in the cognitive sciences, which have come to define the human mind through a 4E model as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended. Introducing Catherine Malabou’s concept of “plasticity,” the study not only confirms the insight of the 4E model of the self as a decentered system, but it also recommends two further traits of the self that have been overlooked in the cognitive sciences, namely the negativity of plasticity and the tension between giving and receiving form. Finally, the article matures these philosophical insights to develop a concrete model of the religious mind, equipping it with three further Es, namely emotional, evolved, and exoconscious.


Sofia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Azevedo Leite

One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy of cognitive science derived therefrom. Based on research in current molecular and cellular neuroscience, the framework holds that the best strategy for integrating human neuro-cognitive theories is through direct reductive explanations based on molecular and cellular neural processes. It is my aim to investigate whether the neo-mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that leading neo-mechanists offer some significant replies; however, they are not able yet to completely remove strong explanatory reductionism from their own framework.


Author(s):  
Kevin Michael Mitchell

This paper uses F.W.J. Schelling’s Naturphilsophie as a point of departure to theorize the concept of digital labour. Beginning with Marx’s distinction between fulfilling and unfulfilling labour, it is argued that the former is labour that is immanent to, and in line with, the Schellingian notion of Nature as process and ungrounded ground, while the unfulfilling variant externalizes Nature and attempts to use it against itself in the service of capital, and the establishment of what I call a state-of-power. Schelling’s The Ages of the World is re-interpreted by exchanging his version of immaterial spirituality for digital virtuality, and as a result, digital labour is viewed as a consequence of previous forms of world historical developments. While digital virtuality is in fact materialist in terms of both the labour that activates it, and the substrate that sustains it, the materiality of the digital is often overlooked in favour of an anti-materialist stance that works to disconnect the digital labourer from their online activity, and preclude the critical self-awareness necessary for the acknowledgement of their online “playful” activity as work. It ends with an analysis of Mark Zuckerberg’s ideational attempt to “re-wire” the world via Facebook’s digital infrastructure, which begins to set the conditions of possibility for inter-personal interaction, and explores the possibilities for resistance available in Foucault’s notion of the care of the self.


Author(s):  
Jesper Sørensen

English abstract: This article has a double focus. First, and in line with the special theme of this issue, it will address and discuss the celebrated, later rebuked and finally almost forgotten ‘hero’ from our discipline’s historical cabinet of curiosity, the Dutch phenomenologist of religion and theologian, Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890-1950). Van der Leeuw’s work had its primary impact in the first part of the 20th century, but came to play a special role in Denmark when his Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion was published in Danish in 1969 – a book which influenced a whole generation of Danish high school teachers. Second, taking my departure from van der Leeuws emphasis, I reevaluate the concept of mana in order to explore its relevance in the contemporary, academic study of religion. My point of departure is, that we need a concept covering broad notions of force. Further I argue that a rejuvenated notion of mana should build upon results from the cognitive sciences regarding causal representation as well as from the notion of force-dynamic representations argued in cognitive linguistics. Finally, in a more speculative manner, I shall present a number of hypotheses concerning the relation between social organization and mana and argue that this relation can be understood as a driving factor in a general history of religion. Dansk resume: Denne artikels formål er dobbelt. For det første vil den, i tråd med dette nummers overordnede tema, diskutere en hyldet, udskældt og nu nærmest glemt ’helt’ fra det forskningshistoriske raritetskabinet, den hollandske religionsfænomenolog og teolog, Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890-1950). Van der Leeuw havde sit virke i første halvdel af det 20. århundrede, men fik en særlig i indflydelse i Danmark fra 1969, hvor hans indføring i religionsfænomenologien udkom på dansk under titlen Mennesket og Mysteriet – en bog, som fik stor indflydelse på en hel generation gymnasielærere. For det andet vil den, med afsæt i van der Leeuws brug af mana som central eksplanatorisk kategori, revurdere dette begreb for at undersøge dets relevans for den moderne religionsvidenskab. Udgangspunktet er, at religionsvidenskaben har brug for et begreb, der dække kraftforestillinger bredt forstået, og at nyere kognitive forklaringer på kausale forestillinger samt den kognitive lingvistiks fokus på kraftdynamik i sproget kan fungere som udgangspunkt for et moderne mana-begreb. Afslutningsvis vil artiklen mere spekulativt udkaste en række hypoteser om forholdet mellem social organisering og mana som en central drivkraft i den generelle religionshistorie.


2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (105) ◽  
pp. 211
Author(s):  
Agenor Brighenti

Num contexto de crise da modernidade, novos desafios se impõem – a nova racionalidade, o mundo da insignificância e o pluralismo cultural e religioso, com implicações para a semântica e a sintática da teologia. Ainda que tenham adquirido amplitude mundial, nem por isso se manifestam com a mesma intensidade e da mesma maneira em âmbito local. No âmbito da semântica da teologia, os novos desafios obrigam a um alargamento do conceito de teologia, a uma relação inter e transdisciplinar com as demais ciências, a ser uma prática teórica relevante para os pobres e a autocompreender-se desde a pluriculturalidade e a plurirreligiosidade. No âmbito da sintática da teologia, os novos desafios exigem um novo paradigma teológico, que permita integrar em seu discurso as novas perguntas emergentes, no horizonte de uma ‘terceira ilustração’, que tem no pluralismo, não um ponto de partida, mas um pressuposto.ABSTRACT: In the crisis context of modernity, new challenges are imposed – the new rationality, the world of insignificance and the cultural and religious pluralism, with implications for the semantic and the syntactic dimensions of theology. Although these challenges have acquired world amplitude, they are not so evident with the same intensity and in the same manner at the local level. In the semantic scope of theology, the new challenges compel a widening of the concept of theology to an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary relation with other sciences to be a theoretically relevant practice for the poor and to self awareness from the multicultural and multireligious dimensions. In the syntactic scope of theology, the new challenges require a new theological paradigm that allows the integration of new emerging questions in its discourse, on the horizon of a ‘third illustration’, that has in pluralism, not a point of departure but rather a presupposition. 


Author(s):  
Jonathan Jong ◽  
Christopher Kavanagh ◽  
Aku Visala

SummaryIn recent years, theoretical and empirical work done under the rubric of the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have led many to conclude that religion (or, at least, some aspects thereof) is “natural”. By this, it is meant that human beings are predisposed to believe in supernatural agents, and that their beliefs about these agents are constrained in various ways. The details about how and why these predispositions and cognitive constraints developed and evolved are still largely unknown, though there is enough of a theoretical consensus in CSR for philosophers to have begun reflecting on the implications of CSR for religious belief. In particular, much philosophical work has been done on the implications of CSR for theism, on both sides of the debate. On one hand, CSR might contribute to defeating particular arguments for theism, or indeed theism altogether; on the other hand, CSR might provide support for specific theological views. In this paper, we argue that the CSR is largely irrelevant for


Author(s):  
Nico Orlandi

Why do things look to us as they do? This question, formulated by psychologist Kurt Koffka, identifies the main problematic of vision science. Consider looking at a black cat. We tend to see both the cat and its colour as the same at different times. Despite the ease with which this perception occurs, the process by which we perceive is fairly complex. The initial stimulation that gives rise to seeing, consists in a pattern of light that projects on the retina – a light-sensitive layer of the eye. The so-called ‘retinal image’ is a two-dimensional projection that does not correspond in any obvious manner to the way things look. It is not three-dimensional, coloured and shaped in a similar fashion to the objects of our experience. Indeed the light projected from objects is not just different from what we see, it is also both continuously changing and ambiguous. Because the cat moves around, the light it reflects changes from moment to moment. The cat’s projection on the retina correspondingly changes in size. We do not, however, see the cat as changing in size. We tend to see it as size-constant and uniformly coloured through time. How do we explain this constancy? Along similar lines, the cat’s white paws cause on the retina a patch of light that differs in intensity from the rest. This patch could also be caused by a change in illumination. A black surface illuminated very brightly can look like a white surface illuminated very dimly. This means that the light hitting the retina from the paws is underdetermined – it does not uniquely specify what is present. But, again, we tend to see the paws as consistently white. We do not see them as shifting from being white to being black, but illuminated brightly. How do we explain this stability? A central aim of theories of vision is to answer these questions. The science that attempts to address these queries is interdisciplinary. Traditionally, philosophical theories of vision have influenced psychological theories and vice versa. The collaboration between these disciplines eventually developed into what is now known as cognitive science. Cognitive science includes – in addition to philosophy and psychology – computer science, linguistics and neuroscience. Cognitive scientists aim primarily to understand the process by which we see. Philosophers are interested in this topic particularly as it connects to understanding the nature of our acquaintance with reality. Theories of vision differ along many dimensions. Giving a full survey is not possible in this entry. One useful difference is whether a theory presumes that visual perception involves a psychological process. Psychological theories of vision hold that in achieving perception – which is itself a psychological state – the organism uses other psychological material. Opponents of psychological theories prefer to make reference to physiological, mechanical and neurophysiological explanations.


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