Ontology I: From Brain to World–Brain Relation

2018 ◽  
pp. 239-268
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Relational View ◽  
Time And Space ◽  
The World ◽  
Ontological Dimension ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Brain

How can we account for the brain’s existence and reality? I now shift my focus from the empirical (Part I and II) context in the previous chapters to the ontological dimension. Specifically, I focus on an “ontology of brain” as part of a wider “philosophy of brain” (Northoff 2004). Based on the empirical data, I argue that the brain’s existence and reality is based on structure and relation rather than elements like properties. This makes possible to determine the brain’s existence and reality by world-brain relation rather than physical or mental properties within the brain itself. That is well compatible with ontic structural realism (OSR). More specifically, the world-brain relation can be understood in spatiotemporal terms entailing what I describe as “spatiotemporal ontology”. Time and space are here no longer understood in observational terms, e.g., “observational time and space”, but rather as relational in the sense of OSR, i.e., “relational time and space”. Taken together, I ontologically characterize the brain by world-brain relation presupposing relation and structure as in OSR. This amounts to a “relational view” of the brain in our “ontology of brain”. Such relational view of the brain’s existence and reality can be specified by “relational time and space” (as I say) as distinguished from “observational time and space”. That opens the door for a novel ontological characterization of consciousness in the terms of world-brain relation and OSR – this shall be the focus in the next chapter.

Ontology II: From World–Brain Relation to Consciousness

2018 ◽  
pp. 269-314
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Physical Features ◽  
The Brain

How can we account for the existence and reality of consciousness and mental features in general? The present chapter complements the previous one by shifting the focus from the ontological determination of the brain to consciousness. I characterized the brain’s existence and reality by world-brain relation for which I presupposed relation and structure as basic units of existence and reality. This entails structural realism, that is, ontic structural realism (OSR). I now apply the definition of the brain by world-brain relation and OSR to consciousness. The main point is that I extend the spatiotemporal definition of world-brain relation to consciousness, that is, its phenomenal features as distinguished from neuronal (and physical) features (while leaving out other features of consciousness like cognitive features; chapter 7). Specifically, I argue that the world-brain relation provides the necessary non-sufficient ontological condition of possible consciousness, the “ontological predisposition of consciousness” (OPC) as I say. The world-brain relation is characterized by spatiotemporal structure with relational time and space which makes possible “upward spatiotemporal entailment” of consciousness. Accordingly, consciousness is entailed spatiotemporally by world-brain relation; this, in turn, makes possible necessary (rather than contingent) a posteriori ontological connection between brain and consciousness on the basis of their commonly underlying and shared world-brain relation. Importantly, this makes superfluous the introduction of the concept of mind to account for necessary connection of mental features to their underlying ontological basis. Therefore, I suggest replacing the concept of mind by the one of world-brain relation. This entails that the mind-body problem becomes superfluous and can be replaced by what I describe as “world-brain problem”.

Is Our Brain an Open or Closed System? Prediction Model of Brain and World–Brain Relation

2018 ◽  
pp. 55-76
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Model ◽  
Closed System ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Resting State ◽  
Clinical Symptoms ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
The Brain

Some recent philosophical discussions consider whether the brain is best understood as an open or closed system. This issue has major epistemic consequences akin to the scepticism engendered by the famous Cartesian demon. Specifically, one and the same empirical theory of brain function, predictive coding, entailing a prediction model of brain, have been associated with contradictory views of the brain as either open (Clark, 2012, 2013) or closed (Hohwy, 2013, 2014). Based on recent empirical evidence, the present paper argues that contrary to appearances, these views of the brain are compatible with one another. I suggest that there are two main forms of neural activity in the brain, one of which can be characterized as open, and the other as closed. Stimulus-induced activity, because it relies on predictive coding is indeed closed to the world, which entails that in certain respects, the brain is an inferentially secluded and self-evidencing system. In contrast, the brain’s resting state or spontaneous activity is best taken as open because it is a world-evidencing system that allows for the brain’s neural activity to align with the statistically-based spatiotemporal structure of objects and events in the world. This model requires an important caveat, however. Due to its statistically-based nature, the resting state’s alignment to the world comes in degrees. In extreme cases, the degree of alignment can be extremely low, resulting in a resting state that is barely if at all aligned to the world. This is for instance the case in schizophrenia. Clinical symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations in schizophrenics are indicative of the fundamental delicateness of the alignment between the brain’s resting-state and the world’s phenomena. Nevertheless, I argue that so long as we are dealing with a well-functioning brain, the more dire epistemic implications of predictive coding can be forestalled. That the brain is in part a self-evidencing system does not yield any generalizable reason to worry that human cognition is out of step with the real world. Instead, the brain is aligned to the world accounting for “world-brain relation” that mitigates sceptistic worries.

Conclusion: Copernican Revolution—Is the Brain’s Spontaneous Activity an Empirical, Epistemic, and Ontological Game Changer in Neuroscience and Philosophy?

2018 ◽  
pp. 435-438
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Spontaneous Activity ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Game Changer

Are the brain and its spontaneous activity a “game changer” in our pursuit of the question of the existence and reality of mental features? A game changer is something that allows to take something into view that hitherto remained invisible and was not yet discovered. That, for instance, makes it possible to raise a novel question or problem replacing the previous one. I argue that the brain’s spontaneous activity is indeed a game changer in this sense, an “empirical and ontological game changer” in that it allows us to replace the mind–body problem with the world–brain problem....

Ontology III: From the World to Consciousness

2018 ◽  
pp. 315-348
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Main Argument ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Spatiotemporal Scale ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
The Brain

Summary I so far focused mainly on the brain and how it is related to consciousness. This let me suppose that the brain, through its relation to the world, i.e., the world-brain relation, is necessary connected to consciousness (chapter 10). While this highlighted the central importance of the brain for the existence and reality of consciousness, the world itself and its ontological role were rather neglected so far – that shall be the focus in this chapter. My main argument is that the world is indispensable for consciousness and mental features in general: without world, there could no world-brain relation, which, in turn, renders impossible consciousness. I will discuss the role of the world for consciousness in terms of three arguments, the “argument of calibration”, the “argument of structure”, and the “argument of location”. First, as discussed in the “argument of calibration”, the world serves as “spatiotemporal frame”; this makes it possible for world-brain relation to serve as “spatiotemporal baseline” and “space of possible experience” for calibrating the possible objects or events for consciousness. That, as I argue, is central for yielding specifically the phenomenal features of consciousness. Secondly, as discussed in the “argument of structure”, the world itself can ontologically be characterized by “spatiotemporal nestedness”: the brain and its smaller spatiotemporal scale are contained and nested within the larger spatiotemporal scale of the world. Such “spatiotemporal nestedness” is an ontological feature of the world which is necessary for and makes possible, i.e., predisposes, consciousness. Finally, as discussed in the “argument of location”, the world allows for “complex location” of both brain and consciousness as part of and within the world as distinguished from both “simple location” and “non-location”. In sum, inclusion of the world in our ontology is indispensable if one wants to understand the existence and reality of mental features which, if reduced or limited to either brain or mind, remain unclear. I conclude that we need to include both world and brain including their relation, i.e., world-brain relation, in our ontology of consciousness – this amounts to what I describe as world-brain problem. Otherwise, when considering either brain or world alone as in “brain problem” and “world-problem” as I say, one leaves a gap between world and brain which makes it impossible to account for the existence and reality of mental features like consciousness.

Characterization of Ischemic Stroke in CT Images using Image Processing

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Amal Alzain ◽  
Suhaib Alameen ◽  
Rani Elmaki ◽  
Mohamed E. M. Gar-Elnabi
Keyword(s):  
Ischemic Stroke ◽  
White Matter ◽  
Classification Accuracy ◽  
Ct Images ◽  
Gray Level ◽  
Level Variation ◽  
Interactive Data ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Brain Tissues

This study concern to characterize the brain tissues to ischemic stroke, gray matter, white matter and CSF using texture analysisto extract classification features from CT images. The First Order Statistic techniques included sevenfeatures. To find the gray level variation in CT images it complements the FOS features extracted from CT images withgray level in pixels and estimate the variation of thesubpatterns. analyzing the image with Interactive Data Language IDL software to measure the grey level of images. The results show that the Gray Level variation and   features give classification accuracy of ischemic stroke 97.6%, gray matter95.2%, white matter 97.3% and the CSF classification accuracy 98.0%. The overall classification accuracy of brain tissues 97.0%.These relationships are stored in a Texture Dictionary that can be later used to automatically annotate new CT images with the appropriate brain tissues names.

Pelvic schwannoma

GYNECOLOGY ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 84-86
Author(s):  
Sergei P. Sinchikhin ◽  
Sarkis G. Magakyan ◽  
Oganes G. Magakyan
Keyword(s):  
Auditory Nerve ◽  
World Literature ◽  
Morphological Study ◽  
Clinical Observation ◽  
Nerve Trunk ◽  
Practical Case ◽  
Surgical Volume ◽  
The World ◽  
Brain And Spinal Cord ◽  
The Brain

Relevance.A neoplasm originated from the myelonic sheath of the nerve trunk is called neurinoma or neurilemmoma, neurinoma, schwannoglioma, schwannoma. This tumor can cause compression and dysfunction of adjacent tissues and organs. The most common are the auditory nerve neurinomas (1 case per 100 000 population per year), the brain and spinal cord neurinomas are rare. In the world literature, there is no information on the occurrences of this tumor in the pelvic region. Description.Presented below is a clinical observation of a 30-year-old patient who was scheduled for myomectomy. During laparoscopy, an unusual tumor of the small pelvis was found and radically removed. A morphological study allowed to identify the remote neoplasm as a neuroma. Conclusion.The presented practical case shows that any tumor can hide under a clinical mask of another disease. The qualification of the doctor performing laparoscopic myomectomy should be sufficient to carry out, if necessary, another surgical volume.

Consciousness, law of nature, and nomological determinism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Important Thing ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
The World ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Brain

Nomological determinism does not mean everything is predictable. It just means everything follows the law of nature. And the most important thing Is that the brain and consciousness follow the law of nature. In other words, there is no free will. Without life, brain and consciousness, the world follows law of nature, that is clear. The life and brain are also part of nature, and they follow the law of nature. This is due to scientific findings. There are not enough scientific findings for consciousness yet. But I think that the consciousness is a nature phenomenon, and it also follows the law of nature.

Exploring the abnormal signal transduction mediated internet addiction and gaming disorders

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bhumika Chauhan ◽  
Sisir Nandi
Keyword(s):  
Signal Transduction ◽  
Internet Addiction ◽  
Internet Gaming Disorder ◽  
Online Data ◽  
Abnormal Signal ◽  
Internet Gaming ◽  
The World ◽  
Loss Of Appetite ◽  
Sleeping Disorder ◽  
The Brain

: The world is connected by the internet. It is very useful because we use Google to find out any new topic, to search new places, to quest updated research, and to get knowledge for learnng. The person around the world can communicate with each other through the Google video conference talk. Internet is frequently used in smartphones, laptops, desktop, and tablet. Excessive affinity towards internet-based online data collection, downloading pictures, videos, cyber relationships, and social media may produce addiction disorders followed by different symptoms such as behaviors change, mind disturbance, depression, anxiety, loss of appetite hyperactivity, sleeping disorder, headache, visual fatigueness, trafficking of memory, attention-deficit, loss of efficiency in work and social detachment which may be caused by an imbalance of neurotransmitters. This is very difficult to control because of abnormal signal transduction in the brain. The present study is an attempt to discuss internet addiction disorder (IAD), internet gaming disorder (IGD), and give awareness to society to get rid of this addiction.

Delving into Horror

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 135-150
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Time And Space ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Perception Of Time ◽  
Definition Of

The springboard for this essay is the author’s encounter with the feeling of horror and her attempts to understand what place horror has in philosophy. The inquiry relies upon Leonid Lipavsky’s “Investigation of Horror” and on various textual plunges into the fanged and clawed (and possibly noumenal) abyss of Nick Land’s work. Various experiences of horror are examined in order to build something of a typology, while also distilling the elements characteristic of the experience of horror in general. The essay’s overall hypothesis is that horror arises from a disruption of the usual ways of determining the boundaries between external things and the self, and this leads to a distinction between three subtypes of horror. In the first subtype, horror begins with the indeterminacy at the boundaries of things, a confrontation with something that defeats attempts to define it and thereby calls into question the definition of the self. In the second subtype, horror springs from the inability to determine one’s own boundaries, a process opposed by the crushing determinacy of the world. In the third subtype, horror unfolds by means of a substitution of one determinacy by another which is unexpected and ungrounded. In all three subtypes of horror, the disturbance of determinacy deprives the subject, the thinking entity, of its customary foundation for thought, and even of an explanation of how that foundation was lost; at times this can lead to impairment of the perception of time and space. Understood this way, horror comes within a hair’s breadth of madness - and may well cross over into it.

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