Mutual Recognition of Driving Licences in the EU – Current State of Integration and Perspectives

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 37-60
Author(s):  
Meinhard Schröder

A driving licence is a document and an administrative act, which is, according to the principle of territoriality, only valid in the territory of the issuing State. This is incompatible with practical needs of international traffic, and mutual recognition helps to overcome the problem. This article presents the development of mutual recognition of driving licences in the EU, from pre-existing public international law to current harmonising legislation and the relevant ECJ jurisprudence. It finds that once there was sufficient harmonisation, the ECJ promoted mutual recognition, while the EU legislator had to close the loopholes for 'driving licence tourism' by amending the directives. Unlike in other areas of the internal market, primary law never played an important role for the mutual recognition of driving licences. Determining the current state of integration, the article identifies a lack of information exchange between Member States and a lack of harmonisation of sanctions as main obstacles for full, unconditional recognition, and proposes ways leading towards an 'internal market of driving licences'.

2015 ◽  
pp. 289-306
Author(s):  
Tijana Surlan

Recognition is an instrument of the public international law founded in the classical international law. Still, it preserves its main characteristics formed in the period when states dominated as the only legal persons in international community. Nevertheless, the instrument of recognition is today as vibrant as ever. As long as it does not have a uniform legal definition and means of application, it leaves room to be applied to very specific cases. In this paper, the instrument of recognition is elaborated from two aspects - theoretical and practical. First (theoretical) part of the paper presents main characteristics of the notion of recognition, as presented in main international law theories - declaratory and constitutive theory. Other part of the paper is focused on the recognition in the case of Kosovo. Within this part, main constitutive elements of state are elaborated, with special attention to Kosovo as self-proclaimed state. Conclusion is that Kosovo does not fulfill main constitutive elements of state. It is not an independent and sovereign state. It is in the status of internationalized entity, with four international missions on the field with competencies in the major fields of state authority - police, judiciary system, prosecution system, army, human rights, etc. Main normative framework for the status of Kosovo is still the UN Resolution 1244. It is also the legal ground for international missions, confirming non-independent status of Kosovo. States that recognized Kosovo despite this deficiency promote the constitutive theory of recognition, while states not recognizing Kosovo promote declaratory theory. Brussels Agreement, signed by representatives of Serbia and Kosovo under the auspices of the EU, has also been elaborated through the notion of recognition - (1) whether it represents recognition; (2) from the perspective of consequences it provokes in relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Official position of Serbian Government is clear - Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state. On the other hand, subject matter of Brussels Agreement creates new means of improvement for Kosovo authorities in the north part of Kosovo. Thus, Serbian position regarding the recognition is twofold - it does not recognize Kosovo in foro externo, and it completes its competences in foro domestico. What has been underlined through the paper and confirmed in the conclusion is that there is not a recognition which has the power to create a state and there is not a non-recognition which has the power to annul a state.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 603-628
Author(s):  
GUY HARPAZ

AbstractThe EU's consistent policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been that Israel's presence in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip (prior to the 2005 disengagement) and the Golan Heights is subject to the laws of belligerent occupation, that any purported Israeli annexation is illegal and null and void, that Israel's settlements in the Territories are in breach of public international law and constitute a serious obstacle to peace, and that Israel and Palestine should settle their conflict on the basis of public international law and through the two-state solution. In recent years the EU attempted to concretize this policy through its trade and trade-related agreements with Israel, withholding the benefits of EU-Israeli co-operation from companies and research institutions based in the Territories or operating therein, as well as from products produced therein (the New Approach). Thus, from the EU perception, the New Approach towards the long-standing conflict and its reliance on international law may be seen as an instrument to reinforce internal and external legitimacy, buttress identity cohesiveness and as a manifestation of its more robust effectiveness. But this article seeks to conduct a more careful and balanced analysis of the New Approach and in doing so to reveal that the EU's (almost) exclusive focus on non-governmental entities, such as corporations situated in the Territories, and on Territories’ products, is misplaced in terms of public international law and effectiveness. The New Approach's deficiencies, in abstracto and in concreto, as evaluated in this article, are likely to prevent it from serving as a paradigm shift in EU-Israel relations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 101-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vassilis Hatzopoulos

AbstractAt least three generations of governance methods have been—and are still being—used for the regulation of the internal market: the classic EU method, leading to harmonisation and (more rarely) unification; the ‘new approach’ based on mutual recognition and the use of standards; and ‘new governance’ which does not entail any formal delegation of powers to the EU and operates through self-regulation, the creation of EU agencies and networks, administrative cooperation and other means of open coordination. It is impossible to establish either a hierarchy or a clear chronological order between these methods, while it is also quite difficult to reach a clear conclusion as to their efficiency. What is certain is that all methods of governance are under constant adjustment and that they all feed into one another in order to secure the smooth operation of the internal market. The interaction between these methods is the topic of the present chapter.


1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 533-550
Author(s):  
Klea Vyshka

This article offers a reading of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) from a private international law perspective (PIL). The developments that the CJEU thus gave start to in the field of company law, and especially in EU citizenship, invites for a reshaping of the balances between Union law and Member State private international laws, especially in the field of methods of application. This article aims to shed light into the question ‘To what extent has the EU citizenship as a connecting factor in the context of a Europeanized PIL changed the PIL traditional methods of application?’ The host Member State is obliged to recognize the duly created rights in the original Member State, with respect to the mutual recognition principle. The return of the vested rights theory as opposed to the use of the traditional conflict-of-law approach seems on its way.


2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Marsden

This article examines the opportunities for individuals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to obtain access to justice in the European Union (EU) via international law. In the context of the first part of a concluded case before the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC), it reviews the EU rules that restrict standing and examines whether the preliminary reference procedure from Member State courts provides an effective alternative to direct access to EU courts. Based on the general findings and recommendations, and analysis of the relationship between international and EU law, it is argued that there remains a need for greater EU compliance with the Convention, with the implication that EU primary as well as secondary law may need to be reformed if public international law obligations are to be fully met.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Ewa Kamarad

The Term ‘Spouse’ in EU Law – Comments on the Judgment in the Coman Case (C‑ 673‑16) The paper concerns the judgment of 5 June 2018 issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Coman case (C‑673‑16), in which the Court for the first time defined the term ‘spouse’ for the purpose of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. It discusses the consequences of the judgement and its relation to the traditional mechanisms of private international law and the EU principle of mutual recognition.


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