Bullets Not Ballots

Author(s):  
Jacqueline L. Hazelton

This book challenges the claim that winning “hearts and minds” is critical to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Good governance, this conventional wisdom holds, gains the besieged government popular support, denies support to the insurgency, and makes military victory possible. The book argues that major counterinsurgent successes since World War II have resulted not through democratic reforms but rather through the use of military force against civilians and the co-optation of rival elites. The book offers new analyses of five historical cases frequently held up as examples of the effectiveness of good governance in ending rebellions — the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, and the Salvadoran Civil War — to show that, although unpalatable, it was really brutal repression and bribery that brought each conflict to an end. By showing how compellence works in intrastate conflicts, the book makes clear that whether or not the international community decides these human, moral, and material costs are acceptable, responsible policymaking requires recognizing the actual components of counterinsurgent success — and the limited influence that external powers have over the tactics of counterinsurgent elites.

2021 ◽  
pp. 29-80
Author(s):  
Jacqueline L. Hazelton

This chapter examines support for the compellence theory in three cases: the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, and the Philippines' campaign against the Huk insurgency. In the British campaign in Malaya, 1948–1957, the colonial government defeated a small, isolated Communist insurgency that failed to gain political traction even within the population of impoverished ethnic Chinese rubber plantation workers that it targeted as its often-unwilling base of support. In Greece in 1947–1949, the United States backed the repressive, fragile post-World War II Greek government and built its military capacity sufficiently to defeat the Communist and nationalist insurgents. In the Philippines in 1946–1954, the United States backed the Philippine government as a bulwark against Communist expansion in Asia, pressing for major governance reforms while building Philippine security forces. In all three cases, elite accommodation played a significant role in the counterinsurgent's ability to defeat the insurgency militarily, with the type of elite involved varying by case; uses of force included forcefully controlling civilians; and uses of force broke the insurgency before reforms were implemented, if they were implemented at all, as the compellence theory predicts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-156
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Timofeev

The article considers the perception of World War II in modern Serbian society. Despite the stability of Serbian-Russian shared historical memory, the attitudes of both countries towards World wars differ. There is a huge contrast in the perception of the First and Second World War in Russian and Serbian societies. For the Serbs the events of World War II are obscured by the memories of the Civil War, which broke out in the country immediately after the occupation in 1941 and continued several years after 1945. Over 70% of Yugoslavs killed during the Second World War were slaughtered by the citizens of former Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The terror unleashed by Tito in the first postwar decade in 1944-1954 was proportionally bloodier than Stalin repressions in the postwar USSR. The number of emigrants from Yugoslavia after the establishment of the Tito's dictatorship was proportionally equal to the number of refugees from Russia after the Civil War (1,5-2% of prewar population). In the post-war years, open manipulations with the obvious facts of World War II took place in Tito's Yugoslavia. In the 1990s the memories repressed during the communist years were set free and publicly debated. After the fall of the one-party system the memory of World War II was devalued. The memory of the Russian-Serbian military fraternity forged during the World War II began to revive in Serbia due to the foreign policy changes in 2008. In October 2008 the President of Russia paid a visit to Serbia which began the process of (re) construction of World War II in Serbian historical memory. According to the public opinion surveys, a positive attitude towards Russia and Russians in Serbia strengthens the memories on general resistance to Nazism with memories of fratricide during the civil conflict events of 1941-1945 still dominating in Serbian society.


Author(s):  
Emily Robins Sharpe

The Jewish Canadian writer Miriam Waddington returned repeatedly to the subject of the Spanish Civil War, searching for hope amid the ruins of Spanish democracy. The conflict, a prelude to World War II, inspired an outpouring of literature and volunteerism. My paper argues for Waddington’s unique poetic perspective, in which she represents the Holocaust as the Spanish Civil War’s outgrowth while highlighting the deeply personal repercussions of the war – consequences for women, for the earth, and for community. Waddington’s poetry connects women’s rights to human rights, Canadian peace to European war, and Jewish persecution to Spanish carnage.


1966 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Spector

On his mother's side, W. Cameron Forbes was the grandson of Ralph Waldo Emerson, and on his father's, the grandson of John Murray Forbes, who made his fortune in the China clipper trade. He carried in his heredity the shrewd business ability of the one and the liberalism of the other. In Hofstadter's turn of phrase, he was the patrician as liberal. His wealth, his education — the best available (Milton Academy, Hopkinson School, Harvard) — would have entitled him to admittance to the innermost recesses of post-Civil War Republicanism. Yet he remained at best only affiliated with that party, and at heart an outspoken Independent. In 1892, on graduation from Harvard, he joined Stone and Webster, later gained experience in business as officer and director of several Boston banks, and then, just before the turn of the century, joined the family firm of J. M. Forbes and Co., Merchants.


Author(s):  
Christopher Phillips

This chapter details Russia's decision to send its air force to directly support Assad in late summer 2015 — what motivated this dramatic mobilisation and what impact it had on the conflict. Russia's involvement suddenly raised the stakes and the consequences for the Syrian civil war. The rebel resurgence of spring 2015 provoked real fears of Assad's collapse in Moscow and Tehran, resulting in the Vienna Process along with ceasefire and peace talks. However, while Russia's intervention likely prevented any prospect of sudden regime collapse, it did not change the fundamental structure of the civil war and thus was unlikely to lead to a decisive regime military victory. What it did was create a better negotiating position for pro-Assad forces — which may have been Putin's intention all along.


Author(s):  
Jörg Baberowski

This chapter examines the aftermath of the Bolsheviks' victory over both the Whites, or counterrevolutionaries, and all rival socialists. The Bolsheviks broke the military resistance of the Whites, crushed the unrest and strikes of the peasants, and even restored the multiethnic empire, which, in the early months of revolution, had largely fallen apart. In spring 1921, when the Red Army marched into Georgia, the Civil War was officially over. For the Bolsheviks, however, military victory was not the end but rather the beginning of a mission, not simply to shake the world but to transform it. Although weapons may have decided the war in favor of the revolutionaries they had not settled the question of power. This chapter considers Vladimir Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) that would implement economic reforms, the Bolsheviks' failure to carry power into villages, and the dictatorship's lack of support from the proletariat. It also describes the nationalization of the Russian empire and Joseph Stalin's rise to power.


Author(s):  
Ирина Борисовна Белова

Статья посвящена общественно-политической и социально-экономической ситуации в период Гражданской войны (1917-1922 гг.) в Калужской губернии, одной из центральных губерний Европейской России, находившейся вне театра военных действий. Автором освещён сложный процесс прихода к власти большевиков, который завершился только под угрозой применения ими вооруженной силы против защитников прежней власти. В статье показаны формы сопротивления населения большевистской политике «военного коммунизма», способы реагирования власти на сопротивление, конец и итоги этой политики. Автор отмечает, что катастрофическая ситуация с продовольственным снабжением в губернии способствовала стихийному бегству коренного и беженского населения в производящие юго-восточные регионы и за Урал. The article deals with the sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation in Kaluga province which was one of the central provinces in European part of Russia outside the theatre of operations during the Civil war (1917-1922).The author highlights the complex process of Bolsheviks installation which was completed only after they threatened to use military force against the defenders of the former regime. The article covers the forms in which the population of the province resisted the Bolshevik policy of «military communism», the ways the authorities reacted to the resistance and the outcome of this policy. The author points out that the catastrophic situation with food supply contributed to chaotic exodus of the natives and the refugees to the producing south-east regions and behind the Urals.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 336-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Walch

How do natural disasters affect rebel group recruitment? Some influential research to date suggests that natural disasters – by lowering the opportunity cost of joining an armed movement – are likely to facilitate rebel group recruitment. In contrast, this study argues that natural disasters can negatively affect rebel organization and their recruitment efforts. It posits that natural disasters may weaken rebel groups in two main interrelated ways: (1) by leading to acute scarcity for rebel combatants and supporters, weakening the rebel group’s organizational structure and supply lines, and (2) by increasing government and international presence in areas where the insurgents operate. Empirically, this article explores these suggested mechanisms in two cases of natural disasters in the Philippines (typhoons Bopha in 2012 and Haiyan in 2013), which affected regions partially controlled by the communist rebel group, the New People’s Army (NPA). Based on data from extensive fieldwork, there is no evidence suggesting a boom in rebel recruitment in the wake of the typhoons. Rather, the NPA was temporarily weakened following the tropical storms, significantly impacting the civil war dynamics in the Philippines.


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