NIEHS Oil Spill Health and Safety Training: Learning from Deepwater Horizon to Improve Future Response Training

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2129-2146
Author(s):  
Joseph T. Hughes ◽  
Scott Rudolph

ABSTRACT: When the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig exploded on April 20, 2010, in the Gulf of Mexico, the United States faced an enormous challenge. The massive oil release had significant consequences in the region for the environment and for human health. The U.S. government has plans in place for an emergency response to disasters, and these plans are based on experiences during previous disasters, including the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the World Trade Center (WTC) disaster, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. After each disaster, the emergency response was evaluated and analysis of lessons learned led to revised emergency response plans for oil spills and for other types of disasters. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon event, the National Contingency Plan (NCP) was activated. The disaster response was implemented rapidly on a huge scale. Numerous governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, local groups, and BP employees and contractors were engaged. Over 47,000 cleanup workers were trained to deal with the oil release. (See Table One) Over time, concerns have been raised about the health of cleanup workers, and the monitoring of their health continues.Table One:DWH Workforce Metrics The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) Worker Education and Training Program (WETP) held a workshop in Mobile, AL on May 4–5, 2011 that included a broad range of participants who were involved in the Deepwater Horizon response. This paper summarizes findings from the workshop report of what worked and what did not work as the basis for improvements in preparedness for future disasters. Specifically, workshop findings and recommendations focused on two topics: community engagement in the response process and the development of safety training for non-professional cleanup workers. The dialogue revealed that local community resources were utilized during the Deepwater Horizon response. However, workshop attendees noted areas for improving community engagement. They expressed that communities possess unparalleled knowledge of their local environments and can provide a valuable workforce to support response efforts. Workshop participants also called attention to a need to consider local community health issues in the response plan, so that information, appropriate medical care, and other health needs are addressed rapidly. While worker training was implemented quickly, training quality needs improvement. Issues around appropriate pre-incident training need to be addressed by OSHA and others responsible for worker protection. The Deepwater Horizon oil release was a disaster that called upon the U.S. to assemble and deploy tremendous resources to address an evolving challenge. The response was rapid, resilient, and in many ways effective. Workshop participant experience documents areas for improvement. The government has taken experiences from previous disasters to revise national disaster response plans. Deepwater Horizon response, as summarized in this report, can be applied to further improve worker safety and health training so that emergency responses to future disasters can more effectively address the challenges and needs of those involved in the event.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1635-1652
Author(s):  
Sue Ann Sarpy ◽  
Michael J. Burke

(1) Background: In this case study, we examined the safety-training-related experiences of individuals from six racial-ethnic groups (Asians (Vietnamese), Blacks, Hispanics, Isleños, Native Americans, and Whites) involved in the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. (2) Methods: We assessed, via a survey, 495 disaster response trainees’ reactions to the design and delivery of training, learning, safety performance, and injury and illness experience. (3) Results: Our results showed statistically significant racial-ethnic group differences with respect to reactions to training, components of learning (i.e., cognitive, skill, and affective), and safety performance (i.e., use of personal protective equipment, engaging in safe work practices, communicating of safety information, and exercising employee rights and responsibilities). In general, Asians and Isleños group members had lower reactions to training, self-reported learning, and safety performance. Additionally, we found that the safety climate interacted with learning to positively affect safety performance. (4) Conclusions: We discuss the implications of our findings for improving the quality of safety training in relation to addressing language and literacy concerns, developing training that is useful and engaging for volunteer and other cleanup workers from the contaminated region, and promoting a positive safety climate to enhance training transfer.


2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (9) ◽  
pp. 1189-1213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis DeSipio

In this article, the author analyzes five domains of immigrant incorporation and participation in the United States—civic and community engagement among immigrants; naturalization patterns; immigrant (and co-ethnic) partisanship and electoral behaviors; the election of naturalized citizens, and their U.S.-born co-ethnics, as elective officeholders; and immigrant transnational efforts to influence the civic or political life of their communities or countries of origin—in an effort to highlight both the opportunities immigrants and naturalized citizens have seized in U.S. politics and the barriers, particularly, institutional barriers, they continue to face. Although the primary analytical focus is immigrants in the United States, the author is attentive to the challenge raised by Irene Bloemraad (2011 [this issue]) in her introductory article to identify opportunities for comparative insights from the Canadian case. As will be evident, the author ultimately identifies more apples and oranges in the comparison of the U.S. and Canadian cases than peas sharing an analytical pod.


Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) Regency is part of the South Sumatra Province whose area is prone to flooding and fire. As for the tropical region, OKI also has two extreme seasons between the rainy and dry seasons. In the dry season is a prone period of forest and land fires, while in the raining season, its prone to flooding. This study aimed to conduct Disaster Management in Wetland Settlements at Ogan Komering Ilir Regency. The method was using qualitative study design with six informant that consist of six local community and two key informant from worker of Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah and Dinas Kesehatan OKI. The result showed that disaster management was classified into four phase. First, the phase of prevention and mitigation that analyzed socialization efforts conducted in OKI were distribution of leaflets and posters. Then, phase of disaster preparedness showed preparedness program in OKI has not been implemented optimally. In disaster emergency response phase discovered no specific procedure in disaster management. Moreover, the phase of disaster recovery indicated that collaborative efforts with multi-sector stakeholders have been conducted. It can be concluded to prepare Disaster Response Village Programs in Ogan Komering Ilir.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-6
Author(s):  
Alan P. Bentz ◽  
Stanley L. Smith

ABSTRACT In several recent court cases, evidence of an oil “fingerprint” has been used to identify the source of an oil spill. As a result, those responsible for the spill have been required to pay a civil penalty and to reimburse the United States for the cost of cleaning up the oil. The use of such evidence in court supports the conclusion that the U.S. Coast Guard's oil spill identification system is both scientifically and legally sound.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis Harris ◽  
Tawny Waltz ◽  
James Patrick O’Neal ◽  
Kelly Nadeau ◽  
Matthew Crumpton ◽  
...  

AbstractThe watershed events of September 11, 2001; the anthrax attacks; Hurricane Katrina; and H1N1 necessitated that the United States define alternative mechanisms for disaster response. Specifically, there was a need to shift from a capacity building approach to a capabilities based approach that would place more emphasis on the health care community rather than just first responders. Georgia responded to this initiative by creating a Regional Coordinating Hospital (RCH) infrastructure that was responsible for coordinating regional responses within their individual geographic footprint. However, it was quickly realized that hospitals could not accomplish community-wide preparedness as a single entity and that siloed planning must come to an end. To reconcile this issue, Georgia responded to the 2012 US Department of Health and Human Services concept of coalitions. Georgia utilized the existing RCH boundaries to define its coalition regions and began inviting all medical and nonmedical response partners to the planning table (nursing homes, community health centers, volunteer groups, law enforcement, etc). This new collaboration effectively enhanced emergency response practices in Georgia, but also identified additional preparedness-related gaps that will require attention as our coalitions continue to grow and mature.(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2016;10:174–179)


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelsie L. Kelly ◽  
Caz M. Taylor

Blue crabs, Callinectes sapidus Rathbun, 1896, are ubiquitous along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States. These organisms play an integral role in the ecosystems of the Gulf of Mexico (GOM), where not only are they a keystone species, but are also socioeconomically important. The survival of embryonated eggs is necessary to ensure adequate recruitment into the next generation. Because the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill (DWH) occurred during the peak of the blue crab spawning season, the incident likely impacted blue crab embryos. In order to assess the effect of oil on embryonic growth and development, we collected embryonated eggs from seven different female blue crabs from the GOM throughout the spawning season and exposed them to an oil concentration of 500 ppb (the approximate concentration of oil at the surface water near the site of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig). Exposure to oil at this concentration caused a significantly larger proportion of prezoeae versus zoeae to hatch from embryonated eggs in experiments lasting longer than 4 days. Exposure to oil did not significantly affect overall survival or development rate. The prezoeal stage is a little-studied stage of blue crab development. Though it may or may not be a normal stage of development, this stage has been found to occur in suboptimal conditions and has lower survival than zoeal stages. The larger proportion of prezoeae following prolonged exposure to oil thus indicates that crude oil at concentrations likely to be experienced by crabs after the DWH spill negatively impacted the development of blue crab embryos. In addition to providing insight into the effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, this study sheds light on embryonic development in blue crabs, a critical, but poorly investigated phase of this important species’ life cycle.


Author(s):  
John Collier ◽  
Srijith Balakrishnan ◽  
Zhanmin Zhang

AbstractOver the past years, the frequency and scope of disasters affecting the United States have significantly increased. Government agencies have made efforts in improving the nation’s disaster response framework to minimize fatalities and economic loss due to disasters. Disaster response has evolved with the emergency management agencies incorporating systematic changes in their organization and emergency response functions to accommodate lessons learned from past disaster events. Technological advancements in disaster response have also improved the agencies’ ability to prepare for and respond to natural hazards. The transportation and logistics sector has a primary role in emergency response during and after disasters. In this light, this paper seeks to identify how effective policy changes and new technology have aided the transportation and logistics sector in emergency response and identify gaps in current practices for further improvement. Specifically, this study compares and contrasts the transportation and logistical support to emergency relief efforts during and after two major Hurricane events in the U.S., namely Hurricane Katrina (which affected New Orleans in 2005) and Hurricane Harvey (which affected Houston in 2017). This comparison intends to outline the major steps taken by the government and the private entities in the transportation and logistics sector to facilitate emergency response and the issues faced during the process. Finally, the paper summarizes the lessons learned from both the Hurricane events and provides recommendations for further improvements in transportation and logistical support to disaster response.


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