How partisan politics influence government policies in response to ageing populations

Since old-age programmes mitigate life-course risks that are relevant to individuals across socio-economic groups in ageing societies, all parties have a political incentive to support these initiatives. Nevertheless, pre-existing partisan commitments bind the policy instruments that parties use. Cabinet-level analyses of OECD economies demonstrate that left incumbency relies more on public expenditure than right-wing governments. What is more important is that, in the context of large elderly populations, pension coverage is greater under right-leaning governments, while pension replacement rates are higher in left-leaning governments. This shows that party behaviour related to life course-related policies cannot be explained by the conventional pro-expansion versus the pro-retrenchment partisan politics. Rather, a focus on partisan variation in the use of policy instruments is required.

Local Communities and Separate Space: The Zionist Stance on Jewish Settlement in Arab Cities—The Case of Acre

This article looks at the impact of harsh environmental conditions on the development of the Zionist narrative and the pursuit of Jewish urban settlement in Arab cities, specifically Acre. While overcoming adversity was part of the Zionist farming ethos, settling in areas that were environmentally challenging was one of the factors that kept the Zionist establishment from acknowledging or supporting urban Jewish settlement in Arab towns. In fact, the openly professed ideology of settling in such locations and creating mixed cities was implemented only in the few cases where an economic or political incentive existed. These incentives aside, environmental issues like swampy land and seasonal flooding were major inhibiting factors, not only affecting the scope of Jewish settlement but also the way they were addressed in the Zionist narrative.

Don’t Pass Deferred Maintenance Costs to the Next Generation!: The Effects of Politics on State Highway Maintenance Spending

Routine maintenance spending for public infrastructure is critical for reducing life-cycle costs, and improving asset preservation and quality. Yet, states focus more on building new roads and expansion than maintaining existing assets’ conditions. Deferred maintenance costs are transferred to the future taxpayers, and they will eventually pay the expensive price. So far, there is little academic endeavor to examine the determinants of state and local routine maintenance spending. This study uses a panel data analysis covering 47 states from 1995 to 2009 to examine the effects of politics on state highway routine maintenance spending. The study finds that political incentive and conflict are key factors delaying state highway routine maintenance spending. The re-election-minded governors and legislatures tend to allocate less funding to maintenance to satisfy the current taxpayers. The study further finds that politically-divided states spend less on highway maintenance due to higher transaction costs in the policy-making process.

The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public Support for Compliance with International Agreements: An Experimental Analysis of the Paris Agreement

How does naming and shaming affect public support for compliance with international agreements? We investigated this question by conducting survey experiments about the Paris Agreement, which relies on social pressure for enforcement. Our experiments, administered to national samples in the United States, produced three sets of findings. First, shaming by foreign countries shifted domestic public opinion in favor of compliance, increasing the political incentive to honor the Paris Agreement. Second, the effects of shaming varied with the behavior of the target. Shaming was more effective against partial compliers than against targets that took no action or honored their obligations completely. Moreover, even partial compliers managed to reduce the effects of shaming through the strategic use of counter-rhetoric. Third, identity moderated responses to shaming. Shaming by allies was not significantly more effective than shaming by non-allies, but Democrats were more receptive to shaming than Republicans. Overall, our experiments expose both the power and the limits of shaming as a strategy for enforcing the Paris Agreement. At the same time, they advance our understanding of the most significant environmental problem facing the planet.

Correction to: Running out of steam? A political incentive perspective of FDI inflows in China

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-021-00436-z

Adaptive Institutions and Networked Governance

Chapter 3 lays out the main argument of the book, that in the context of the invisibility bargain, a democratic government has a political incentive to prioritize the interests of citizens over migrants (even when formal institutions promise protections), and thus may be an inadequate guarantor of security in migrant-receiving areas. The resulting gaps in formal state protections can increase migrant vulnerability and escalate conflict between migrants and citizens. Governance networks that connect international organizations, nonstate actors and the state can emerge to fill these gaps, adapting innovative forms of governance that complement, substitute, or compete with state authority and security provision. More diverse and dense networks provide a greater number of potential access points through which migrants might gain the resources and protections they need to thrive in the host community. The chapter provides a theoretical framework for understanding how governance networks contribute to host-migrant human security.

La revocatoria de mandato en Colombia: diseño institucional y resultados de su aplicación // The Recall in Colombia: institutional design and results of its application

Resumen:Desde los años 90, tras la crisis del modelo de representación de masas característico de los Estados de Bienestar y el arribo de la llamada democracia de audiencia, propia de los Estados de la Era Global, varios paísesde América Latina emprendieron reformas constitucionales en las que, entre otros cambios, incorporaron mecanismos de participación y control ciudadano asociados a las concepciones participativa y directa de democracia, como ser: la iniciativa popular, la consulta popular, el presupuesto participativo y la revocatoria de mandato, entre otros. Esta última herramienta de accountability societal vertical permite a los ciudadanos destituir a los representantes por elloselegidos a través del voto en un referéndum, el que es convocado luego de que sus promotores hayan logrado reunir la cantidad de firmas mínimas requeridas para dar curso a la iniciativa popular de solicitud. Colombia la incorporó en su Constitución de 1991, pero solo para destituir a gobernadores y alcaldes. Es decir, autoridades ejecutivas del nivel subnacional, excluyendo por tanto al presidente y a los legisladores de todos los niveles. En el año 1994 dos leyes reglamentaron su ejercicio: la ley número 131 y la 134. En los años 2002 y 2015 se aprobaron modificaciones tendientes a disminuir sus requisitos: la ley número 741 y la 1.757, respectivamente. No obstante, habiéndose presentado numerosas solicitudes en sus más de 20 años de vigencia, ningún gobernante fue revocado hasta ahora. Este artículo se aboca por tanto a analizar, en primer lugar, el diseño institucional de la revocatoria de mandato en Colombia, para determinar si el mismo ha tendido a facilitar o a dificultar su uso por parte de la población. En igual sentido, se abordaron las sucesivas modificaciones realizadas a través de las mencionadas leyes, las que se orientaron a reducir requisitos claves como: la cantidad de firmas necesarias para acompañar la solicitud, la participación mínima exigida en el referéndum para validar la votación, el número de votos necesarios para destituir al mandatario, entre otros. Asimismo, se estudia el desempeño empírico de esta herramienta durante el período 1997-2015. Los resultados obtenidos indican que, a pesar de las reformas reglamentarias que redujeron en forma progresiva sus requisitos de implementación, y habiéndose presentado numerosas solicitudes, ningún mandatario fue revocado. Entre sus causas se identifica el incentivo político que el reemplazo del revocado vía elecciones implica para sus opositores interesados en arribar anticipadamente al poder. Sin embargo, el uso político electoral de este mecanismo, a manos de ex y futuros candidatos al cargo, no ha sido acompañado en las urnas de un apoyo popular suficiente para alcanzar las adhesiones mínimas requeridas para la revocación. De este modo, la revocatoria de mandato en Colombia funcionaría menos como un mecanismo de control ciudadano que como un instrumento de disputa política intra-élite. Summary:I. Introduction. II. Brief Definition of the Recall. III. The Recall In Colombia: Institutional Analysis 1. Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991. 2. Law No. 131 «By which the programmatic vote is regulated and other provisions are enacted», 1994. 3. Law No. 134 «By which are dictated norms on citizen participation mechanisms», 1994. 4. Law No. 741 Reforming Laws 131 and 134, 2002 5. Statutory Law No. 1,757, 2015. IV. Performance of the Recall in Colombia: its Application Between 1997 and 201. V. Conclusions Abstract:Since the 90s, after the crisis of the mass representation model characteristic of the Welfare States, and the arrival of the so-called audience democracy, typical of the States of the Global Era, several Latin American countries undertook constitutional reforms in which, among other changes, incorporated citizen participation and control mechanisms associated with participatory and direct conceptions of democracy, such as: the popular initiative, the popular consultation, the participatory budget and the recall, among others. This last tool of vertical societal accountability allows the citizens to dismiss the representatives elected by them through the vote in a referendum, which is called after their promoters have managed to gather the minimum number of signatures required to carry out the initiative. Colombia incorporated it in its 1991 Constitution, but only to dismiss governors and mayors. That is, executive authorities at the subnational level, thus excluding the president and legislators at all levels. In 1994 two laws regulated its exercise: law number 131 and 134. In the years 2002 and 2015, modifications were approved tending to diminish its requirements: law number 741 and 1.757, respectively. However, having submitted numerous applications in its more than 20 years of validity, no ruler was revoked until now. This article focuses on analyzing, first, the institutional design of the recall in Colombia, to determine if it has tended to facilitate or hinder its use by the population. In the same sense, the successive modifications carried out through the aforementioned laws were studied, which were aimed at reducing key requirements such as: the number of signatures needed to accompany the request, the minimum participation required in the referendum to validate the vote, the number of votes needed to dismiss the president, among others. Likewise, the empirical performance of this tool is studied during the period 1997-2015. The results obtained indicate that, despite the regulatory reforms that progressively reduced their implementation requirements, and having submitted numerous requests, no agent was revoked. Among its causes is identified the political incentive that the replacement of the revoked rulers via elections implies for its opponents interested in arriving in advance to power. However, the electoral political use of this mechanism, at the hands of former and future candidates for office, has not been accompanied at the polls with sufficient popular support to reach the minimum adhesions required for the revocation. In this way, the recall in Colombia would work less as a mechanism of citizen control than as an instrument of intra-elite political dispute.