Syntactic and semantic interference in sentence comprehension: Support from English and German eye-tracking data

A long-standing debate in the sentence processing literature concerns the time course of syntactic and semantic information in online sentence comprehension. The default assumption in cue-based models of parsing is that syntactic and semantic retrieval cues simultaneously guide dependency resolution. When retrieval cues match multiple items in memory, this leads to similarity-based interference. Both semantic and syntactic interferencehave been shown to occur in English. However, the relative timing of syntactic vs. semantic interference remains unclear. In this first-ever cross-linguistic investigation of the time course of syntactic vs. semantic interference, the data from two eye-tracking reading experiments (English and German) suggest that the two types of interference can in principle arise simultaneously during retrieval. However, the data also indicate that semantic cues may be evaluated with a small timing lag in German compared to English. This suggests that there may be cross-linguistic variation in how syntactic and semantic cues are used to resolve linguistic dependencies in real-time.

Rationalism, Universalism, and Relativism

People seem to regard some norms (e.g., about the wrongness of armed robbery) as universally true, and other norms (e.g., about which side of the road to drive on) as true relativized to some context or group. This chapter considers whether such meta-evaluative beliefs are rational. There are reasons to doubt that the belief in universalism about norms is evidentially rational. Nonetheless, universalism seems to be a default setting in normative cognition. That is, when we acquire norms, we tend to presuppose that they hold universally. This chapter argues that even though the default assumption of universalism might not be evidentially rational, it is ecologically rational to have a bias in favor of universalism. However, people are not completely locked into universalism. Under conditions of low consensus regarding some norm, people do move away from universalism and adopt some form of relativism, at least at a reflective level. And this is plausibly an evidentially rational response to low consensus.

Essentialism and Prejudice

Humans can’t help but generalize in ways that are rarely, if ever, dictated by reason and prudence. We jump quickly to confirmatory and reassuring conclusions with a propensity to invent things in reference to worlds that only exist in our minds. Rather than being just games of the imagination, these inventions actually influence, often unbeknownst to us (subliminally), our attitudes and actions in the real world, in particular our discriminatory attitudes and actions toward people. Our innate propensity to chunk, cluster, and categorize things corresponds with our propensity to reproduce patterns of reality that are constructed based on ready-made or default implicit beliefs (i.e., stereotyping). Furthermore, the built-in default assumption that things and people have essential, nonobvious characteristics (definition of essentialism) allows for the immediate experience of favorable or unfavorable feelings toward people or things prior to, or not based on, actual experience (i.e. the definition of prejudice).

Tracking stimulus representation across a 2-back visual working memory task

How does the neural representation of visual working memory content vary with behavioural priority? To address this, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG) while subjects performed a continuous-performance 2-back working memory task with oriented-grating stimuli. We tracked the transition of the neural representation of an item ( n ) from its initial encoding, to the status of ‘unprioritized memory item' (UMI), and back to ‘prioritized memory item', with multivariate inverted encoding modelling. Results showed that the representational format was remapped from its initially encoded format into a distinctive ‘opposite' representational format when it became a UMI and then mapped back into its initial format when subsequently prioritized in anticipation of its comparison with item n + 2. Thus, contrary to the default assumption that the activity representing an item in working memory might simply get weaker when it is deprioritized, it may be that a process of priority-based remapping helps to protect remembered information when it is not in the focus of attention.

Lexically specific vs. productive constructions in L2 Finnish

ABSTRACTIt is assumed from a usage-based perspective that learner language constructions emerge from natural language use in social interaction through exemplar learning. In L1, young learners have been shown to develop their constructions from lexically specific, formulaic expressions into more productive, abstract schemas. A similar developmental path has been shown for L2 development, with some exceptions. The aim of the current study is to explore to what extent the default assumption holds for L2 learning. The development of two constructions was traced in four adults learning L2 Finnish. Free-response data, collected weekly over a period of 9 months, were used to investigate the productivity of the constructions. The results show that, contrary to the traditional assumption, L2 learners do not start off with only lexically specific expressions, but that both lexically specific and more productive constructions are used from the beginning. Our results therefore suggest that, for educated adult L2 learners, the schema formation can happen rather quickly and even without the repetition of a specific lexical sequence.

Replicability of the EC-Earth3 Earth system model under a change in computing environment

Most Earth system models (ESMs) are running under different high-performance computing (HPC) environments. This has several advantages, from allowing different groups to work with the same tool in parallel to leveraging the burden of ensemble climate simulations, but it also offers alternative solutions in the case of shutdown (expected or not) of any of the environments. However, for obvious scientific reasons, it is critical to ensure that ESMs provide identical results under changes in computing environment. While strict bit-for-bit reproducibility is not always guaranteed with ESMs, it is desirable that results obtained under one computing environment are at least statistically indistinguishable from those obtained under another environment, which we term a “replicability” condition following the metrology nomenclature. Here, we develop a protocol to assess the replicability of the EC-Earth ESM. Using two versions of EC-Earth, we present one case of non-replicability and one case of replicability. The non-replicable case occurs with the older version of the model and likely finds its origin in the treatment of river runoff along Antarctic coasts. By contrast, the more recent version of the model provides replicable results. The methodology presented here has been adopted as a standard test by the EC-Earth consortium (27 institutions in Europe) to evaluate the replicability of any new model version across platforms, including for CMIP6 experiments. To a larger extent, it can be used to assess whether other ESMs can safely be ported from one HPC environment to another for studying climate-related questions. Our results and experience with this work suggest that the default assumption should be that ESMs are not replicable under changes in the HPC environment, until proven otherwise.

Why Does Sex/Gender (Come to) Matter? Researchers' Reasons for Sex/Gender Assessment Illustrate its Context-Dependencies and Entanglements

The simultaneous artificiality and reality of social categories such as (dis)abilities, ethnicity, gender, race, sex, sexuality, or social class can pose methodological and ethical problems that can be obscured and aggravated by a lack of transparency about the categories' operational definitions. In the case of sex/gender, for example, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that mutually exclusive categories such as ‘female’ and ‘male’ can fail to adequately represent human and nonhuman variability and may not meet the standards of scientific measurement. A lack of information about what these or similar labels mean, how they were derived, or what prompted their inclusion in a study can therefore make it difficult to evaluate not only the operationalizations themselves but also the data they yield. In this article, I argue for the consideration of context in the development and evaluation of sex/gender-related assessment methods by exploring the phenomenon's instrumental and abstract roles in research. In an online survey, sixty-four international researchers from various disciplines shared the reasons why they assess or report sex/gender and which purpose sex/gender variables serve in their research. The findings indicate that although researchers' motivation can stem from research topics or general methodological considerations, it is also possible that structural conventions or institutional constraints lead to default inclusions of sex/gender variables. The findings also indicate that sex/gender is attributed with various forms of agency and spatio_temporal (non)locations, ranging from concrete physiological (e.g. hormones) to abstract social concepts (e.g. human history), which could be seen as potential precursors for definitions. The results demonstrate that science is both affected by and contributes to societal constructions of social categorisations, and that sex/gender in research is an entangled, multifaceted, unstable phenomenon. I conclude by proposing to engage in the default assumption that sex/gender is not one thing that can be measured and that the dissonances that surround its assessment could be addressed by identifying and operationalizing aspects of sex/gender that are meaningful in the context of a study.

Terraforming and Eco-Economics in the Mars Trilogy

In Red Mars (1992), Green Mars (1993), and Blue Mars (1996), Robinson uses the speculative science of terraforming an alien world to explore the complex relationships between planetary ecology--the interlocking, autopoietic systems that allow life to flourish--and political economy, the distribution of scarce resources among competing populations and interests. At the center of the trilogy lies what Robinson calls “eco-economics,” his challenge to the default assumption that economics means the exploitation, degradation, and eventual exhaustion of natural resources. Terraforming transforms Mars over the course of the three novels and becomes a means to imagine the birth of a new planetary order that confronts head-on the obstacles to utopian progress: socioeconomic conflict, environmental degradation, racial and religious antagonisms, state violence, and corporate greed. As it undergoes its sea-change from red to green to blue, Mars offers its citizens (and the novels’ readers) a means to imagine a utopian future that replaces the politics of scarcity and desperation with hard-won forms of cooperation, ecological stewardship, democracy, and diversity.

Replicability of the EC-Earth3 Earth System Model under a change in computing environment

Most Earth System Models (ESMs) are running under different high-performance computing (HPC) environments. This has several advantages, from allowing different groups to work with the same tool in parallel to leveraging the burden of ensemble climate simulations but also offering alternative solutions in case of shutdown (expected or not) of any of the environments. However, for obvious scientific reasons, it is critical to ensure that ESMs provide identical results under changes in computing environment. While strict bit-for-bit reproducibility is not always guaranteed with ESMs, it is desirable that results obtained under one computing environment are at least statistically indistinguishable from those obtained under another environment, which we term a replicability condition following the metrology nomenclature. Here, we develop a protocol to assess the replicability of the EC-Earth ESM. Using two versions of EC-Earth, we present one case of non-replicability and one case of replicability. The non-replicable case occurs with the older version of the model and likely finds its origin in the treatment of river runoffs along Antarctic coasts. By contrast, the more recent version of the model provides replicable results. The methodology presented here has been adopted as a standard test by the EC-Earth consortium (27 institutions in Europe) to evaluate the replicability of any new model version across platforms, including for CMIP6 experiments. To a larger extent, it can be used to assess whether other ESMs can safely be ported from one HPC environment to another for studying climate-related questions. Our results and experience with this work suggest that the default assumption should be that ESMs are not replicable under changes in the HPC environment, until proven otherwise.

Act Now, Play Later: Temporal Expectations Regarding the Onset of Self-initiated Sensations Can Be Modified with Behavioral Training

Mechanisms of motor-sensory prediction are dependent on expectations regarding when self-generated feedback will occur. Existing behavioral and electrophysiological research suggests that we have a default expectation for immediate sensory feedback after executing an action. However, studies investigating the adaptability of this temporal expectation have been limited in their ability to differentiate modified expectations per se from effects of stimulus repetition. Here, we use a novel, within-participant procedure that allowed us to disentangle the effect of repetition from expectation and allowed us to determine whether the default assumption for immediate feedback is fixed and resistant to modification or is amenable to change with experience. While EEG was recorded, 45 participants completed a task in which they repeatedly pressed a button to produce a tone that occurred immediately after the button press (immediate training) or after a 100-msec delay (delayed training). The results revealed significant differences in the patterns of cortical change across the two training conditions. Specifically, there was a significant reduction in the cortical response to tones across delayed training blocks but no significant change across immediate training blocks. Furthermore, experience with delayed training did not result in increased cortical activity in response to immediate feedback. These findings suggest that experience with action–sensation delays broadens the window of temporal expectations, allowing for the simultaneous anticipation of both delayed and immediate motor-sensory feedback. This research provides insights into the mechanisms underlying motor-sensory prediction and may represent a novel therapeutic avenue for psychotic symptoms, which are ostensibly associated with sensory prediction abnormalities.