Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the book’s key findings. It then considers the policy implications, directions for future research, and lessons for South Asian security. The chapter makes a recommendation to military commanders to abstain from outsourcing violence. Weaponizing civilians and former combatants is unethical and violates international humanitarian law. It is also of questionable long-term value. In all of the cases examined in this book, the victories states achieved with the help of nonstate allies were either ephemeral or incomplete. The chapter also calls for greater scholarly attention to changes in actors’ motivations, covert and illicit state behavior, and the problem of chance. It concludes by highlighting three powerful narratives the book challenges about South Asian security: (1) Pakistan’s uniqueness in outsourcing violence; (2) India as a model great power; and (3) the ability of powerful states to manage their allies in foreign-led counterinsurgencies while avoiding serious backlash and unintended consequences.

Tribal “Awakenings” in Pakistan and India

This chapter presents two little-known but highly consequential rebellions in Pakistan and India, and the state-nonstate alliances forged to combat them. In Pakistan, what led to the alliance was the local tribes’ desire to take back their land from the Taliban, and the state’s willingness to collaborate with the tribes in order to prevent the further spread of the anti-Pakistan Taliban outside the tribal areas. Islamabad was not prepared to enforce full sovereignty over the region, and so its alliance with the tribes was weak. The Naxalite insurgency enjoyed free reign over a region that remained for many decades a backwater to the Indian government. But, when the insurgency gained serious steam and private companies developed plans to exploit the area’s mineral deposits, the government stepped in. After achieving a rough balance of local power, it allied with opportunists, who formed a civilian-manned counterinsurgency outfit known as the Salwa Judum.

State-Nonstate Alliances in Civil War

This chapter develops a new balance-of-interests framework for understanding how states and nonstate actors identify and enlist one another as allies in times of civil war. It begins by considering the relevant terms and develops the concepts and categories useful for the study of state-nonstate alliances. A brief overview of the relevant scholarly approaches provides potential explanations as well as the foundation for a new theoretical framework, which is then detailed. The chapter also considers the scope conditions for the argument. It concludes by describing the research design and methodologies used for data collection and analysis.

“Guns Plus Interest”

This chapter shows that the principal factors driving the state-nonstate alliances in Kashmir (1989–2003) were the local balance of power and actors’ interests. It was only when the Indian army demonstrated force employment prowess through a string of military victories that it was able to attract opportunists. These were former rebels seeking local power, profit, and security. The proxies—most notably the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon in the north, as well as the Jammu and Kashmir Ikhwan and Muslim Mujahideen in the south of the Kashmir Valley—helped to shift the balance of power in India’s favor. This prompted the insurgency to move to the mountainous Jammu region. There, the security forces turned to local activists. These, mostly Hindu, villagers formed the so-called Village Defense Committees.

Introduction

The introduction presents the main puzzle: states with robust militaries, such as Pakistan and India, gambling with violence by outsourcing counterinsurgency to nonstate actors. Why would these states share their world-class armies’ resources and responsibilities with characters of questionable capability and loyalty? The puzzle is illustrated with a discussion of the risks and illicit nature of violence outsourcing with concrete examples from around the world. The introduction also explains the value of studying state-nonstate alliances in times of civil war, and why South Asia is the ideal setting for doing so. The chapter then provides a survey of the existing research, overview of the main argument, and outline of the book’s structure.

All the State’s Proxies in Turkey and Russia

This chapter considers the applicability of the balance-of-interests framework beyond South Asia with cases drawn from Turkey (1984–1999) and Russia (1994–96 and 1999–2002). Despite their differences, these states behaved very similarly to Pakistan and India. When, in the mid-1980s, the Kurdish rebels came to dominate the Kurdish countryside, the Turkish army allied with nationalist clans. Once a rough balance of local power was achieved, opportunists joined the counterinsurgency. Then, as in Kashmir, the rebels relocated. This prompted the Turkish army to ally with Islamist militants operating in the rebel-controlled urban areas. It was not until the Russian army achieved parity with the Chechen rebels that the likes of Bislan Gantamirov and Akhmad Kadyrov opportunistically joined the Russian side. The former, a convicted criminal, helped Moscow recapture the capital city of Grozny. The latter, a former rebel leader, and his son, Ramzan Kadyrov, helped Moscow regain control of Chechnya.

Saving the House of Islam

This chapter describes the alliances between the Pakistani state and nonstate actors during the 1971 counterinsurgency campaign in the country’s eastern wing. The Pakistani army enlisted the help of nonstate allies to tilt the local balance of power in its favor, but only when it was able to satisfy their varied interests. Thousands of Razakars (civilian “volunteers”) joined the counterinsurgency because of the patronage and protection the state was able to offer once it regained some footing in the region. The activists, notably the members of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s youth wing comprising the al-Badr Brigade, became allies only after the Pakistani army built robust links with Islamist organizations and made a credible commitment to the Islamist agenda. In September 1971, even though Pakistan was clearly losing the war to the insurgents (and India), the activists created a death squad targeting high-profile supporters and sympathizers of the secessionist movement.