The Individual, the State, and International Relations: Toward an Interest Contiguity Theory of Parallel and Competing Sovereignties

Author(s):  
M. J. Balogun
Author(s):  
David Boucher

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janina Dill

AbstractDoes International Humanitarian Law (IHL) impose a duty of care on the attacker? From a moral point of view, should it? This article argues that the legal situation is contestable, and the moral value of a legal duty of care in attack is ambivalent. This is because a duty of care is both a condition for and an obstacle to the ‘individualization of war’. The individualization of war denotes an observable multi-dimensional norm shift in international relations. Norms for the regulation of war that focus on the interests, rights, and duties of the individual have gained in importance compared to those that focus on the interests, rights, and duties of the state. As the individual, not the state, is the ultimate locus of moral value, this norm shift in international relations, and the corresponding developments in international law, are morally desirable. When it comes to IHL, the goal of protecting the interests of the individual creates strong reasons both for and against imposing a legal duty of care on the attacker. The enquiry into whether IHL does and should impose a legal duty of care therefore reveals that the extent to which war can be individualized is limited.


Author(s):  
John M. Owen IV

Liberalism has always been concerned with security, albeit the security of the individual; institutions, including the state, are all established and sustained by individuals and instrumental to their desires. Indeed, liberalism cannot be understood apart from its normative commitment to individualism. The tradition insists that all persons deserve, and it evaluates institutions according to how far they help individuals achieve these goals. Nor is liberalism anti-statist. Liberal theory has paid particular attention to the state as the institution defined by its ability to make individuals secure and aid their commodious living. Although liberal security literature that only examines individual states’ foreign policies may be guilty of denouncing the role of international interaction, the general liberal claim argues that the international system, under broad conditions, permits states choices. As such, for liberalism, states can choose over time to create and sustain international conditions under which they will be more or less secure. Liberalism’s history can be traced from the proto-liberalism in the Reformation to the emergence of the social contract theory and neo-theories, as well as liberalism’s focus on increasing security. Meanwhile, current debates in liberalism include the democratic peace and its progeny, reformulations of liberal international relations (IR) theory, and meta-theory. Ultimately, liberalism’s most striking recent successes concern the democratic peace and related research on democratic advantages in international cooperation. Liberalism is a useful guide to international security insofar as individuals and the groups they organize affect or erode states.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
pp. 89
Author(s):  
Ziad Khalaf Abdullah Al - Jubouri

The concept of international relations is very broad. In modern use it includes not only relations between States but also relations between States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and other enterprises. As a result of the scientific and technological development of mankind and the accompanying economic, social and cultural developments, Is the only actor in international relations there are other international people have emerged to exist one by one in harmony with and consistent with these developments in humanity is no longer the international theater exclusive to the State alone, Lyon are better with the ability to work, performance and influence in international relations, the last of whom is an actor visible international individual.


Author(s):  
Heather Rae ◽  
Christian Reus-Smit

Exploring contradictions inherent in liberal orders, this chapter questions the treatment of liberalism in the International Relations academy as a relatively straightforward set of beliefs about the individual, the state, the market, and political justice. It asserts that the contradictions and tensions within liberal internationalism are in fact deep and troubling. Highlighting some of liberalism's obscured and sometimes denied contradictions — between liberal ‘statism’ and liberal ‘cosmopolitanism’; between liberal ‘proceduralism’ and liberal ‘consequentialism’; and between liberal ‘absolutism’ and liberal ‘toleration’ — the chapter explores their implications for liberal ordering practices internationally. It concludes that liberal political engagement necessitates a more reflective standpoint and more historical sensibility if we are to be aware of how contradictions have shaped liberal orders in the past and are likely to continue to do so in the future.


2008 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-692 ◽  
Author(s):  
HALVARD LEIRA

AbstractJustus Lipsius (1547–1606) was among the most influential thinkers of the late 16th/early 17th centuries. His guides for action were highly influential in the establishment of moderate absolutism and what has been called the fiscal-military state across Europe. In this article I explore Lipsian thought in an International Relations context. Special attention is paid to his ideals of discipline, which were meant to order both the ruler and those that he ruled. Dignity, self-restraint and discipline were the recipes for the foreign policy of the prince, while the individual was subordinated to the purposes of the state, and taught to control his own life by mastering his emotions. If not a seminal thinker in his own right, it is necessary to understand Lipsius’ thought and influence to be able to fully understand the 17th century theoretical approaches to peace and prosperity and the relative discipline of early-modern statecraft.


2021 ◽  
pp. 227-232
Author(s):  
V. V. Serediuk

Neoconservatism as an ideological and political-economic system of knowledge contains a number of ideas about the role, tasks, purpose and meanings of the modern state, its relationship with social institutions (family, church, NGOs), as well as its role in economic relations. American neoconservatism, in contrast to British or German, is also characterized by attention to the foreign policy function of the state. Reconsideration of the role, tasks and significance of the state in various spheres of society and in international relations in modern conditions determines the relevance of our study of this issue. Neoconservatism, the ideas of which were implemented in the policies of the conservative parties of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany in the 1970-1990s, continues to influence the implementation of national and international policies of various states to this day. Neoconservatism, unlike neoliberalism, offers a different understanding of the role and meaning of the modern state. Traditional values are ideologically substantiated and promoted: family, religion, morals, community, and the state. An important place in neoconservatism is given to social institutions, the need to overcome isolation of the individual from the institution of community (religious, social, government). The integration of the individual into social institutions and the return of the importance of the state authority in the worldview of the individual are considered priorities of state influence. American neoconservatism substantiates the US foreign policy function – to protect the democratic values in international relations. In the economic sphere, neoconservatives insist on reducing government intervention in market relations, returning to the ideals of classical economic liberalism, and taking a number of fiscal and monetary policy measures to reduce inflation, unemployment, and stimulate economic development. Although neoconservatism recognizes the need to build a strong state, it is not seen as authoritarian, encroaching on,restricting or abolishing human and civil rights and freedoms recognized in democracies after World War II. However, freedom is understood as a sphere of free behavior of the individual, which exists in relations with other members of society and is limited by the freedom of another person. Keywords: neoconservatism, state, role, individual, social institutions, traditional values, intervention, economy, law.


Author(s):  
Gregory J. Moore

This chapter follows Niebuhr’s logic to a discussion of collective society, the state, and international relations. Niebuhr believed that moral dualism is necessary because while moral conduct such as pacifism might be possible for individuals, it is difficult to find between human collectivities (groups, states) because groupism (nationalism in the context of states) is fundamental for any group. From this flows collective pride, which the group depends on to maintain group unity, then conflict, because groups depend on groupism and pride to maintain group cohesion. Niebuhr concluded that power is the primary motivating force in international relations (IR), key to order at home and abroad, that there must by necessity be a measure of moral ambiguity in IR because what morality we might espouse at the individual level may not be practicable at the national or international level (“turning the other cheek” is plausible with Aunt Mary, but not with Hitler).


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janis Grzybowski

AbstractThe literature on de facto states challenges the conventional identification of states by legal recognition, proposing to identify states based on their effectiveness instead. Yet, as I argue in this paper, rather than turning the tables on recognition, the de facto state challenge ultimately reveals all state identification in International Relations and international law to be essentially indeterminate. This lacuna, I suggest, is not an accidental omission, but an expression of the foundational paradox of modern political order that is rooted in the intertwined ontology of the state system and the individual states constituting it, with each presupposing the other. As a result, the opposition between empirical facts, political decisions, and legal norms invoked in attempts to identify states cannot but remain irresolvable. This should not be regarded as a problem to be overcome, however, but as a source of social order. Although states cannot be substantively identified, any effort to do so in practice naturalizes the state as the very form through which we articulate and shape political claims, conflicts, and settlements. In performatively enacting states precisely at the contested margins, state identification thus both invokes and (re-)produces the statist international as the central imaginary of modern political order.


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Pickering

AbstractFor researchers and students of International Relations (IR), one date looms larger than all others: 1648. The end of the Thirty Years War, formalized by the signing of the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, led to a period known as the “Peace of Westphalia.” Westphalia represented a fundamental change in the power balance of European politics: instead of the Holy Roman Empire holding supreme authority, power would now rest with states themselves, manifested in terms of sovereignty, territory and equality. One of the chief ways in which these “Westphalian” states would cement this authority was through the use of maps. Before 1648, there was little on a European map to indicate where one country ended and another one began. But after 1648, this all changes: these new Westphalian states are represented with bright colors and clearly marked boundaries, defining borders and becoming an important part in creating the state and justifying its sovereignty. The role which maps have played in the spread of the Westphalian state is only just beginning to be researched. Yet the limited efforts to date have all focussed on Europe. This is unfortunate, as today, while Europe has, according to some observers, moved into a stage in which Westphalia is no longer a useful model with which to understand the state and the ways in which it relates to sovereignty, government, power and the individual, the old Westphalian model of the state has more recently been exported all around the world. This paper presents the first part of a project which aims to look at this expansion. The European angle will be presented in this paper; future research will be carried out in China, Japan and Taiwan.


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