From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 321-342
Author(s):  
Theodore Pelagidis ◽  
Michael Mitsopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Pressure Groups ◽  
State Capture

The State is Captured Before It Exists

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-58
Author(s):  
David B. Kanin
Keyword(s):  
Civic Education ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Patronage Politics ◽  
State Capture ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
Social Management ◽  
The Relationship

Analysts of “State Capture” too often treat the phenomenon as an outside-in process. They identify firms or rent-seeking political entrepreneurs that take over, subvert, or otherwise bend political structures to serve their parochial interests. The key to solving the perceived problem is supposed to lie in better governance, strengthened judicial systems, civic education, and transparency in political and civic activities. This essay will suggest this construct involves a misunderstanding of the relationship between patronage networks and supposedly “legitimate” legal and constitutional institutions enshrined in a teleology of Democracy and Rule-of-Law performances. Patronage politics in the Balkans produces pragmatic social management patterns, not just theft by greedy firms and selfish individuals. This argument builds on Charles Tilly’s observation of the inverse relationship between Democracy and trust to explain why externally imposed programs of civic education and political reform designed to free a state from its perceived capture fail to do much more than recruit a thin sliver of local civic activists, scold “captured” populations, and undermine the credibility of international overseers.

The Role of Rents in the Transition from Socialist Redistributive Economies to Market Capitalism

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Mihalyi ◽  
Iván Szelényi
Keyword(s):  
19Th Century ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Capitalist Country ◽  
State Capture ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Market Capture ◽  
Market Capitalism

In this paper the authors make a critical distinction between inequalities arising from profits and wages and inequalities arising from rents, following Sorensen and 19th century economist Ricardo. Their new contribution is to articulate how rents are especially important in post-communist capitalist transition. Without the concept of rents, the mechanisms of corruption cannot be understood. The authors identify three types of rent-seeking behavior, which can be observed in any capitalist country, that play a particularly important role in post-communist transition: (i) market capture by political elites; (ii) state capture by oligarchs; (iii) capture of oligarchs by autocratic rulers through selective criminalization and the redistribution of their wealth to loyal new rich.

State-Owned Enterprises in South Africa

2021 ◽  
pp. 575-598
Author(s):  
Mark Swilling ◽  
Nina Callaghan
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Developmental State ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Current Crisis ◽  
Strategic Vision ◽  
State Capture ◽  
National Economic ◽  
Social And Economic Development ◽  
Basic Services ◽  
National Economic Development

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have the ability to shape industrial policy, the potential to transform economies by investing in the provision of basic services and stimulate new industries. It is fair to deduce that how these entities are deployed is a critical indicator of a state’s directionality. This chapter traces how SOEs reflect South Africa’s evolving political economy, from a racist national capitalism, an indecisive developmental state, through a decade of state capture, to a weak strategic vision of how they can drive national economic development. The chapter highlights the obduracy of the mineral-energy complex and its enclave nature that lends itself to corrupted governance and assigning SOEs conflicted mandates for social and economic development. The current crisis of South Africa’s SOEs is a signifier of political leadership that has made a series of ideological missteps amidst a legacy of rent-seeking behaviours that began during the apartheid era, and continued into the post-1994 era.

Een economische benadering van pressiegroeperingen

Res Publica ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-593
Author(s):  
Frank Naert
Keyword(s):  
Group Theory ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
The Political ◽  
Pressure Group ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Pressure Groups ◽  
Global Dynamic ◽  
Economic Method

This article tries to provide a dynamic interest group theory. Using the economic method of the 'homo economicus' demand for and supply of policy catering to the needs of pressure groups are analysed. Central are the notions of information and organisation costs that face latent groups treatened by already existing groups. These notions permit to integrate the existing theories on pressure group into one global dynamic theory. The economists' rent seeking theory and the political scientists' pluralism and neo-corporatism can thus be  understood as stages in a continuing process.

Peran Pengawasan Internal Dalam Menghindari Kutukan Sumber Daya Alam

Liquidity ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Andilo Tohom
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Rich Country ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
The World ◽  
Policies And Programs ◽  
The Right

Indonesia is one of many countries in the world so called resource-rich country. Natural resources abundance needs to be managed in the right way in order to avoid dutch diseases and resources curses. These two phenomena generally happened in the country, which has abundant natural resources. Learned from Norwegian experiences, Indonesian Government need to focus its policy to prevent rent seeking activities. The literature study presented in this paper is aimed to provide important insight for government entities in focusing their policies and programs to avoid resources curse. From the internal audit perspective, this study is expected to improve internal audit’s role in assurance and consulting.

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

2005 ◽  
pp. 4-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Growth Rates ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Grass Roots ◽  
Protection Systems ◽  
Private Protection ◽  
The Rich

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

On the Origins of Administrative Rent: Doing Business in a Russian Region N

2010 ◽  
pp. 58-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Oleinik
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Resource Rent ◽  
Competitive Edge ◽  
Doing Business ◽  
Russian Region ◽  
Positive Gain ◽  
Access To The Field ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Methods

In the article two types of rent are differentiated: resource rent and administrative rent. The latter is linked to restrictions on the access to the field of interactions. The contribution of the theory of public choice and the theory of rent-seeking and directly-unproductive activities is further developed by shifting the emphasis from individual decision-making to interactions between three actors: C, who controls access to the field, A, who gets a competitive edge as a result, and B, who assumes a subjacent position with regard to both A and C, yet still receives a positive gain from transacting. Domination by virtue of a constellation of As, Bs, and Cs interests is illustrated with the help of an in-depth case study of a Russian region. This study combines quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as their triangulation.

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