Inherited Dreams of ‘the West’: Eastern European Students’ Paths to Denmark

Author(s):  
Mette Ginnerskov-Dahlberg
2014 ◽  
Vol 155 (21) ◽  
pp. 833-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
József Marton ◽  
Attila Pandúr ◽  
Emese Pék ◽  
Krisztina Deutsch ◽  
Bálint Bánfai ◽  
...  

Introduction: Better knowledge and skills of basic life support can save millions of lives each year in Europe. Aim: The aim of this study was to measure the knowledge about basic life support in European students. Method: From 13 European countries 1527 volunteer participated in the survey. The questionnaire consisted of socio-demographic questions and knowledge regarding basic life support. The maximum possible score was 18. Results: Those participants who had basic life support training earned 11.91 points, while those who had not participated in lifesaving education had 9.6 points (p<0.001). Participants from former socialist Eastern European countries reached 10.13 points, while Western Europeans had average 10.85 points (p<0.001). The best results were detected among the Swedish students, and the worst among the Belgians. Conclusions: Based on the results, there are significant differences in the knowledge about basic life support between students from different European countries. Western European youth, and those who were trained had better performance. Orv. Hetil., 2014, 155(21), 833–837.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Orenstein

This introductory chapter outlines the core argument of the book: that as Russia ramped up its hybrid war on the West starting around 2007, politics in Western countries has become more similar to politics in the vulnerable “lands in between.” Russia’s hybrid war on the West has contributed to political polarization by promoting extremist parties and creating a sense that every election presents voters with a “civilizational choice” between Russia and the West or authoritarianism and democracy. Paradoxically, many of the leaders that rise to the top in these conditions are those who find ways to profit from both sides. They benefit from the sponsorship of pro-Russia and pro-Western interests to enrich themselves in the process. The plan of this book is simple. It starts with exploring the nature of Russia’s hybrid war on the West and the West’s delayed response. Then it shows how this conflict shapes the politics of the lands in between, Central and Eastern European member states of the European Union, and core Western countries.


2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-85
Author(s):  
Delia Popescu

In this article I argue that one of the main tools that allowed the Romanian communist state to control oppositional activities, far better than many of its Eastern European neighbors, was the transformation of political opponents into petty criminals and felons. I contend that in the two decades that preceded 1989, communist Romania witnessed a pragmatic shift from hard rule (based on simply imprisoning political opponents under the category of “political detainees”) to subversive criminalization. The main operative tool for the subversive criminalization of so-called political offenses was Law 18/1968 (subtitledLaw regarding the control of the provenance of goods that have not been acquired through legal means). I argue that Law 18 was the result of two interconnected political drives. The first drive was the desire of the Ceauşescu regime to gain favor with the West by perpetuating the rhetoric launched as a result of the general amnesty for political detainees in 1964, under the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej administration. The second drive was the political imperative of the Ceauşescu regime to suppress political opposition. My argument is that this transformative shift was accomplished through the development of what I call amechanism of state induced theftbacked by the deployment of a subversive legal instrument of criminalization, which was Law 18/1969. This paper analyzes the role, essence, and implications of Law 18 while supporting a theory of a strategic shift in communist policy.


Author(s):  
MARCIN SAR

The author comments on the dynamics of Moscow's effort to reconcile its pursuit of control over Eastern Europe with its interest in a viable Eastern Europe, one that is stable and capable of self-sustaining development. Although Moscow has always exercised control in military matters, it allowed some Eastern Europeans economic independence in the 1970s. Changing circumstances in the 1980s, however, have caused the Kremlin to rethink its relationships with its Eastern European “satallies”— half satellites, half allies. Moscow faces dilemmas in areas such as energy, agriculture, the Eastern European states' relations with the West, economic reforms occurring in Eastern Europe, and integration within COMECON. How Moscow resolves these dilemmas lies at the core of its future relationships with Eastern Europe. Other important factors include the lessons learned from Poland, East Germany's evolving relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, and China's growing economic and political initiatives vis-à-vis Eastern Europe.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu. V. Boltryk ◽  
V. M. Okatenko ◽  
G. M. Toscev

This article is devoted to the extensive description of the environment of the two largest settlement structures of the Eastern European steppes — the Kapuliv and Kamyanka which date V—III centuries BC. These two powerful settlements appeared on the opposite banks near the ancient crossings through the Dnipro. They formed the main core of the Scythian state, in which Kapuliv served as the capital and Kamyanka was its economic partner. Intense life here has arisen from the time of Ariapet’s rule to the life of the descendants of King Ateus. The Scythians chose the best place in the Pontic steppe, where in the zone of floodplain meadows and forests there were numerous straits with lakes surrounded by magnificent pastures. Therefore, along with these two main settlements, on the banks and partly in the floodplain, there were many settlements of the second order. The importance of this zone is emphasized by the accumulation of kurhans and graveyards placed almost symmetrically on different shores. In the immediate surrounding of the settlements there are almost equal in importance burial mounds of the ordinary population. Among them are the burial ground near the village Kut, the Nikopol mound field and the burial ground of Mamay-Gora. The last one is the largest in the Eastern Europe in terms of the number of excavated burials. This graveyard is unique due to five large kurhans, located in one line: three long kurhans and two round in plan. It is possible that there was a general Scythian cult center. Further from the Dnipro there were burial memorials of representatives of the higher social stage, among which were the largest burial mounds of Scythia — Solokha and Chortomlyk. There is a noteworthy mound alley (1.6 km long), which retreated to the west of the Solokha kurhan and turned slightly to the north, where it probably connected with a part of another smaller kurhan alley. Not far from a smaller alley there was the recently opened manufacturing settlement Sorokina Balka. The time of its existence (all IV BC) is recorded by the findings of the coins of the cities of the North Pontus, the Marmara Sea and Macedonia.


Author(s):  
Dean Vuletic

Immediately following the Second World War, Eastern European communist parties employed censorship against Western popular culture, such as film and popular music, which they regarded as politically inappropriate. From the late 1950s, most parties increasingly sought to satisfy their citizens’ desires for consumption and entertainment, and they promoted the development of local cultural alternatives. The parties were not uniform in their policies, as a comparison between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia demonstrates. However, they did seek to appropriate popular culture to advance their political interests, and they similarly faced resistance from some domestic artists who criticized the government. The reluctance of the parties to allow as much freedom of consumption and expression as existed in the West, together with their inability to provide cultural goods that could keep up with Western fashions, points to popular culture as a factor that contributed to the demise of communism in Eastern Europe


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Piotr Żuk ◽  
Paweł Żuk

The authors of the article show manifestations of homophobia in a range of Eastern European countries. They use the example of Poland to compare the current situation of LGBT people with that in the communist period. The article defends the thesis that homophobia, which goes hand in hand with Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and widespread dislike for any cultural minority, is a cultural compensation for economic disappointment and an expression of the Eastern European opposition to the economic and political expansion of the West. From this perspective, the dominant nationalist orientation requires treating not only LGBT communities, but also their defenders, supporters of a more liberal culture and civic organizations, as representatives of “foreign centers” who intend to meet “the interests of the core European Union (EU) countries.” Thus, messianic nationalism and homophobia are a compensation for economic marginalization and a form of defense moved from the sphere of economic problems to the sphere of identity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caius Dobrescu ◽  
Roxana Eichel ◽  
Dorottya Molnár-Kovács ◽  
Sándor Kálai ◽  
Anna Keszeg

Our article focuses on a corpus of crime television series reflecting upon differences between western and eastern Europe – a phenomenon that we will address as the ‘West–East slope’. The series figure as instances of the struggle for recognition at the level of the social imaginary, between western and eastern Europe. Addressing the double logic of the western narrative on eastern Europe and the eastern narrative of western Europe, one of our main findings is that the recognition aesthetics of eastern Europe produced a multi-layered representation of the West varying from country to country. On the other hand in western productions, there is still a bias towards a more politically correct image of easternness, a state of affairs that is questioned by eastern European attempts to produce their original contents.


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