“Democracy Is Not for Everyone”

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Piotr Żuk ◽  
Paweł Żuk

The authors of the article show manifestations of homophobia in a range of Eastern European countries. They use the example of Poland to compare the current situation of LGBT people with that in the communist period. The article defends the thesis that homophobia, which goes hand in hand with Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and widespread dislike for any cultural minority, is a cultural compensation for economic disappointment and an expression of the Eastern European opposition to the economic and political expansion of the West. From this perspective, the dominant nationalist orientation requires treating not only LGBT communities, but also their defenders, supporters of a more liberal culture and civic organizations, as representatives of “foreign centers” who intend to meet “the interests of the core European Union (EU) countries.” Thus, messianic nationalism and homophobia are a compensation for economic marginalization and a form of defense moved from the sphere of economic problems to the sphere of identity.

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Orenstein

This introductory chapter outlines the core argument of the book: that as Russia ramped up its hybrid war on the West starting around 2007, politics in Western countries has become more similar to politics in the vulnerable “lands in between.” Russia’s hybrid war on the West has contributed to political polarization by promoting extremist parties and creating a sense that every election presents voters with a “civilizational choice” between Russia and the West or authoritarianism and democracy. Paradoxically, many of the leaders that rise to the top in these conditions are those who find ways to profit from both sides. They benefit from the sponsorship of pro-Russia and pro-Western interests to enrich themselves in the process. The plan of this book is simple. It starts with exploring the nature of Russia’s hybrid war on the West and the West’s delayed response. Then it shows how this conflict shapes the politics of the lands in between, Central and Eastern European member states of the European Union, and core Western countries.


Author(s):  
MARCIN SAR

The author comments on the dynamics of Moscow's effort to reconcile its pursuit of control over Eastern Europe with its interest in a viable Eastern Europe, one that is stable and capable of self-sustaining development. Although Moscow has always exercised control in military matters, it allowed some Eastern Europeans economic independence in the 1970s. Changing circumstances in the 1980s, however, have caused the Kremlin to rethink its relationships with its Eastern European “satallies”— half satellites, half allies. Moscow faces dilemmas in areas such as energy, agriculture, the Eastern European states' relations with the West, economic reforms occurring in Eastern Europe, and integration within COMECON. How Moscow resolves these dilemmas lies at the core of its future relationships with Eastern Europe. Other important factors include the lessons learned from Poland, East Germany's evolving relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, and China's growing economic and political initiatives vis-à-vis Eastern Europe.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Eperjesi Zoltan

<p>The current study strives to present how the European Union changed its economic policy due to the economic and financial crises and the fierce global competition. The main emphasis was laid upon competitiveness on contrary of cohesion and social and economic close up of the newly joined Middle- and Eastern European countries. Funds serving the target of competitiveness for growth and employment are increased by 6-7% annually during the budget period 2007-2013 while agricultural spending decreases by 3% annually. The change of paradigm projects the two speed Europe concept and causes severe tensions between the core regions and the peripheries. </p>


2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 521-537
Author(s):  
Gábor Hunya ◽  
Béla Galgóczi

This article examines foreign direct investment (FDI) in the European context and assesses the significance of relocation of production and workplaces from the west to the east. The first part of the article provides a statistical overview of FDI in central and eastern European countries (CEECs) for the last five years. Structural features of FDI flow and stock are presented and the trend of an increasing role for reinvested profits is examined. The second part focuses on the qualitative features of FDI and foreign trade. It provides evidence of the incidence of relocation, the growing role of intra-industrial trade, and the changing role of manufacturing in the economies of the EU-15 and the CEECs.


2017 ◽  
pp. 39-45
Author(s):  
Zoltán Eperjesi

I my current essay I tried to prove that the European Union modified its economic policy due to the financial and economic crisis and the fierce global competitiveness requirements. The main emphasis was laid on the increase of competitiveness. Competitiveness became preferredto cohesion and the economic and social closing up of the newly joined Middle-Eastern European countries. The funds for competitiveness for growth and employment increase by 6–7% yearly during the financial perspective between 2007–2013. On the contrary the funds for agriculture and rural development decrease by 3% yearly in this period. The tendency remains unchanged during the financial perspective 2014–2020.This tendency strengthens the establishment of the two speed Europe concept and causes tensions between the core regions and the peripheries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 100-123
Author(s):  
Marlene Laruelle

With memory wars between Central and Eastern European states and Russia, the Second World War has become a useable past instrumentalized as a currency for legitimacy on the international scene. These memory wars focus on who was fascist and who colluded with Nazism—the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941 or the collaborationist forces in Central and Eastern Europe? And, subsequently, who are the new fascists advancing a revisionist interpretation of the Second World War today: Putin’s Russia or Central and Eastern European countries? What is at stake here is the recognition of Russia as having a legitimate say in European affairs because of the Soviet victory, or its exclusion for refusing to repent of its role in dividing Europe and occupying a part thereof. This article debunks the accusation of fascism attributed to Putin’s regime and offers to look at the label of fascism as a mirror game between the West and Russia in defining what Europe should be like and Russia’s inclusion or exclusion.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Tismaneanu

As a political variety within Leninism, different from what is usually called national communism, national Stalinism systematically opposed any form of liberalisation, let alone democratisation. Reactionary and self-centered, it valued autarky and exclusiveness. The fundamental values of such a regime are political voluntarism, sectarianism, radicalism, cult of hierarchy and authority, scorn for parliamentary democracy, and constitutionalism. This article first analyses the origins and the model for national Stalinism, and then looks at four cases amongst Eastern European countries in the post-Stalin era: Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, and Poland. In contrast to Nikolai Lenin, for Joseph Stalin, the complete, irreversible victory of socialism in Russia was not contingent upon the success of proletarian revolutions in the West.


This article analyses the contrasting images of the West and the East in the conflict narrative in Ukraine: Where is the imaginary line that divides them? Which countries constitute the ‘East’ and which the ‘West’? and How does the Russia-Ukraine conflict affect the perceived division? This article is informed by Edward Said’s hypothesis of orientalism, specifically that Western knowledge of the Eastern world(s) carries a negative connotation. Testing this hypothesis on the materials of elite interviews conducted in Ukraine in 2017, the article ‘maps’ the image of the world from a Ukrainian point of view. It explores if an internalized ‘othering’ may be present within Ukraine’s borders due to the ongoing conflict in the East. The findings, however, disprove this assumption. Results show that there is a perceived sense of closeness between Ukraine and Eastern European countries due to historical and cultural ties as well as modern day partnership. Relations with Russia were perceived as ambiguous despite the armed conflict in the East and the annexation of Crimea. There is also no evidence for “othering of Eastern vis-à-vis Western regions inside Ukraine.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoni Sułek

This article constitutes a meta-analysis of sociological surveys conducted between 1967 and 2010 on the attitudes of Poles towards Jews. This analysis covers factual knowledge about Jews, like/dislike feelings, social distance, cognitive schema, and views regarding Polish–Jewish history. The results reflect a general nonacceptance of strangers as well as a specific type of anti-Semitism with strong roots in and encompassing a broad spectrum of Polish society. In this respect, Poland and some of the other Central Eastern European countries are much alike and distinguish themselves negatively in comparison to Western Europe. Nevertheless, in the last decade a positive shift in Polish attitudes towards Jews has been manifesting itself: feelings of closeness are increasing while disapproving cognitive schemes are decreasing. Further changes depend upon the reconstruction of Polish national identity as well as on the public debates delving into Polish–Jewish relations past and present.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 539-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Ritzen ◽  
Caroline Wehner ◽  
Klaus F. Zimmermann

Abstract Before the Great Recession, the rising income inequality within the “old” European Union has been suggested as an important driver of the increase in Euroskepticism. We revisit this finding for the 27 EU member states from 2006 to 2011, introducing individual negative financial expectations as a further driving factor. We also distinguish between Western and Eastern European countries. In the period of Eastern EU enlargement after 2005, Euroskepticism increased by one third while income inequality on average remained stable. Negative financial expectations are positively related to Euroskepticism in the West and non-significantly negatively related in the East. This suggests that Westerners interpret European integration as a threat, while Easterners view it as a chance. In addition, income inequality lost its role in “old” Europe. An increase of one Gini point decreases the probability of Euroskepticism by half a percentage point in the West, while it has no impact in the East.


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