Immanenzgedanken and Knowledge as Unification. Scientific Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Author(s):  
Paolo Parrini
Author(s):  
Jan Sprenger ◽  
Stephan Hartmann

In this final chapter, we look back on the results of the book and the methods we used. In particular, we enter a discussion whether Bayesian philosophy of science can and should be labeled a proper scientific philosophy due to its combination of formal, conceptual, and empirical methods. Finally, we explore the limitations of the book and we sketch projects for future research (e.g., integrating our results with social epistemology of science and the philosophy of statistical inference).


Author(s):  
Jan Wolenski

Twardowski, one of the most distinguished of Brentano’s students, became famous for his distinction between the content and object of presentations. Twardowski, after his appointment as a professor of philosophy at the University of Lwów (Lvov), considerably limited his own philosophical research for the sake of teaching activities. He set himself an ambitious task: to create a scientific philosophy in Poland. Twardowski fully realized his aim, giving the first step towards the so-called Lwów–Warsaw School, a group of philosophers working in analytic philosophy – in particular, logic, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language. In spite of his concentration on teaching, Twardowski also made remarkable contributions to philosophy after coming to Lwów.


1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo Dingler

The peculiar situation of epistemology has often been remarked upon, meaning that sort of epistemology which issued from English empiricism and whose father is taken to be John Locke. Epistemology in the general sense has existed as long as there has been scientific philosophy, and in truth it has always formed the basis and core of all scientific philosophizing.


Author(s):  
Michael Friedman

Logical positivism (logical empiricism, neo-positivism) originated in Austria and Germany in the 1920s. Inspired by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century revolutions in logic, mathematics and mathematical physics, it aimed to create a similarly revolutionary scientific philosophy purged of the endless controversies of traditional metaphysics. Its most important representatives were members of the Vienna Circle who gathered around Moritz Schlick at the University of Vienna (including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Kurt Gödel, Hans Hahn, Karl Menger, Otto Neurath and Friedrich Waismann) and those of the Society for Empirical Philosophy who gathered around Hans Reichenbach at the University of Berlin (including Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling and Carl Hempel). Although not officially members of either group, the Austrian philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper were, at least for a time, closely associated with logical positivism. The logical positivist movement reached its apogee in Europe in the years 1928–34, but the rise of National Socialism in 1933 marked the effective end of this phase. Thereafter, however, many of its most important representatives emigrated to the USA. Here logical positivism found a receptive audience among such pragmatically, empirically and logically minded American philosophers as Charles Morris, Ernest Nagel and W.V. Quine. Thus transplanted to the English-speaking world of ‘analytic’ philosophy it exerted a tremendous influence – particularly in philosophy of science and the application of logical and mathematical techniques to philosophical problems more generally. This influence began to wane around 1960, with the rise of a pragmatic form of naturalism due to Quine and a historical-sociological approach to the philosophy of science due mainly to Thomas Kuhn. Both of these later trends, however, developed in explicit reaction to the philosophy of logical positivism and thereby attest to its enduring significance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Febta Pratama

ABSTRACK           This research tries to see how the development of Muslim scholarship and travel, especially in the field of philosophy. Describes how the philosophers studied then develop and spread the knowledge gained. The method used is the method of history that consists of four phases i.e. heuristics, critique, interpretation, and historiography. The results showed that there was already a Muslim scholarly tradition since the time of the prophetic. The entry of Muslim civilization to the philosophy starts when the emergence of scientific groups such as the Al Khawarijh, Muta'zillah, and Ahl Sunnah Wal Jammaah. The tradition of science especially philosophy started by a civilization of Islam since the fall of Byzantium and rebuilding of Bait Al Hikmah as a place to translate books from Greece. Then the Muslim tradition of scientific philosophy continued by Muslim figures and also philosophers such as Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, Al Farabi. It is these philosophers who developed a philosophy of science especially become  the reference of Western philosophers in afterwards.Keyword. Philosophy, Philosophers, Muslim


Author(s):  
Sailesh Ranjan Bhattacharyya

Pursuit of Ultimate Reality forms the foundation of philosophical inquiry. The present paper represents a pursuit of this sort. Here I make a humble effort at making philosophy scientific— an effort which is based on the revival of Atomism initially formulated by some ancient philosophers of the East and West: Jainas, Vaisesikas, Democritus, Beucippus and others. Every material particle, however minute, is composite and divisible; naturally, the original 'stuff' of the Universe is required to be 'nonparticular.' Modern physicists have reached the terminal point of the method of analysis and succeeded to transform a very little part of a nuclear mass into an enormous kinetic energy by way of fission and fusion. The 'energy' as such, being the 'power' of activity dormant in the nuclear mass of every atom, is obviously 'non-particular' and original. Thus 'mass' is continually being transformed into 'energy' and conversely, resulting in the evolution of everything that makes up the universe; so that the original power is amenable to transformation and alien to annihilation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-96
Author(s):  
Fakhruddin Fakhruddin

The Qur' an is the guide book for Muslims, not the scientific or philosophical book. It shows the right paths for the people who want _to succeed in their life in both this world and the hereafter. One of the content of the Qur'an is about the philosophy of science. This article describes the concept of the philosophy of science. It will elaborate the relationship between the philosophy and the philosophy of science in the beginning, and then the following part is the philosophy of science in the Qur'an. The discussion of the philosophy of science is always related to the matter of ontology, epistemology and axiology. The ontological aspect in the perspective of the scientific philosophy explains the essence of science. The epistemological aspect shows the ways to collect the knowledge, for instance, through the experience and thought. Finally, the axiological aspect discusses the way to implement the science in daily life, whether it is valuable or value free. The Qur'an since its first revelation of al-Alaq:1-5 has stated that science is very essential, some of them are developed by hard working (kasbi) or just given by God (ladunni). In addition, the Qur' an explains that the science can be achieved by the role of senses, brain, or intuition. Nevertheless, it is stated that the science is not value free. The science should be applied through the regulations which have been determined by the owner of science, the Almighty God, Allah.


Problemata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 81-107
Author(s):  
Zeyad El Nabolsy

I argue that the reception of Hegel in the sub-field of history and philosophy of science has been in part impeded by a misunderstanding of his mature metaphilosophical views. I take Alan Richardson’s influential account of the rise of scientific philosophy as an illustration of such misunderstanding, I argue that the mature Hegel’s metaphilosophical views place him much closer to the philosophers who are commonly taken as paradigms of scientific philosophy than it is commonly thought. Hegel is commonly presented as someone who conceived of philosophy as a science that relied on the solitary genius of the individual thinker, and as a science whose propositions could not and should not be made accessible to “the common people”. Against this view, I argue that Hegel in fact thought that philosophy was a thoroughly anti-individualistic activity, and that he emphasized the importance of the intersubjective accessibility of philosophical discourse. I argue that when we carefully reconstruct Hegel’s reasons for his break with Schelling, and if we pay close attention to his explicit metaphilosophical pronouncements, we can see that he in fact adhered to what I call a “proto-modernist” conception of philosophy as a science. I conclude by pointing out how the mischaracterization of Hegel has served to obscure the existence of a strand of scientific philosophy that emerged by way of an immanent critique of Hegel, namely Marxist philosophy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document