Autonomy, ethical

Author(s):  
Andrews Reath

The core idea of autonomy is that of sovereignty over oneself, self-governance or self-determination: an agent or political entity is autonomous if it is self-governing or self-determining. The ancient Greeks applied the term to city-states. In the modern period, the concept was extended to persons, in particular by Kant, who gave autonomy a central place in philosophical discourse. Kant argued for the autonomy of rational agents by arguing that moral principles, which authoritatively limit how we may act, originate in the exercise of reason. They are thus laws that we give to ourselves, and Kant thought that rational agents are bound only to self-given laws. Much contemporary discussion has focused on the somewhat different topic of personal autonomy, and autonomy continues to be an important value in contemporary liberalism and in ethical theory. It is important to distinguish different senses of autonomy because of variation in how the concept is used. Self-governance or self-determination appears to require some control over the desires and values that move one to action, and some such control is provided by the capacity to subject them to rational scrutiny. Thus, autonomy is often understood as the capacity to critically assess one’s basic desires and values, and to act on those that one endorses on reflection. In other contexts, autonomy is understood as a right, for example as the right to act on one’s own judgment about matters affecting one’s life, without interference by others. The term is also sometimes used in connection with ethics itself, to refer to the thesis that ethical claims cannot be reduced to nonethical claims.

Author(s):  
Simon Lumsden

This paper examines the theory of sustainable development presented by Jeffrey Sachs in The Age of Sustainable Development. While Sustainable Development ostensibly seeks to harmonise the conflict between ecological sustainability and human development, the paper argues this is impossible because of the conceptual frame it employs. Rather than allowing for a re-conceptualisation of the human–nature relation, Sustainable Development is simply the latest and possibly last attempt to advance the core idea of western modernity — the notion of self-determination. Drawing upon Hegel’s account of historical development it is argued that Sustainable Development and the notion of planetary boundaries cannot break out of a dualism of nature and self-determining agents.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 84-88
Author(s):  
Khalifa A. Alfadhel

The downfall of the Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s led to an atmosphere of exaggerated victory, notably captured in Francis Fukuyama's famous book, The End of History, which celebrated the ideological triumph of democracy as a unanimously agreed-upon ideal form of government. The international law literature was not immune from the sense of democratic rejoicing. Of special note in this regard was the notion of an entitlement to democracy, introduced by the late Thomas Franck. Drawing on ideas of self-determination in international law, which themselves date back to the American Declaration of Independence, Franck postulated an “emerging right to democratic governance.” He stipulated that “[s]elf-determination postulates the right of a people organised in an established territory to determine its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of the democratic entitlement.” This essay considers Franck's claims, and argues that his view of democracy was too thin; instead, the essay argues for an instrumental conception of democracy that ties it to other rights and entitlements.


2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 792-806 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nandini Devi

Making decisions is an important component of everyday living, and issues surrounding autonomy and self-determination are crucial for persons with intellectual disabilities. Adults with intellectual disabilities are characterized by the limitations in their intellectual functioning and in their adaptive behavior, which compromises three skill types (conceptual skills, social skills, and practical skills), and this starts before the age of 18. Though persons with intellectual disabilities are characterized by having these limitations, they are thought to face significant decisionmaking challenges due to their disability. Moving away from this generalization, Article 12 (Equal recognition before the law) of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (herewith called “the Convention”) addresses this issue of decision-making for persons with disabilities, recognizing the right to legal capacity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-68
Author(s):  
Jan Podkowik

Abstract The article discusses the concept of personal autonomy as a constitutional fundamental right protected by the Polish Constitution of 1997. Autonomy is not only a constitutional value of an unspecified character but also a right with its own specific normative content. Personal autonomy, also called the right to self-determination, is rooted in natural law. The scope of its constitutional protection is determined and – simultaneously – limited by constitutional standards of an absolute character such as human dignity, non-discrimination, and the like. Autonomy as a constitutional right may be subjected to further restrictions imposed by the legislator in accordance with the principle of proportionality. The legal status of an individual’s right to self determination is thus determined by all the prohibitions and orders resulting directly from the Constitution as well as sub-constitutional statutory provisions which respect the principle of proportionality requirements.


2021 ◽  
pp. 56-63
Author(s):  
Oleg Letov ◽  

This review examines such ethical categories as human dignity, freedom of expression, identity, etc. It is emphasized that when changing sex, this right is a powerful form of control over personal data, especially health data, which may indicate a gender that they are not. identify and not reject. In the context of gender transition, the relationship between the «right to self-determination», «the right to deletion» and «the right to identity and individuality» is discussed. With regard to ethical issues in the fight against coronavirus, much of the ethical debate caused by the pandemic has been about what moral principles can be used to justify such a choice.


2003 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 167-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol L. Caldwell ◽  
Dianne Wasson ◽  
Veronica Brighton ◽  
Lois Dixon ◽  
Mary Ann Anderson

Autonomy is defined as having control over one’s life, not being subject to the will of another, the right of self-determination, and the right to decide, or freedom of choice. An autonomous individual is protected from unwanted interference. There is a consistent theme running through the literature of nursing, medicine, and ethics that assumes that the autonomous individual is sufficiently competent to receive, understand, and make choices based on information available. Using a focus group approach, a Nursing Outcomes Classification label, a definition, and indicators were developed for personal autonomy. The definition and indicators were refined into a conceptually and clinically coherent outcome. Findings include the definition and 11 measurable indicators. Clinical relevance and utility are currently under investigation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-37
Author(s):  
PETRA GÜMPLOVÁ

Abstract:This article provides a normative account of sovereign rights to natural resources on the basis of moral principles which underlie its international legal structure – the right to self-determination and human rights. The first part locates the emergence of the system of sovereign rights to natural resources in the process of the decolonisation and justifies it as a correction of historical injustice of violent appropriation of natural resources. The second part identifies the key moral component and justificatory principle of the system of sovereign rights to natural resources – the right to self-determination. I outline a justice-based interpretation of the right to self-determination and show why rights to natural resources are its corollary. The last part connects rights to self-determination and rights to natural resources to human rights and shows how human rights define the permissible scope of rights to natural resources in two dimensions – the dimension of political legitimacy of the exercise of resource rights and the dimension of the distribution of resource benefits.


Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace

Questions about the possibility and nature of moral motivation occupy a central place in the history of ethics. Philosophers disagree, however, about the role that motivational investigations should play within the larger subject of ethical theory. These disagreements surface in the dispute about whether moral thought is necessarily motivating – ‘internalists’ affirming that it is,‘externalists’ denying this. The disagreement between externalists and internalists reflects a basic difference in how the subject matter of ethics is conceived: externalism goes with the view that ethics is primarily about the truth of theories, construed as sets of propositions, while internalists see morality as a set of principles meant to guide the practical deliberations of individual agents. Internalists interpret questions of objectivity in ethics as questions of practical reason, about the authority of moral principles to regulate our activities. Here controversy has centred on whether the authority of practical principles for a given agent must be grounded in that agent’s antecedent desires, or whether, instead, practical reason can give rise to new motivations. There are also important questions about the content of moral motivations. A moral theory should help us to make sense of the fact that people are often moved to do the right thing, by identifying a basic motive to moral behaviour that is both widespread and intelligible, as a serious source of reasons. Philosophers have accounted for moral motivation in terms of self-interest, sympathy, and a higher-order concern to act in accordance with moral principles. But each of these approaches faces difficult challenges. Can egoistic accounts capture the distinctive character of moral motivation? Can impartial sympathy be integrated within a realistic system of human ends? Can we make sense of responsiveness to moral principle, as a natural human incentive?


Ecclesiology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-251
Author(s):  
Nikolaus Knoepffler ◽  
Martin O’Malley

Abstract A 2020 decision by Germany’s highest court dramatically shifted the national discussion on assisted suicide. The decision stressed the ‘right to a self-determined death’ which must ‘be respected by state and society as an act of personal autonomy and self-determination’. Moreover, it clarified the non-criminality of assistance for suicides by third parties. The reaction of the main churches in Germany to this decision reflects ecclesiological differences. Protestant positions on assisted suicide are defined by pluralism; the Roman Catholic official position remains tied to ontologically-referenced principles of natural law that prohibit assisted suicide as intrinsically evil. Thus, ecumenical efforts on bioethics are complicated by a context where many Protestant leaders prioritize autonomy and pluralism, whereas Roman Catholic leaders stress consensus and orthodoxy. Even official church guidelines on such matters are received differently in Protestant and Roman Catholic communities. For Protestant Christians, an opinion functions primarily as guideline; for Catholic Christians, there is a goal at least of reaching principles reflecting the objective order of God’s creation.


2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Capron

Is information about a person's genome, whether derived from the analysis of DNA or otherwise, protected by the right to privacy? If it is, why and in what manner? It often appears that some people believe that the answer to this question is to be found in molecular genetics itself. They point to the rapid progress being made in basic and applied aspects of this field of biology; this progress has remarkably increased what is known about human genetics. Since knowledge of a particular person's genetic makeup entails a potential intrusion into that person's most private realms and exposes him or her to dire results if revealed to others, they argue, the law needs to protect “genetic privacy.” There is nothing inherently wrong with this account, but it certainly presupposes that we know—and agree about—what it means to protect privacy and, indeed, what interests are implicated in the concept and why they matter. Rather than make this assumption, in this essay I first elaborate a concept of privacy before turning to the potential privacy implications that arise at the intersection of human genetics and the field of insurance. I argue that the core value here is self-determination broadly conceived—that control over one's genetic information may be important for achieving self-determination—but that at least in the context of contracts for life insurance, we should be reluctant to recognize “rights” that would permanently preclude the use of genetic data by insurers.


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