scholarly journals Is the Peer Presence Effect on Heightened Adolescent Risky Decision-Making only Present in Males?

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 693-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivy N. Defoe ◽  
Judith Semon Dubas ◽  
Edwin S. Dalmaijer ◽  
Marcel A. G. van Aken

AbstractSocial neurodevelopmental imbalance models posit that peer presence causes heightened adolescent risk-taking particularly during early adolescence. Evolutionary theory suggests that these effects would be most pronounced in males. However, the small but growing number of experimental studies on peer presence effects in adolescent risky decision-making showed mixed findings, and the vast majority of such studies did not test for the above-described gender and adolescent phase moderation effects. Moreover, most of those studies did not assess the criterion validity of the employed risky decision-making tasks. The current study was designed to investigate the abovementioned hypotheses among a sample of 327 ethnically-diverse Dutch early and mid-adolescents (49.80% female; Mage = 13.61). No main effect of peer presence on the employed risky-decision making task (i.e., the stoplight game) was found. However, the results showed a gender by peer presence moderation effect. Namely, whereas boys and girls engaged in equal levels of risks when they completed the stoplight game alone, boys engaged in more risk-taking than girls when they completed this task together with two same-sex peers. In contrast, adolescent phase did not moderate peer presence effects on risk-taking. Finally, the results showed that performance on the stoplight game predicted self-reported real-world risky traffic behavior, alcohol use and delinquency. Taken together, using a validated task, the present findings demonstrate that individual differences (i.e., gender) can determine whether the social environment (i.e., peer presence) affect risk-taking in early- and mid-adolescents. The finding that performance on a laboratory risky decision-making task can perhaps help identify adolescents that are vulnerable to diverse types of heightened risk behaviors is an important finding for science as well as prevention and intervention efforts.

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathy T. Do ◽  
Paul B. Sharp ◽  
Eva H. Telzer

Heightened risk taking in adolescence has long been attributed to valuation systems overwhelming the deployment of cognitive control. However, this explanation of why adolescents engage in risk taking is insufficient given increasing evidence that risk-taking behavior can be strategic and involve elevated cognitive control. We argue that applying the expected-value-of-control computational model to adolescent risk taking can clarify under what conditions control is elevated or diminished during risky decision-making. Through this lens, we review research examining when adolescent risk taking might be due to—rather than a failure of—effective cognitive control and suggest compelling ways to test such hypotheses. This effort can resolve when risk taking arises from an immaturity of the control system itself, as opposed to arising from differences in what adolescents value relative to adults. It can also identify promising avenues for channeling cognitive control toward adaptive outcomes in adolescence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivy N. Defoe ◽  
Judith Semon Dubas ◽  
Daniel Romer

Surveys concur that adolescents disproportionately engage in many real-world risk behaviors, compared with children and adults. Recently researchers have employed laboratory risky decision-making tasks to replicate this apparent heightened adolescent risk-taking. This review builds on the main findings of the first meta-analysis of such age differences in risky decision-making in the laboratory. Overall, although adolescents engage in more risky decision-making than adults, adolescents engage in risky decision-making equal to children. However, adolescents take fewer risks than children on tasks that allow the option of opting out of taking a risk. To reconcile findings on age differences in risk-taking in the real-world versus the laboratory, an integrative framework merges theories on neuropsychological development with ecological models that emphasize the importance of risk exposure in explaining age differences in risk-taking. Policy insights and recent developments are discussed.


Author(s):  
Joshua B. Hurwitz

Increased real-time risk-taking under sleep loss could be marked by changes in risk perception or acceptance. Risk-perception processes are those involved in estimating real-time parameters such as the speeds and distances of hazardous objects. Risk-acceptance processes relate to response choices given risk estimates. Risk-taking under fatigue was studied using a simulated intersection-crossing driving task in which subjects decided when it was safe to cross an intersection as an oncoming car approached from the cross street. The subjects performed this task at 3-hour intervals over a 36-hour period without sleep. Results were modeled using a model of real-time risky decision making that has perceptual components that process speed, time and distance information, and a decisional component for accepting risk. Results showed that varying a parameter for the decisional component across sessions best accounted for variations in performance relating to time of day.


2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (6) ◽  
pp. 941-956
Author(s):  
Wijnand AP van Tilburg ◽  
Nikhila Mahadevan

We examined the impact of viewing exemplars on people’s behaviour in risky decision-making environments. Specifically, we tested if people disproportionally choose to view and then imitate the behaviour of successful (vs. unsuccessful) others, which in the case of risky decision-making increases risk-taking and can hamper performance. In doing so, our research tested how a fundamental social psychological process (social influence) interacts with a fundamental statistical phenomenon (regression to the mean) to produce biases in decision-making. Experiment 1 ( N = 96) showed that people indeed model their own behaviour after that of a successful exemplar, resulting in more risky behaviour and poorer outcomes. Experiment 2 ( N = 208) indicated that people disproportionately choose to examine and then imitate most successful versus least successful exemplars. Experiment 3 ( N = 381) replicated Experiment 2 in a context where participants were offered the freedom to examine any possible exemplar, or no exemplar whatsoever, and across different incentive conditions. The results have implications for decision-making in a broad range of social contexts, such as education, health, and finances where risk-taking can have detrimental outcomes, and they may be particularly helpful to understand the role of social influence in gambling behaviour.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karita E. Ojala ◽  
Lieneke K. Janssen ◽  
Mahur M. Hashemi ◽  
Monique H. M. Timmer ◽  
Dirk E. M. Geurts ◽  
...  

AbstractDopamine has been associated with risky decision-making, as well as with pathological gambling, a behavioural addiction characterized by excessive risk-taking behaviour. However, the specific mechanisms through which dopamine might act to foster risk-taking and pathological gambling remain elusive. Here we test the hypothesis that this might be achieved, in part, via modulation of subjective probability weighing during decision-making. Healthy controls (n = 21) and pathological gamblers (n = 16) played a decision-making task involving choices between sure monetary options and risky gambles both in the gain and loss domains. Each participant played the task twice, either under placebo or the dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonist sulpiride, in a double-blind, counter-balanced, design. A prospect theory modelling approach was used to estimate subjective probability weighting and sensitivity to monetary outcomes. Consistent with prospect theory, we found that participants presented a distortion in the subjective weighting of probabilities, i.e. they overweighted low probabilities and underweighted moderate to high probabilities, both in the gain and loss domains. Compared with placebo, sulpiride attenuated this distortion in the gain domain. Across drugs, the groups did not differ in their probability weighting, although in the placebo condition, gamblers consistently underweighted losing probabilities. Overall, our results reveal that dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonism modulates the subjective weighting of probabilities in the gain domain, in the direction of more objective, economically rational decision-making.Significance statementDopamine has been implicated in risky decision-making and gambling addiction, but the exact mechanisms underlying this influence remain partly elusive. Here we tested the hypothesis that dopamine modulates subjective probability weighting, by examining the effect of a dopaminergic drug on risk-taking behaviour, both in healthy individuals and pathological gamblers. We found that selectively blocking dopamine D2/D3 receptors diminished the typically observed distortion of winning probabilities, characterized by an overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities. This made participants more linear in their subjective estimation of probabilities, and thus more rational in their decision-making behaviour. Healthy participants and pathological gamblers did not differ in their risk-taking behaviour, except in the placebo condition in which gamblers consistently underweighted losing probabilities.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lydia Hickman ◽  
Connor Keating ◽  
Jennifer Cook ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig

Everyday risky decisions are susceptible to influence from a variety of sources, including the social context in which decisions take place. In the general population, people update their risk preferences based on knowledge of choices made by previous participants. In this study, we examined the influence of social information on the risky decision-making of autistic adults, a group in which differences in social processing have been observed. Autistic and non-autistic adults completed a risky decision-making task in the presence of both social and non-social information, either choosing for themselves or someone else on each trial. Notably, the social information comprised tokens that represented preferences of previous participants and was thus devoid of overt social cues such as faces or gestures. The non-social condition comprised a previously validated method where tokens represented “preferences” generated by weighted roulette wheels. Participants significantly shifted their choices when the influence (social or non-social) suggested a less risky choice. There were no group differences in risky decision-making when deciding for oneself compared to others. Interestingly, no differences in the effects of social and non-social influence were found between autistic and non-autistic adults. Considering previous evidence of social influence differences when using overtly social cues, we suggest that the removal of social cues in our paradigm led to comparable performance between the autistic and non-autistic groups. The current study paves the way for future studies investigating a confounding effect of social cues, which will lead to important insight for theories of social influence in autism.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominic S. Fareri ◽  
Joanne Stasiak ◽  
Peter Sokol-Hessner

Choices under conditions of risk often have consequences not just for ourselves, but for others. Yet, it is unclear how the other’s identity (stranger, close friend, etc.) influences risky choices made on their behalf. Here, two groups of undergraduates made a series of risky economic decisions for themselves, for another person, or for both themselves and another person (i.e., shared outcomes); one group of participants made choices involving a same-sex stranger (n = 29), the other made choices involving a same-sex close friend (n = 28). Hierarchical Bayesian Estimation of computations underlying risky decision-making revealed that relative to choosing for themselves, people were more risk averse, more loss averse, and more consistent when choices involved another person. Interestingly, partner identity differentially modulated decision computations. People became risk neutral and more consistent when choosing for friends relative to strangers. In sum, these findings suggest that the complexity of the social world is mirrored in its nuanced consequences for our choices.


SLEEP ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (Supplement_2) ◽  
pp. A35-A36
Author(s):  
Garrett Hisler ◽  
David Dickinson ◽  
Brant Hasler

Abstract Introduction Cognitive performance and decision making have been shown to suffer under conditions of misalignment between circadian preference and time-of-assessment; however, little is known about how misalignment between the timing of sleep and circadian rhythm impacts decision making. To this end, this study captured naturally occurring degrees of alignment between the timing of sleep and the circadian rhythm (i.e., alignment of sleep-wake timing with circadian phase) to examine if greater misalignment predicts worse behavioral decision making. Methods Over the course of two weeks, 32 participants (18–22 years of age; 61% female; 69% White) continuously wore actigraphs and completed two overnight in-lab visits (Thursday and Sunday) in which both dim light melatonin onset (DLMO) and behavioral decision-making (risk taking, framing, and strategic reasoning tasks) were assessed. Sleep-wake timing was assessed by actigraphic midsleep from the two nights prior to each in-lab visit. Alignment was operationalized as the interval between DLMO and average midsleep. Multilevel modeling was used to predict performance on decision making tasks from circadian alignment during each in-lab visit; nonlinear associations were also examined. Results Misalignment characterized by shorter time between DLMO and midsleep predicted decision-making in a curvilinear fashion (i.e., squared misalignment term predicted performance). Specifically, shorter time between DLMO and midsleep predicted greater risk-taking under conditions of potential loss (B = .10, p = .04), but less risk-taking under conditions of potential reward (B = -.14, p = .04) in a curvilinear fashion. Misalignment did not predict decision-making in the framing and strategic reasoning tasks. Conclusion Findings suggest that naturally occurring degrees of misalignment between the timing of sleep and the circadian rhythm may impact risky decision-making, further extending accumulating evidence that sleep/circadian factors are tied to risk-taking preferences. Future studies will need to replicate findings and experimentally probe whether manipulating alignment influences risky decision making. Support (if any) R21AA023209; R01DA044143


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