Benefits of Downward Earnings Management and Political Connection: Evidence from Government Subsidy and Market Pricing

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 255-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Jiang ◽  
Yuanyuan Hu ◽  
Honghui Zhang ◽  
Donghua Zhou
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Dwikky Darmawan ◽  
Weny Putri

The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of political connection toward the earnings management of service sector companies with control variables firm size and audit quality. Firm�s political connection measured by using dummy variable. Earnings management is proxied by discretionary accrual which is measured by using Modified Jones Model. The research data applied in this study are the secondary data which are taken from the annual reports of service sector companies that listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange of 2016-2017 periods. There are 330 observations fit as sample, which are taken by using purposive sampling method. Data are processed by applying the multiple linear regression test. The result show that the political connection had positive but not significant influence to earnings management. Firm size had negative but not significant influence to earnings management. Whereas the audit quality had a negative and significant influence to earnings management.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-593
Author(s):  
Enni Savitri ◽  

Political connections have an essential role in the earnings management strategy. Political connections can influence earnings management practices. The research aimed to analyze the effect of politics and family ownership on earnings management practices. The sample is 92 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2016-2019. Methods of data using a purposive sampling method. Multiple linear regression is an analytical tool used to test the hypothesis. The results show that political connections influence profits. The company pays more attention to the company’s reputation and maintains the privileges of the political relationship that has existed between the company and the government. Family ownership affects earnings management. Family ownership has control rights that can be used to influence management in company profits. The novelty of this research is that political connections can influence earnings management.


ACCRUALS ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-225
Author(s):  
Mala Ayu Anggita ◽  
Trisandi Eka Putri ◽  
Asep Kurniawan

The purpose of this study to determine the effect of tax avoidance, earnings management, and political connection on the corporate social responsibility disclosure (case studies on manufacturing companies listed on the idx for the period 2016-2017). This study uses a quantitative approach. The population in this study were all manufacturing companies listed on the IDX for the period 2016-2017. The analytical method used in this study is descriptive analysis, classic assumption test and multiple linear regression analysis. The results showed that partially, tax avoidance and earnings management had no effect on corporate social responsibility disclosure, and political connections had a positive effect on corporate social responsibility disclosure. While simultaneously, tax avoidance, earnings management and political connection have an effect on jointly on corporate social responsibility disclosure


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 255
Author(s):  
Mohammad Abedalrahman Alhmood ◽  
Hasnah Shaari ◽  
Redhwan Al-dhamari

The Chief Executive Officer (CEOs) tends to be the most influential member of a corporation as they exert control over corporate decisions such as financial disclosure, board structure, and company performance in ensuring enhanced corporate performance and earnings. The issue of earnings management (EM) that has captured the attention of researchers may be among the most critical factors that are linked to financial statement manipulation. Therefore, the current study explored the effects of the personal characteristics of CEOs on real earnings management (REM) practices in Jordan. Data of 58 companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for six years from 2013 to 2018 were utilised to achieve this study’s objectives. The results of this study revealed that CEOs’ experience had a significantly positive association with REM. Meanwhile, CEOs’ tenure had no impact on REM among Jordanian firms. Also, the results exposed the presence of a significantly negative association between CEO duality and REM. Finally, CEOs’ political connection was found to have a significantly positive association with REM. This study offers empirical evidence on the effect of CEO characteristics on REM and how such characteristics can lead to exploitation, which brings an impact on the financial reporting quality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (8) ◽  
pp. 909-929
Author(s):  
Armaya'u Alhaji Sani ◽  
Rohaida Abdul Latif ◽  
Redhwan Ahmed Al-Dhamari

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of CEO discretion on the real earnings management and to explore whether the discretion of the CEO to ensure accurate and reliable financial reports is influenced by the political connection of board members. Design/methodology/approach Using the generalized method of movement to control the potential endogeneity on the sample of listed companies in Nigeria, the study conducted several checks using Driscoll–Kraay panel data regression with standard error to robust the main findings. Findings The paper provides evidence that CEO Discretion reduces the tendency of real earnings management and improve the reporting quality. However, the CEO’s discretion to provide reliable financial reports and to reduce the likely earnings manipulation is overturn by the presence of politically connected directors. Originality/value Existing studies on CEO attributes and earnings management in Nigeria fail to explain why CEOs were involved in corporate financial scandals. This paper suggests that the presence of politically connected directors is what override and upturn the CEO discretion to dwell into real earnings manipulations. Prior studies measured political connection using a dummy variable (Chaney et al., 2011; Osazuwa et al., 2016; Tee, 2018), this paper measured political connection using the proportion of politically connected directors. This is on the idea that the presence of more politically connected directors may give them the power to override the CEOs decision.


Author(s):  
Roopini A/P Sriram ◽  
Wan Sallha Yusoff

This paper aims to perform a systematic review of prior literature, with the focus being on earnings management and the influence of political connection towards this practice. This systematic review was made on a total of twenty-five (25) journals that firstly has a clear definition of political connection, and secondly has studied earnings management in politically connected companies. There have been multiple definitions of political connection, whereby the most common proxy is if any of the company’s board of directors is or was a Member of Parliament, or is or was holding any Minister position, or is closely related to any politician or political party. Furthermore, this systematic review will display the mixed results from prior literature, in which some studies showed a positive influence of political connection on earnings management, and on the other hand, overall more studies showed a negative impact of political connection on earnings management.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 128
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Liao ◽  
Weijian Zhang ◽  
Xiaohui Tao

Earnings management behaviour lowers the quality of accounting information of private enterprises to a certain extent. Hence, it is necessary to study the relationship between political connection and earnings management of private enterprises. Through the investigation and statistics of the private companies in China’s Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Board Market from 2013 to 2017, this paper performs empirical analysis to verify the relationship between political connection and earnings management. It shows that political connection can weaken accrual-based earnings management level, which helps private firms obtain more preferential policies and financing help. Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations, which provide reference for the governance of private enterprises and the capital market.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 388-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mouna Ben Rejeb Attia ◽  
Naima Lassoued ◽  
Anis Attia

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to test the political costs hypothesis in emerging economies characterized by interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. The paper uses executives’ political connection and state control to measure firms’ political costs. Design/methodology/approach Based on a sample of Tunisian firms, univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test whether firms’ political costs have any impact on earnings management. Findings The empirical analysis indicates that the executives’ political connection is not directly related to earnings management. However, the interaction between executives’ political connection and the state control affects the firm’s sensitivity to political pressure and its earnings management practices. More specifically, this study provides evidence that non-connected firms and state-controlled firms attempt to use accounting policies to decrease their earnings especially during periods of the former government when they had to face high political costs. This finding is robust to comparing means of political cost indicators between different groups. Indeed, private firms with political connection enjoy a significantly lower insurance right, tax and donations and grants compared to other firms. Research limitations/implications This study provides empirical evidence for the specific application of accounting theory in emerging economies. Practical implications Political influence may be an important criterion that will be used by auditors and investors to appreciate and detect specific manipulations of accounting earnings. Similarly, regulators should be aware of the political factors effect on discretionary behavior of managers to provide appropriate rules and standards. Originality/value The study is a pioneer in proving that a firm’s size is not always a suitable measure of its political cost. It extends the accounting literature on the role of political economy in the application of the political costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is confirmed in emerging economies by providing new and significantly measure of firms’ political costs


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