scholarly journals Governmental-Funded Religious Associations and Non-Discrimination Rules: On Immunity and Public Funding

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nahshon Perez

Many religious associations exhibit internal norms that differ from liberal norms and rules. Such norms often directly contradict the non-discrimination norms and rules that are part and parcel of the liberal democracies in which these associations operate. Religious associations often are considered, in both legal and scholarly writings, exempt from at least some of these norms and rules. This tension between broad societal non-discrimination1 rules and the norms of specific religious associations has won the attention of scholars and courts.2 In many such debates, the background assumption is that these religious groups are voluntary associations functioning within a model of separation between religion and state; that is, such associations operate through the free choices of their members and individuals are as free to leave the associations as they were to form them.3 While theorizing about non-discrimination rules and whether they apply to religious associations that are funded via the contributions of their members is of obvious importance, this article examines a distinct problem: that of discrimination within religious associations that are directly supported by democratic governments. Recent research on religion-state relations4 has pointed out that, in many democratic countries, religious associations are funded by the government to a considerable extent. The tension between non-discrimination norms and the presumed rights of the state-funded religious associations to be exempted from such rules, however, is neglected in the literature. Perhaps this is because the most prominent legal cases of this kind were tried at the European Court of Human Rights5 and the U.K. Supreme Court,6 rather than the more conspicuous U.S. Supreme Court. This article asks the following question: in what way, if at all, does receiving governmental funding change the presumed right of religious associations to be exempted from non-discrimination rules? The ‘immunity thesis’—the idea that religious associations enjoy the right to be exempted from non-discrimination rules—is not challenged here: this article argues that if there is such a right to immunity, receiving governmental funding does not necessarily eliminate it. Much depends on how each case maintains the balance between the autonomy of religious associations7 and the protection of individual citizens from discrimination that impacts important civil interests such as access to jobs or high-quality education. Of the suggested variables identified to test this balance, three are internal to the associations’ structure: the centrality of the potentially illiberal norm to the funded religious association; the kind of violation of non-discrimination rules (either internal or external discrimination, see below); and the willingness of the religious association to internalize the cost of the discrimination. Two additional variables that can be used to test the balance of competing social values are external to the association and depend on the political-legal environment in which the association functions: the quantity of funding that the government makes available to the association, and the process by which potentially competing religious associations can become eligible for recognized and funded status. A multivariable ‘test’ is required in order to determine whether and how governmental funded religious associations can still claim immunity when practicing discriminatory norms.

Author(s):  
Anushka Singh

Liberal democracies claim to give constitutional and legal protection of varying degrees to the right to free speech of which political speech and the right to dissent are extensions. Within the right to freedom of expression, however, some category of speeches do not enjoy protection as they are believed to be ‘injurious’ to society. One such unprotected form of political speech is sedition which is criminalized for the repercussions it may have on the authority of the government and the state. The cases registered in India in recent months under the law against sedition show that the law in its wide and diverse deployment was used against agitators in a community-based pro-reservation movement, a group of university students for their alleged ‘anti-national’ statements, anti-liquor activists, to name a few. Set against its contemporary use, this book has used sedition as a lens to probe the fate of political speech in liberal democracies. The work is done in a comparative framework keeping the Indian experience as its focus, bringing in inferences from England, USA, and Australia to intervene and contribute to the debates on the concept of sedition within liberal democracies at large. On the basis of an analytical enquiry into the judicial discourse around sedition, the text of the sedition laws, their political uses, their quotidian existence, and their entanglement with the counter-terror legislations, the book theorizes upon the life of the law within liberal democracies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 399
Author(s):  
Akmal Adicahya

Access to justice is everyone rights that have to be fulfilled by the government. The regulation number 16 year 2011 of legal aid is an instrument held by the government to guarantee the right. The regulation allowed the participation of non-advocates to provide the legal aid. Through this policy, government emphasizes that:1) Indonesia is a state law which legal aid is an obliged instrument; 2) the prohibition of non-advocate to participate in legal aid is not relevant due to inadequate amount of advocate and citizen seek for justice (justiciabelen), and the advocate is not widely extended throughout Indonesia; 3) Non-Advocates, especially lecturer and law student are widely spread; 4) there are no procedural law which prohibits non-advocate to provide a legal aid. Those conditions are enough argument for government to strengthen the participation of non-advocates in providing legal aid. Especially for The Supreme Court to revise The Book II of Guidance for Implementing Court’s Job and Administration.Keywords: legal aid, non-advocate, justice


2017 ◽  
pp. 221-247
Author(s):  
Rajesh Chakrabarti ◽  
Kaushiki Sanyal

This chapter narrates the saga of the Right to Food Security. Briefly pointing out various prior food movements, the chapter dates the movement to 2001 in Rajasthan with a writ petition at the Supreme Court. The SC took up the issue with surprising enthusiasm issuing order after order to force the government to comply with reports and action. The government, while not antagonistic, was apathetic. Encouraged by the court orders the activists gathered under a single banner of Right to Food Campaign in 2004 and built on the campaign in court as well as on the ground. Political support finally came when the issue entered UPA’s election manifesto in 2009. Post UPA victory, the NAC submitted its draft bill in 2010 but a substantially altered bill finally got enacted in 2013. The movement reflects a combination of Punctuated Equilibrium Framework and Advocacy Coalition Framework.


Author(s):  
Akhileshwar Pathak

The case discusses the issues related to Zee Tele Films Limited's claims that the Board of Cricket Control of India was “state” and could act arbitrarily in the award of telecasting rights. The “state” as defined in Article 12 includes “other authorities”, and these are subject to the constitutional limitations. The right to equality requires them to not act arbitrarily. A body which is an instrumentality or agency of the government is “other authority”. The term has been subject to judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court, by a majority judgement, in the Zee Tele Films Case ruled that the Board is not “other authorities” within Article 12 of the Constitution.


Legal Studies ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Higgins

The paper examines the controversial issue of referral fees for personal injury claims. It looks at the function of referral fees in the civil justice system, their relationship to the guarantees of access to court and the right to seek legal assistance in ECHR Art 6, and the debate about promoting access to justice or a litigious society. It examines the experience of the referral fees market in England and Wales, where the costs of referrals have risen dramatically and there is concern that referrers are auctioning their customers to the highest bidder rather than helping them find competent lawyers. Sir Rupert Jackson recommended banning referral fees in his report on the costs of civil litigation, and the Government has announced it will implement this recommendation. The paper considers the potential effects of a ban on competition in the legal services market and its compatibility with UK and EU competition law. The paper argues that a combination of better regulation of the industry and proper regulation of costs rules is a better and more proportionate way of controlling legal costs and the quality of legal services than an outright ban. While referral fees have not delivered all the benefits one would expect from a for-profit independent referrals service, they can help people obtain information about their legal rights, and competent lawyers to enforce them. This service is particularly valuable given that the state has substantially cut public funding of the civil justice system in recent years.


Intersections ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ákos Kopper ◽  
Pál Susánszky ◽  
Gergely Tóth ◽  
Márton Gerő

In recent years, many theoretical and empirical analyses about the changing regimes of Central and Eastern Europe have been written, pointing out the authoritarian tendencies and radicalization in the region. Hungary is a significant case in the changing landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The right-wing government rules the country with incontestable force, despising and disrespecting the norms of liberal democracies. Although the general impression is that the government has such a strong grip on power that resisting it is futile, in fact, it only enjoys only the support of 30 per cent of Hungarian citizens. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect the opposition to be able to effectively mobilize against the regime. In reality, no political opponent seems to stand a chance of defeating it. In order to explain why this is so, we focus on the way Orbán constantly creates images of ‘the enemy’ that keep alive an atmosphere of vigilance that blocks the efforts of critical actors to efficiently mobilize citizens. Since the political system in Hungary is highly centralized, the prime-minister’s speeches epitomize the logic and ideology of the regime. Our aim is to understand the mechanism through which the dominant political actors frame the enemy in a system of images, thereby creating an environment where critical actors are stripped of the resources needed to mobilize against them.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Aufi Imaduddin

The national exam is a form of national level learning evaluation that has been set by the government to determine student learning outcomes. However, in the implementation of the national exam has a negative impact on students, teachers and schools. So lately there has been a renewed discourse about the elimination of the national examination, it began with the policy of the Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture to abolish the national examination in 2021. Especially if we examine further that legal efforts to stop the implementation of the national examination have existed since 2006 and the peak in 2009 was the decision of the Supreme Court number: 2596 K / PDT / 2008 which in essence required the government to stop the implementation of the national examination before resolving various existing problems. Therefore, the writer is interested in asking logically to think about the urgency of abolishing the national exam after the decision of the Supreme Court. In this paper, the method used by the author is a qualitative method based on social facts that occur based on juridical reasons based on the laws and regulations related to research. The results of this study found that the implementation of the national exam has claimed justice for students in obtaining their human rights in obtaining education that has been mentioned in the 1945 Constitution and is not in accordance with educational thought according to Ki Hajar Dewantara, as well as causing various depressive pressures which have an impact on their minds stressed and suicidal students. The implementation of national exams has also revoked justice for teachers, where teachers in their teaching are supposed to educate students well and develop their students' thinking instincts, with the national examination the teacher only drills students to memorize and do exercises that lead to the national exam. Recalling also that the implementation of national examinations in a juridical manner in the decision of the Supreme Court has violated various laws and regulations regarding education in Indonesia. Therefore, the elimination of the national exam will give back the right to justice for students, teachers and schools according to their respective proportions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 171
Author(s):  
Wojciech Kwiatkowski

First Bank of the United States as a Prototype for the Federal Reserve SystemSummaryThe article describes the history of the First Bank of the United Statesfirst banking- institution, that was charted in XVII-th century North America as an effect of a cooperation of two federal bodies – Congress and the President. Although, the federal government possessed only 20 %, of the shares with federal licences it could conduct its activity on territory of the whole country. Moreover – the Bank is now referred to as the first central bank in the United States because of its national scope and services rendered to the federal government. The Bank helped the government to obtain emergency loans, facilitated the payment of taxes, and served as the receiver and disburser of the public funds. In addition, it issued bank notes and made them fully redeemable in coin. During a 20-years period the Bank achieved a commercial success and maintained a financial stability. However, in 1811 Congress did not renew the charter because the Bank’s constitutionality was questioned.Alexander Hamilton (the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury), who was [the followerof creation of the bank, already in 1790 assumed that the federal government had the power to charter banks because the Constitution granted the government the right to establish institutions necessary for its operations. Addifferent viewpoint was presented by Thomas Jefferson who favored a more decentralized government and believed that only the states could charter banks under the Constitution. Furthermore – because the Constitution did not expressly grant the power to Congress, he reasoned that federally chartered banks were unconstitutional. Finally in 1819, as a far-reaching decision, the Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall followed Hamilton’s reasoning and ruled in case McCulloch vs Maryland that the Second Bank of the United States was constitutional. For U.S. federal government this decision of the Supreme Court was very important about 200 years later – in 1913, when president Wilson, many politicians’ and main U.S. bankers decided to create the Federal Reserve System.


2016 ◽  
pp. 709
Author(s):  
Graham Mayeda

Bill C-30 (the Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act) and the Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act are two recent attempts by the Canadian government to create incentives for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Online Service Providers (OSPs) to disclose the subscriber information of Internet users to government agencies. In this article, the author argues that while such provisions may not violate section 8 of the Charter based on current judicial interpretation, they ought to be found unconstitutional. To date, the Supreme Court of Canada’s search and seizure jurisprudence uses a normative framework that does not distinguish between defining the right to privacy and justifying limitations to it. This approach is not consistent with that taken for other Charter rights. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court in R v. Spencer and R v. Fearon may signal a slight shift, but they do not go far enough. If courts defined privacy interests more broadly than under current law and required the government to justify restrictions on these interests under section 1, this would create a legal regime that achieves a better balance between competing privacy and security interests.


2012 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 418-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saba Mahmood

The right to religious freedom is widely regarded as a crowning achievement of secular-liberal democracies, one that guarantees the peaceful coexistence of religiously diverse populations. Enshrined in national constitutions and international laws and treaties, the right to religious liberty promises to ensure two stable goods: (1) the ability to choose one's religion freely without coercion by the state, church, or other institutions; and (2) the creation of a polity in which one's economic, civil, legal, or political status is unaffected by one's religious beliefs. While all members of a polity are supposed to be protected by this right, modern wisdom has it that religious minorities are its greatest beneficiaries and their ability to practice their traditions without fear of discrimination is a critical marker of a tolerant and civilized polity. The right to religious freedom marks an important distinction between liberal secularism and the kind practiced in authoritarian states (such as China, Syria, or the former Soviet Union): while the latter abide by the separation of religion and state (a central principle of political secularism), they also regularly abrogate religious freedoms of their minority and majority populations. Despite claims to religious neutrality, liberal secular states frequently regulate religious affairs but they do so in accord with a strong concern for protecting the individual's right to practice his or her religion freely, without coercion or state intervention.


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