scholarly journals Stepping Into the Same River Twice? Judicial Independence in Old and New Authoritarianism

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (7) ◽  
pp. 1316-1326
Author(s):  
Zoltán Szente

AbstractThe study seeks to answer the question of whether there are similarities between the methods used to limit judicial independence in Hungary during the last phase of the communist regime, i.e. before the democratic transition, and today, when many scholars believe that an authoritarian transition is taking place in this country. For this purpose, I argue that despite the undeniable fundamental differences between the political and legal system of these two periods, the mechanisms and ways as the independence of judiciary were and are influenced by the government can plausibly be compared. The analysis seems to support this presumption: both the formal instruments and the informal channels of influence in the hands of the ruling political forces show a number of similarities. Thus, even if there are differences in the degree of their application and result, from centralizing the system of judicial administration to replacing court leaders with politically loyal people there are a number of instruments that enable central government to influence the judiciary, while maintaining the appearance of judicial independence.

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raúúl Beníítez Manaut ◽  
Andrew Selee ◽  
Cynthia J. Arnson

Mexico's democratic transition has helped reduce, if not eliminate, the threat of renewed armed conflict in Chiapas. However, absent more active measures from the government and the Ejéército Zapatista de Liberacióón Nacional (EZLN) to seek a permanent peace agreement and come to terms with the legacies of the past, the conflict will linger on in an unstable déétente, which we term ““armed peace.”” While this situation is far better than the open hostilities of the past, it also belies the promise of a fully democratic society in which all citizens are equally included in the political process. La transicióón democráática en Mééxico ha contribuido a reducir, si no eliminar, la posibilidad de que el conflicto armado en Chiapas se reanude. Sin embargo, sin esfuerzos mas activos por parte del gobierno y del Ejéército Zapatista de Liberacióón Nacional (EZLN) para buscar un acuerdo de paz permanente y saldar cuentas con el pasado, el conflicto permaneceráá en un estado inestable que llamamos ““paz armada””. Aunque esta situacióón es mucho mejor que las tensiones y agresiones del pasado, no cumple los requisitos de una sociedad plenamente democráática en que todos los ciudadanos participan en condiciones de igualdad en el proceso políítico.


PCD Journal ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
Erickson D Calata ◽  
Reginald G. Ugaddan

There are frequent calls to enhance citizens' trust in government to pave the way towards a new paradigm of participatory governance and strong citizen support for government. In various realms, citizens may directly or indirectly engage with the government through various available mediums, even though, despite the availability of various policies and services provided by the government, citizens are generally passive and adamant in trusting the public sector. While many studies have explored a set of determinants that influence citizens' trust in government (i.e., central government, local government, parliament, and the legal system), few studies have ascertained the relationship and the role of social trust, happiness, governance, and political systems. These are critical factors that may influence trust in government. To address this gap, this study draws on the theoretical lens of social capital theory, proposing that cognitive social trust and citizen happiness—environment and performance—are the most likely predictors of citizen trust in government. This study assumes that citizens' perceptions of governance and political systems will moderate the effect of social trust and happiness on trust in government. Using data from the Asia Barometer Survey 2007, and focusing on data collected from the Philippines, this study tests a latent model employing the structural equation modelling technique. It finds that happiness negatively predicts trust in the central government and the legal system, while all other predictors do not have a significant effect. The findings also show that the political system moderates the impact of social trust and happiness on trust in government. Finally, this article points out its theoretical, empirical, and practical implications and provides directions for future research.


Author(s):  
Charlotte Heyl

In a liberal conception of democracy, courts play an important role in facilitating the rule of law by controlling the abidance to rules and by holding the political branches of government accountable. The power of constitutional review is a crucial element for exercising horizontal accountability. Courts across Africa are vested with the power of constitutional review, and, generally speaking, their independence has substantially increased since the beginning of the 1990s—although African courts enjoy overall less independence than the global average for courts’ independence. Within the African region, the level of judicial independence varies widely, between contexts that rarely allow judicial independence and contexts where courts have more power to challenge the government. Furthermore, across the continent, African courts experience undue interference—which frequently takes place informally. Informal interference can occur through the biased appointments of judges, verbal and physical threats, violent attacks, the payment of bribes, or the ouster of sitting judges. Informal networks—held together by ties based on shared educational trajectories, common leisure activities, religion, kinship relations, or political affiliations—are the channels through which such pressure can be transmitted. Yet judges also can actively build informal networks: namely, with the legal community, civil society, and international donors, so as to insulate themselves against undue interference and to increase institutional legitimacy. Research has shown that the agency of judges and courts in signaling impartial decision-making, as well as in reaching out to society, is crucial to constructing legitimacy in the African context. In contrast, the explanatory power of electoral competition as an incentive for power holders to support judicial independence is not straightforward in the context of Africa’s political regimes, where the prospect of losing office is associated with financial, and in some cases even physical, insecurity. However, research on judicial politics in Africa is still only preliminary, because the field requires more comparative studies in order to fully reveal the political repercussions on Africa’s judiciaries as well as to delineate the scope conditions of the prominent theories explaining judicial independence.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 1871-1900
Author(s):  
Patrick O'Brien

AbstractAlthough Ireland is often cited as part of the vanguard of countries adopting forms of judicial self-governance in the 1990s, this appearance can be misleading: the Irish judiciary are self-governing only in limited respects. The judge-led Court Service is in charge of court estate, non-judicial personnel and provision of information on the court system to the public. Many key matters – discipline, promotions and deployment – remain largely out of the control of the corporate judiciary. Judicial appointments are significantly at the discretion of the government. In the last decade, there have been significant moves towards a more corporate judiciary and these are reflected in the creation of a judges’ representative body, the Association of Judges of Ireland, and a shadow Judges Council. There are currently proposals to create a new independent mechanism for appointing judges and to create a Judicial Council with a significant role in disciplining the judiciary.The Irish experience highlights the importance of political and cultural factors in establishing and maintaining judicial independence and self-governance. Despite the significant role for the government in judicial appointments, and the presence of a culture of political patronage in these appointments, there is nonetheless a robust culture ofindividualjudicial independence once judges have been appointed. The creation of the Courts Service in 1999 was a significant transfer of administrative power to the judiciary but it was approved without demur by the political branches, who welcomed the depoliticization of controversial decisions about court estate. Conversely, reforms to judicial appointments have been weak because politicians saw value in maintaining a relatively harmless form of political patronage, and proposals for a Judicial Council that have agreed in outline for two decades have yet to be enacted, apparently because they lack sufficient political salience. The defence of judicial independence, and the creation of robust institutional mechanisms for defending it, ultimately requires the goodwill of politicians.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 799-824
Author(s):  
Mieczysław P. Boduszyński ◽  
Vjeran Pavlaković

What are the consequences of a culture of victory in countries undergoing new state formation and democratic transition? In this article, we examine ‘foundational legitimacy,’ or a hegemonic narrative about the way in which a new state was created, and the role particular groups played in its creation. We argue that the way in which victory is institutionalized can pose a grave threat to the democratic project. If reconciliation and democratization depend of integrating losers into the new order and recognizing plural narratives of state formation, then exclusivist narratives based on foundational legitimacy pose a direct challenge to both. We focus on two Yugoslav successor states, Kosovo and Croatia. For both cases, we trace how appeals to ‘foundational legitimacy’ by groups that claim a leading role in the struggle for independence fostered a politics of exclusion, which ran counter to both the spirit of democracy. In Croatia, foundational legitimacy was partly challenged after 2000 by reformist political forces, though more recently it has re-appeared in political life. In Kosovo, foundational legitimacy was never successfully challenged and continues to shape political dynamics to the present day.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-284
Author(s):  
Roma Dauphin

This study is comprised of two parts. The first is essentially descriptive and seeks to define with greater precision the nature of the Western world's asbestos fiber needs, account being made currently-known technology and the existence of substitutes. Asbestos ore reserves are then examined with a view to evaluating the constraints conditioning current asbestos fiber production. With the exception of that carried out in the U.S.S.R., this production is highly concentrated in Quebec whose surplus output is exported to every continent at prices that have experienced a staggering increase since 1973 even though international trade in asbestos fibers is conducted via multinational firms. The second part of the study contains a cost-benefit analysis of Quebec's new policy as well as a brief consideration of the political forces that have induced the Government of Quebec to adopt it.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 378-384
Author(s):  
Anisa Proda

As the last country in Europe to overthrow the communist regime, Albania has much to achieve in the legal system to build a full democracy. A government should be relied upon to create the necessary reforms to move a country out of transition. The governmental structure can either accelerate or prevent the country’s transition towards a market economy. The other pillar of society that reflects institutional performance is the country’s citizens. Trust is a factor that connects citizens with institutions. The main purpose of this research is to identify causes for citizens to lose their confidence in public institutions. The analysis, supported by quantitative data, aims to show the level of trust that citizens bestow to the most important Albanian public institutions. An Institution for Democracy and Mediation poll and this study’s results of meetings with focus groups were used to illustrate the public’s confidence in the governmental institutions, and to explore the causes of the citizen’s attitude towards the public institutions and their service in Albania.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-137
Author(s):  
Kardo Rached ◽  
Ahmed Omar Bali

The political environment of Iraq in the period from 2011-2014 experienced a great degree of turbulence. Many Sunni tribes in the Anbar, Ramadi and Salahadin regions organized a daily protest against the central government, accusing it of being sectarian. Gradually, these protests become more popular, and the Baghdad government became fearful that it would spread into the other regions of Iraq. In order to control the protests, the government used force, and many were killed. Simultaneously, in Syria, and especially during 2013-2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled more land and more people, and to take advantage of the Iraqi people's dissatisfaction with their government, ISIS crossed the border between Iraq and Syria in June 2014. Mosul as the second most heavily populated city was seized by ISIS and the Iraqi army could not fight back, which meant that the Iraqi army retreated from most of the Sunni areas. Even Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, and the city where the central government operates, was threatened. While the Iraqi army was unable to fight against ISIS, the Shia religious supreme leader Al-Sistani called for self-defence and to stand against ISIS. Sistani’s call became a cornerstone for the creation of the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) with the aim of the fighting against ISIS. In this article, we assess the PMF from different perspectives, for example, using the Weberian theory that the state is the only entity that has a monopoly on violence, considering Ariel Ahram's model of state-sponsored and government-sponsored militias, and finally the devolution of violence to these armed groups.


Author(s):  
P. Cherkasov

The article analyzes IMEMO activities in 1992–1993, when in Russia, under the influence of both radical economic reforms and drastic weakening of the central government, a deep political crisis emerged and gained a dangerous traction, fraught with the death of a young democracy and even the collapse of the state. Under these conditions, along with economic issues, the politological research came to the fore in IMEMO – the analysis of the country's new political system, the definition of its development vector. The Center of Socio-economic and Socio-political Research of IMEMO headed by German Germanovich Diligenskii played the major role in this work. Analysts of the Center prepared a number of recommendations for public authorities concerning the creation and development of a new democratic political system in Russia. IMEMO experts paid the utmost attention to the nature of the political crisis that arose in the post-Soviet Russia in late 1991, and the ways to overcome it. In January 1993, the results of the study were presented to the discussion at the Academic Council. It was agreed that one of the main causes of the political crisis in the country was the social tensions worsening, as a consequence of the “shocking therapy” conducted by the government of Gaidar in 1992. In the discussion on the political outlook German Diligenskii, rejecting the possibility of the old command-administrative system restoration, substantiated a probability of transformation of the "market democracy" not yet established in Russia into the "authoritarian monopoly or monopoly-bureaucratic system". Noting the disunity of democratic forces, weakness of the entrepreneurial class, largely dependent on the state, Diligenskii formulated a program for uniting all adherents of “arket democracy” under the slogan of "social liberalism", which would take into account Russian specifics. Consolidation of democracy and market economy in Russia is impossible without preservation of the state territorial integrity and consolidation of the central government, with a clear division of functions and powers of its constituent branches. Monopolization (usurpation) of all power by one of the branches – legislative or executive – should not be allowed. The victory of any of them in any case would mean the defeat of democracy. Such was, in general terms, the position of IMEMO in the face of the 1992–1993 political crisis. Acknowledgement. The publication was prepared as part of the President of Russian Federation grant to support the leading scientifi c schools NSh-6452.2014.6.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 528-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solveig Hillesund

Do different types of inequality spur violence with different targets? This article explores whom violent movements choose to target when they take to arms, by comparing civil conflicts, which target the state, to communal conflicts, which target other ethnic groups. Different types of ethnic group disadvantage relate to conflict through different mechanisms. Political exclusion is expected to promote the choice to target the central government rather than other ethnic groups, while economic disadvantages should increase the risk of both civil and communal conflicts. The different expectations stem from two important differences between political and economic horizontal inequalities: only the government has the authority to change the political distribution, while there can be many avenues to economic redistribution; and blame is more straightforwardly assigned to the government for political than for economic disadvantages. Statistical analysis of 155 politically relevant ethnic groups in Africa (1991–2009) provides support for both propositions.


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