scholarly journals International Migration and Military Intervention in Civil War

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Bove ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt

Which factors make it more likely that states militarily intervene in ongoing intrastate wars? We develop the argument that migrants, i.e., (1) people coming from the civil-war state living in a potential intervener state (immigrants) and (2) those living in the country at war who stem from the third party (emigrants), influence the decision of external states to intervene in civil wars. Our theoretical framework is thus based on a joint focus on domestic-level determinants in a civil-war country and in foreign states. Primarily based on an accountability rationale, we also claim that the third-party’s regime type has an intervening influence. Using quantitative methods, our empirical results generally support the theory, although there is only weak evidence for the intervening influence of a third party’s level of democracy.

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332097581
Author(s):  
Sara Norrevik ◽  
Mehwish Sarwari

Does the regime type of a foreign intervener influence the duration of civil wars? Existing research has shown that third-party support affects the outcome of a conflict. Moreover, studies show that the type of support offered to conflict actors can determine how a war ends. While this research has offered significant implications on conflict dynamics, extant works have overlooked the importance of characteristics of foreign supporters and how their attributes can impact conflict outcomes. Focusing on foreign troop support and quantities, this article examines the relationship between the regime type of a foreign supporter and the outcome of an armed conflict. We argue that regime type of an external troop sponsor can influence war duration based on two dynamics: selection effects and signaling effects. Specifically, troop assistance provided to warring parties by democracies decreases the length of civil wars and increases the likelihood for a one-sided victory for the supported faction. The empirical findings for all intrastate conflicts during the period 1975–2012 provide evidence for our claims that the regime type of an external intervener influences the outcome of a conflict.


Author(s):  
De Wet Erika

This chapter examines whether the right to self-determination in international law prevents military intervention on the side of the recognized government during a civil war. Post-Cold War state and organizational practice does not convincingly support the claim that direct military assistance at the request of a recognized government is prohibited during a civil war, otherwise known as a ‘non-international armed conflict’ (NIAC). Attempts to explain current state practice by means of counter-terrorism and counter-intervention exceptions to a general prohibition of such assistance also is not grounded in state or organizational practice, nor are such exceptions viable in practice. Instead, state and organizational practice seems to confirm the right of recognized governments to request military assistance from third states, also during civil wars/NIACs, as long as they retain their recognized, de jure status. The potential lack of ‘representativeness’ in such a situation does not seem to limit the extent to which the de jure government can act on behalf of the state (and its people) in matters pertaining to the use of force.


1980 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 250-280
Author(s):  
Chi-hsi Hu

In more respects than one, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign launched by Chiang Kai-shek in 1933–34 against the Jiangxi Soviet may be considered as an important landmark in contemporary Chinese history. From a purely military standpoint, in view of its scope and the particular means used, it is undoubtedly the first modern Chinese campaign. General Jacques Guillermaz points out, quite rightly, that “the methodical nature of the operations, the importance given to fire power and logistical resources, and the tactical use of large and small units all bring the Fifth Campaign closer to certain phases of the 1914–18 war than to traditional Chinese civil wars.” Precisely because of its scope and its methodical nature, the Fifth Campaign, rather than the first four, led Mao, after the Long March, to evolve a theory of guerrilla warfare which “has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy.” This theory, applied first of all to the war against Japan and later to the Third Revolutionary Civil War, was to change the face of China.


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 692-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noel Anderson

Abstract This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Júlia Palik

How does interstate rivals’ intervention in a third-party civil war impact conflict duration and outcome in that country? More specifically, (1) how do interstate rivals engage in third party civil conflicts and (2) how do conflict parties attract, utilize, and sustain the external support they receive from their supporters? I answer these questions by comparing Saudi Arabia and Iran’s intervention in two distinct conflicts in Yemen. This dissertation applies a qualitative case study method and selects two within-case methods: structured-focused comparison and process tracing. In the structured-focused comparison, I compare the support Saudi Arabia and Iran has provided to the Government of Yemen (GoY) and the Houthis respectively, differentiating between military and non-military types of support. I compare these during the Saada wars (2004-2010) and in the current internationalized civil war (2014-2018). To ensure the validity of my causal inferences I triangulate data from three sources: the development of a novel mediation and ceasefire dataset1 (1), semi-structured in-depth elite-interviews2 (2), and document reviews (3). This dissertation develops a mechanism-focused analytical framework that integrates both rivalry and civil war dynamics to explain civil war duration and outcome. I build on five distinct literatures (strategic rivalry, civil war studies, third-party intervention in civil wars, mediation, and rebel governance) and complement them with the literature on Middle East Area Studies. In the analytical framework first, I look at the inter-state dimension and propose that rivals’ initial decision to intervene and their subsequent decisions to remain engaged in third-party civil wars are two distinct processes. Rivals seek to inflict costs on their counterparts, but at the same time they seek to avoid direct confrontation. Their cognitive rigidities lock them in their own conflicts and give rise to the mechanism of conflict integration in third-party conflicts. Besides interveners, I also take into account domestic dynamics and examine civil war conflict parties’ capacity to impact rivals by keeping them engaged in their conflict through the mechanism of rivalry instrumentalization. The external and internal perspectives are reinforcing each other and create networked interdependencies. With this two-dimensional logic, I move beyond the conventional framework of proxy wars.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marika Landau-Wells

When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determines which combatants can draw on state assets, receive overt military aid, and borrow as sovereigns—all of which can have profound consequences for the military balance during civil war. How do third-party states and international organizations determine whom to treat as a state's official government during civil war? Data from the sixty-one center-seeking wars initiated from 1945 to 2014 indicate that military victory is not a prerequisite for recognition. Instead, states generally rely on a simple test: control of the capital city. Seizing the capital does not foreshadow military victory. Civil wars often continue for many years after rebels take control and receive recognition. While geopolitical and economic motives outweigh the capital control test in a small number of important cases, combatants appear to anticipate that holding the capital will be sufficient for recognition. This expectation generates perverse incentives. In effect, the international community rewards combatants for capturing or holding, by any means necessary, an area with high concentrations of critical infrastructure and civilians. In the majority of cases where rebels contest the capital, more than half of its infrastructure is damaged or the majority of civilians are displaced (or both), likely fueling long-term state weakness.


Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth

After surveying the literature on the causes, consequences, and management of civil wars, we argue that novel ways of examining civil war management are needed. We advocate for a developmental view of civil wars in order to better understand how to prevent the escalation of low-level armed conflict to full-scale civil war. To prevent full-scale civil war, third parties need to (a) respond swiftly, (b) have the will and ability to impose tangible costs on (and offer benefits to) governments and rebels, and (c) remain involved over the long term. Our analysis shows that typical third-party civil war management approaches (mediation, peacekeeping, and intervention) fail to adequately address at least one of these issues. This motivates our argument in favor of focusing on a different type of third party that could arguably play a particularly constructive role in civil war prevention: highly structured intergovernmental organizations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199789
Author(s):  
Monica Duffy Toft

Surveying civil war in the world today is striking in terms of how often religious cleavages and grievances have become central to armed conflict. How are the causes and outcomes of religious civil wars different than other civil wars, if at all? Is Islam implicated for the contemporary surge in religious civil war? The first section reviews the literature and addresses the importance of religion for civil war. I then introduce a dataset and describe key trends in religious civil war in the third section, while in the fourth section I present tests of whether Muslim or Arab Muslim societies in particular are more prone to religious strife. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the main findings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sugumaran Narayanan

Historically, Southeast Asia has been among the most peaceful regions of the world. In the last sixty years, however, the populations of Southeast Asia have been torn apart by ravaging civil wars. What could be causing the high number of ethno-religious civil wars in Southeast Asia? To understand this, I use three different methods, two of which I have already employed in previous researches—quantitative (statistical) and traditional case studies. The third, using personal interviews with direct participants of conflict, is the focus of this study. This, combined with the results obtained from the other two methods, will highlight the causes of civil wars in Southeast Asia. While a number of studies have attempted to answer the race-religion-civil war nexus puzzle (none have used all three methods—quantitative, traditional case studies, and personal interviews), and none has specifically addressed Southeast Asian civil wars using all three methods.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang Ki Kim

How does third-party intervention in civil war influence citizens’ physical quality of life (QOL) after civil war? I find that the effects of intervention on postwar QOL depend on its type, unilateral intervention, and United Nations (UN) intervention. Unilateral interveners seeking self-interest tend to impede the improvement in postwar QOL particularly in terms of life expectancy and infant mortality rate. They are likely to do so through producing their protégé’s military victory or negotiated settlement, expanding their influence on postwar government, and resultingly forming a government less responsive to citizens’ hardship and reducing resources available for welfare. UN intervention on humanitarian grounds tends to promote postwar social development particularly in the fields of public health, although it has no significant effect on literacy rate. It is likely to do so by increasing resources available for postwar reconstruction, even though it goes where postwar social development is relatively difficult.


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