Fleeting Mental States
2000 ◽
Vol 59
(2)
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pp. 273-283
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Keyword(s):
Time Gap
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The philosophical concept of acting intentionally does not entail a perceptible time gap between intention and action. We may say of a person who acts on the spur of the moment that their action was intended or intentional; but in such circumstances, intention and action may seem to merge in a way that makes it difficult to disentangle the mental and physical elements of the person's conduct. The author argues that in this context the tools and techniques used by philosophers of mind and action may not provide us with the best understanding of the social practices of blaming found in the criminal law.
2017 ◽
Vol 1
(2-3)
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pp. 87-118
2020 ◽
Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
Vol 20
(4)
◽
pp. 63-73
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