North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1967 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-210

The Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met at The Hague on May 12–14, 1964. The Council reaffirmed that the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs. The Council invited Manlio Brosio, former Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Italy and presently the Italian Ambassador to Paris, to become Secretary-General of NATO in succession to Dirk U. Stikker (Netherlands), who would retire on August 1, 1964.

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 656-657

Council It was reported in the press on July 20, 1956 that the west German government was preparing to bring its anxieties about United Kingdom and United States suggestions for a reduction in armed forces before the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council, but contrary to expectation, at the July 25 meeting of the Council no reference was made to the reduction of forces. The press did note on July 25 that the United States Secretary of State Dulles gave reassurances to the German ambassador that the United States contemplated no change from the existing number of troops at that time and was still in favor of a German contribution of twelve divisions to NATO. Press reports also noted that the west German government transmitted notes to the members of the Western European Union calling for a review of allied strategy and military planning in view of moves by the United States and United Kingdom to cut their armed forces.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-199

On September 28, 1956, Lord Ismay, Secretary General, called a special meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to consider the implications of the decision by the government of the German Federal Republic to request the west German parliament to establish the term of national compulsory military service at 12 in lieu of 18 months. The Council feared that this decision would very probably prevent the German Federal Republic from meeting its commitments to NATO. The west German representative stated that his government would meet its previously negotiated commitments both as to quality and quantity; west German regular forces would be raised from 230,000 to 300,000 to compensate for the reduction of availability of conscripts. The Council requested the west German representative to inform his government of the concern of the Council.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 550-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Grosser

The North Atlantic Treaty has been in existence since April 4, 1949. Article 9 of this treaty gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the imposing headquarters on the edge of the Bois de Boulogne in Paris bear witness to its reality. In his chapter dealing with the nature of the Community, Stanley Hoffmann discusses the question of whether a true Atlantic Community exists outside the pages of the treaty. The present study will examine the existence of that Community insofar as two of its principal members are concerned: France and the Federal Republic of Germany.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-133
Author(s):  
Brittany Lehman

In 1962, the Federal Republic of Germany (frg) agreed to negotiate a guestworker agreement with Morocco in order to create guidelines for handling 4,000 so-called illegal Moroccan migrants, most of whom lived in North Rhine-Westphalia. Unlike other guestworker agreements, this one was not about recruitment, but rather it was designed to restrict migration from Morocco, legalise the stay of Moroccans already in the country, and establish guidelines for future deportations. Looking at the history of the West German-Moroccan Agreement from its start until its termination in 1973, this article provides a discussion of Moroccan labourers access to and legal status in West Germany, demonstrating how international and economic interests as well as cultural stereotypes of both Moroccans and Arabs shaped West German migration policies. In so doing, the article emphasises the West German federal and the North Rhine-Westphalian state governments’ different goals, revealing that the West German government was not a monolithic entity; it was in fact defined by multiple, sometimes contradictory, viewpoints and pressures.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 558-563

At its meeting in Paris on December 13, 1956, the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as was reported in April 1957, heard Mr. Selwyn Lloyd explain in general terms his “grand design” for Europe, which was later presented to the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. The principles of his grand design, according to Mr. Lloyd, were the maintenance of the unity of NATO and the expansion of European integration to include not only the federation of France, west Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, but also such states as Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland. Three elements were contained in the plan: the politico-strategic, the economic, and the parliamentary. In the politico-strategic field, Mr. Lloyd stated that development depended chiefly upon the development of NATO in the direction of closer consultation, as recommended by the Committee of Three of the Council of NATO. In the economic field, it was the view of the United Kingdom government that so far the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was the basic channel for the development of the closest economic relations, and that it would be desirable for the machinery which would be set up for the European free trade area to be part of OEEC. Mr. Lloyd proposed, in connection with parliamentary matters, that one assembly be established for the Council of Europe, Western European Union (WEU), NATO, OEEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Euratom, the Common Market, and the free trade area, as well as for any European organizations which might be established in the future.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 618-629
Author(s):  
Lawrence S. Kaplan

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has played a central role in the regeneration of West Germany since die Second World War, with the accession of die Federal Republic to NATO in May 1955 marking the official return of Germany to the company of civilized nations. West Germany, in turn, has become a not inconsequential member of the treaty organization. The bulk of NATO'S defense forces is located in die Federal Republic; an increasing amount of NATO'S military contribution is German; and the most controversial issue in Europe confronting the organization stems direcdy from die division of Germany and the exposed position of Berlin.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200942199391
Author(s):  
Simone Turchetti

This essay explores the reception of ‘nuclear winter’ at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This response is paradigmatic of how scientific predictions can work as stimuli for science diplomacy activities, and either inflate or deflate these forecasts’ public resonance. Those who elaborated the theory in the early 1980s predicted that the environmental consequences of a future nuclear conflict would have been catastrophic; possibly rendering the earth uninhabitable and leading to the extinction of humankind. This prospect was particularly problematic for the Western defence alliance, since it was difficult to reconcile with the tenets of its nuclear posture, especially after the 1979 Dual Track decision, engendering concerns about the environmental catastrophe that the scientists predicted. Thus, NATO officials refrained from commenting on nuclear winter and its implications for the alliance’s deterrence doctrine for some time in an effort to minimize public criticism. Meanwhile, they progressively removed research on nuclear winter from the set of studies and scientific debates sponsored by NATO in the context of its science initiatives. In essence, NATO officials ‘traded’ the promotion of these problematic studies with that of others more amenable to the alliance’s diplomacy ambitions.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-329 ◽  

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe


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