State-Issued Currency and the Ratification of the U.S. Consitution

1989 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary M. Schweitzer

Paper money, a major component of the colonial money supply, was critical to the economic policies of the colonial legislatures. Why did the state legislatures relinquish the power to issue money to the new federal government through the ratification of the Constitution? Hostility between states with radically different philosophies regarding paper money raised concerns about the viability of the union, and it was this fear which led to the clause in the Federal Constitution that prohibited state paper money issues.

2021 ◽  
pp. 54-73
Author(s):  
Gordon S. Wood

This chapter describes the crisis that led to the calling of the convention that created the federal Constitution in 1787. Although the Articles of Confederation that united the thirteen states lacked the powers to tax and regulate trade, the country was not doing too badly economically or demographically. But the state legislatures were abusing the great power that had been granted to them in the revolutionary state constitutions and tending to ran amuck. The multiplicity, mutability, and injustice of state legislation, especially with the printing of paper money, led reformers to use the weakness of the Confederation as a cover to scrap the Articles and to create an entirely new and powerful central government.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2096056
Author(s):  
Barry C. Burden ◽  
Rochelle Snyder

A fundamental requirement of democracy is the existence of contested elections. Our study documents and explains trends in uncontested seats in the U.S. Congress and state legislatures over time. We uncover a striking inconsistency in the health of elections: the frequency of uncontested seats in Congress has declined while the frequency of uncontested seats in state legislatures has actually increased. To explore these divergent trends, we consider factors that are common to both Congress and state legislatures such as the redistricting cycle but also variables that are unique to the state level. Our analysis points to the relative “flippability” of Congress compared to many state legislatures as a factor behind diverging levels of contestation. While many state legislatures have become bastions for dominant parties, congressional districts in those same states are often nonetheless viewed as enticing targets because they contribute to control of the federal government.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3.30) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Rasyikah Md Khalid ◽  
. .

Federalism refers to an agreement between several states which agree to be united as a nation state but with shared administrative responsibility. Under the dual federalism theory, the federal and the state governments are co-equals with specific powers granted by the constitution. In contrast, cooperative federalism denotes that although the federal government is supreme over the states, both acts cooperatively to solve common problem. Malaysia practices dual federalism as legislative powers of the federal and state governments are separated in the Federal Constitution. Rather than fostering cooperation, dual federalism in Malaysia has created tension between different levels of governments in the water sector as highlighted in the Selangor water woes. This paper evaluates issues arising in the Malaysian water sector from the federalism perspectives. Towards this end, doctrinal analysis on relevant laws and commentaries are made to appreciate the meaning of federalism and different approaches towards federalism. The paper concludes that different approaches towards federal-state relation can assist in improving the water sector and solve water conflict between different levels of governments in Malaysia.   


2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michaele Morrow ◽  
Robert Ricketts

ABSTRACT: We examine the decisions by state legislatures to conform to or decouple from federal tax legislation. We use a generalized estimating equations (GEE) approach to estimate the parameters of a model of factors associated with the state legislative decisions to conform their own tax systems to accommodate 11 federal tax reductions implemented between 2002 and 2008. Our model predicts that state legislators consider political, budgetary, and ease of compliance factors when considering whether to adopt federal tax changes into their own states’ tax codes. Our results are generally consistent with expectations, identifying several factors that are associated with the probability that a state will incorporate revenue-reducing tax changes implemented by the federal government. Our results also suggest that although state legislators appear to value conformity with the tax initiatives of the federal government, given rising budgetary pressures, state conformity with such legislation is likely to decrease in coming years.


1972 ◽  
Vol 1 (01) ◽  
pp. 315-320
Author(s):  
Shirley Elias

For the past three years I have participated in an interesting experiment conducted by the U.S. Government. The program was experimental in that it was one of the few, perhaps the only, program operated by the Federal Government where a direct federal-local relationship exists. States have no direct authority in the program; the Governor is given only veto power over the federal funds entering the state.


1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Campbell

The president's party consistently loses partisan control of state legislatures in midterm elections, a pattern similar to the loss of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in midterms. This study examines presidential coattails as a possible explanation of these losses. Aggregate state legislative election outcomes between 1944 and 1984 in 41 states are examined. The analysis indicates that the president's party gains seats in presidential elections in proportion to the presidential vote in a state, and subsequently loses seats in midterm elections also in proportion to the prior presidential vote in the state. The presidential coattail and the midterm repercussion effects are evident even when gubernatorial coattail effects are introduced, but are fairly modest in states lacking competitive parties.


1980 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald C. Clute ◽  
George B. Garman

Using 92 quarters of data, the authors attempt to determine if federal government economic policies are the cause of unexplained variations in the rate of business failure. The three policy variables, money supply, volume of bank loans, and interest rates are investigated with a Cochran-Orcutt regression model utilizing lagged explanatory variables. The authors conclude that variations in the money supply and the volume of bank loans have an inverse, lagged effect on the rate of business failure. A statistically significant relationship was not established for interest rates.


Author(s):  
Gordon S. Wood

This book covers major issues of constitutionalism in the American Revolution. It begins with the imperial debate over taxation and representation between the colonists and the British government. That debated climaxed with the Declaration of Independence. Each of the former colonies became republics and drew up written constitutions with several of them including bills of rights. These constitutions established patterns that later influenced the federal Constitution created in 1787, including bicameral legislatures, independent executives, and independent judiciaries. But because the Confederation of the states lacked the power to tax and regulate trade and the state legislatures were abusing their considerable power, the revolutionaries sought to solve both problems with a new federal Constitution in 1787. In addition to having to recognize the equality of each state in the Senate, the Convention faced the problem with slavery. Although most Americans thought that slavery was gradually dying, South Carolina and Georgia wanted to import more slaves and forced the Convention to guarantee twenty more years of slave importations and some protections for slavery in the Constitution. The institution that benefited most from the Revolution was the judiciary. It became very important in monitoring the demarcation between the public and the private realms that emerged from the Revolution.


2006 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 255-260
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Brunell

At the end of the 2006 term, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision with respect to the Texas redistricting controversy. While in its decision (LULAC v. Perry) the court struck down one of the newly drawn districts (the 23rd) the case is more notable for what the court did not do. The Court did not see anything in the Constitution indicating that state legislatures are restricted as to when redistricting ought to be done. Traditionally the process is done after the new census data is delivered, usually in years ending in 1, and the new districts are in effect for elections in years ending in a 2. The state government in Texas was still divided in 2001 and a federal court ended up drawing new district boundaries, but after the GOP gained control in the next election they decided to redraw the congressional district lines more to their advantage for the 2004 election. Moreover a big part of the litigation was the claim that the Republicans had treated the Democrats unfairly enough in the new map that it constituted a partisan gerrymander and the Court, the Democrats claimed, ought to step in and doing something about it. The Justices did not strike down the map on these grounds and it is still unclear to most observers if the Court will step into the fray at some late date with respect to this issue.


Author(s):  
John Kenneth Galbraith ◽  
James K. Galbraith

This chapter examines the controversies surrounding money and banking in the early years of the new American Republic. It shows how the U.S. Constitution restricted the right of coinage to the federal government and forbade both the states and the national government to issue paper money. It then coinsiders the issuance of Treasury notes by Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin in the 1812–1814 war, while Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury under the Lincoln administration, asked Congress to authorize repeated issues of greenbacks. The chapter also considers Alexander Hamilton's application for a central bank that would become the Bank of the United States, which competed with other banks. Finally, it discusses the establishment of the Second Bank of the United States and the struggle between President Andrew Jackson and Nicholas Biddle, president of the Bank of the United States.


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