Some Notes on the Provincial Administration of the Early Ṣafawid Empire

1964 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Savory

The names of the principal officers of the early Ṣafawid ṣtate are well known and need only a brief recapitulation here. They were: (1) the wakīl; (2) the amīr al-umarā; (3) the qūrchībāshī; (4) the wazīr; (5) the ṣadr. Of these, the wakīl was the vicegerent of the Shāh, representing him in both his temporal capacity as pādishāh and in his spiritual capacity as murshid-i kāmil. He was thus the most powerful official in the early Ṣafawid state. The amīr al-umarā was, as his name denotes, the principal amīr; he was the commander-in-chief of the qizilbāsh Turkomān tribesmen who constituted the military basis of Ṣafawid political power. The function of the qūrchībāshī during the early Ṣafawid period is extremely obscure. As commander of the qūrchīs or qizilbāsh; tribal cavalry his authority would appear to have been in conflict with that of the amīr al-umarā. The office of qūrchībāshī was from the beginning distinct from that of amīr al-umarā, and during at least the first 30 years of Ṣafawid rule it was of less importance than the latter. From about 940/1533–4 onwards, however, there was a decline in the power of the amīr al-umarā, and a corresponding increase in that of the qurchībāshī, and under Isma'īl II and Muḥammad Khudābanda the qūrchībāshī became the most influential officer in the state. The wazīr was the head of the bureaucracy, and was traditionally the principal officer of state. Up to the time of 'Abbās I, however, his authority was restricted by the overriding authority of the wakīl, by the intervention of the amīr al-umarā in political affairs, by the existence of the ṣadr, who deprived him of the possibility of exercising general supervision over the religious institution, and by the predominantly military character of the early Ṣafawid state in general, which placed the ‘men of the pen’ at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the ‘men of the sword’. The ṣadr was the head of the religious institution, but since in practice the religious institution was subordinated to the political institution, the authority of the ṣadr was necessarily subordinated to that of the wakīl. The main function of the ṣadr was the imposition of doctrinal unity, namely Shi'ism, throughout the Ṣafawid empire. Once this object had been achieved, the power of the ṣadr declined, although from time to time the ṣadr made attempts (largely unsuccessful) to intervene in political matters.

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-28
Author(s):  
Cynthia H. Enloe

Virtually all of the literature concerning the politics of South Africa analyzes the dynamics of that system within the frameworks of racism, authoritarianism, and repression. Yet, strangely, the political institution which is necessarily the bulwark of such a system—the military—has attracted scant attention except in terms of strategy and armaments.


2008 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID CORNELL

In 1314 the English-held castles of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Stirling were seized and destroyed by Robert Bruce. This was the pinnacle of a policy by which Bruce systematically slighted the castles he seized in Scotland. The reign of Edward II has been seen as a period in which the military value of the castle was in decline and by analysing the role the castle played in the campaigns of Bruce it is possible to assess the importance a successful contemporary commander attached to the castle during this period. Bruce had first-hand experience of the castle at war and knew of its limitations. In 1306, however, he seized and garrisoned a number of castles preparing to use them for a specific purpose, but defeat in the field rendered them redundant. On his return in 1307 Bruce initiated a policy of destruction. Castles in the north of Scotland were slighted as they were the regional focus of the political power of his Scottish enemies, and militarily they were of little value to Bruce. In the Lowlands the first-rate castles of Scotland were destroyed precisely because they were so militarily powerful. Bruce recognised that these castles, used aggressively, were indispensable to the English war effort, and consequently he undertook a prolonged and expensive campaign to reduce them, a campaign which involved the tactic of both surprise assault and, more importantly, the set-piece siege. In 1314 the imminent English campaign led Bruce to launch an unprecedented offensive against the English-held castles of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Stirling. These castles were subsequently slighted despite their inextricable association with the Scottish Crown. Bruce recognised that, unlike the English, he did not need to occupy castles in Scotland to fight the war. Although in Ireland a small number of castles were occupied, and Berwick was also garrisoned by Scottish troops, in northern England Bruce did not attempt to occupy English castles. Those which were seized were destroyed, an indication that Bruce never intended a conquest of Northumberland. Indeed Bruce never undertook a serious campaign aimed at the seizure of the first-rate castles of Northumberland despite their frequently perilous state. Instead he sought to gain political capital by threatening their loss and so placing enormous pressure on the English Crown. That the castle featured prominently in the campaigns of Bruce demonstrates it was not in decline. Bruce understood the continued military and political value of the castle, but he was able to exploit its inherent vulnerabilities in order to gain victory in war.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (35) ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Marţian Iovan

Abstract The author analyzes in this paper principles and ides of philosophy of law issued by Mircea Djuvara, which preserve their contemporaneity, being useful for the perfecting of the state institutions and of the democracy not only at national level, but also at European Union one. His ideas and logical demonstration on the rational fundamentals of law, the autonomy of the moral and legal conscience, the specificity of truth and of juridical knowledge, the philosophical substantiation of power and Constitution, the principles of the democracy and the connections between the political power and the law are just few of the original elements due to which Djuvara became an acknowledged and respected personality not only in Romania, but also in the experts clubs of the Europe between the two World Wars.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134
Author(s):  
Daniela Popescu

"The Escape to Turkey. Ways and Methods of Illegal Border Crossings into Turkey from the perspective of SSI documents (1945-1948). Romania`s first years after the communist regime took political power in Romania, concurrent with the onset of the Cold War, meant a reshuffle of the state institutions at first and later a dramatic impact on people`s lives. The political and institutional purges were the first signal that soon repression and terror will follow, thus prompting numerous Romanian citizens to leave the country. Yet, due to the strict surveillance of the Secret Police Services which did not easily allow traveling to Western countries, the only way to escape was through illicit border crossings. One of the most common destinations was Turkey, with documents issued between 1945 and 1948 by the Secret police services revealing an impressive number of such cases. Keywords: Illegal border crossings, escape, communism, Romania, Turkey. "


Ensemble ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-122
Author(s):  
Soham DasGupta ◽  

India played an active role in the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. The relation between the two countries remained cordial in the initial years but it soon soured with the coup d’etat of 1975. This also marked the rise of the anti-Indian elements in the Bangladeshi politics. This article makes a brief survey of anti- Indian elements that has remained a part and parcel of the political fabric of Bangladesh since 1971. It also looks into the ways in which the anti-India stance has been instrumental in garnering popular support to hold on to political power. The article begins with the background of the creation of Bangladesh and India’s active role in it which was followed by the friendship treaty signed between the two countries. Then it moves to the changing scenario following the coup d’état of 1975 which marked the visible changes within the polity of Bangladesh. The nature of nationalism underwent change moving from secularism to a religious character which found expression in the policies of the state. The military rule most often found it convenient to use the anti-Indian stance in order to please the fundamentalist elements of the country in its bid to garner popular support. The issues of water sharing, refugees and issues of fomenting possible insurgency with active support of India were highlighted. Even after the restoration of democracy, the anti-Indian factions remained active in opposing the government of Sheikh Hasina’s foreign policy with regard to India. Radical religious factions, who had throughout opposed the liberation war, still play a major role in fanning the anti-Indian sentiments in Bangladeshi politics.


Author(s):  
Oren Barak

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.


Subject The impact of the failed July coup on civilian-military relations. Significance The psychological impacts of the attempted coup across political life cannot be understated; it has far-reaching implications for the political, bureaucratic and even ideological structures of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). In the aftermath of the attempted putsch, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is more determined than ever to alter the civilian-military machinery of government in Turkey radically. Impacts The purge and radical reforms will bring into question the TSK's operational and strategic reliability for Western partners. A permanently weakened TSK would ease the way for constitutional reforms strengthening Erdogan's grip on the state. It will take years to rebuild the confidence and prestige the military has lost among broad swathes of Turkish society. Any criticism of the TSK reforms, domestically or from abroad, will meet the authorities' fierce condemnation.


ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanaa Ahmed

AbstractDespite a rich history of judicial review, the activism witnessed during the tenure of former Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (2005-2013The Chaudhry court’s activism is mapped against the historic trajectory of judicial review in Pakistan, particularly the cases pertaining to military takeovers and administrative law. It is contended that the seeming expansion of the frontiers of judicial review merely mark the renegotiation of political power between the judiciary, the military as well as political and economic elite. Further, it is argued that the economy was the most convenient amphi­theatre for this battle for greater political relevance by and among the political actors in contemporary Pakistan and not, as alleged, what was actually being fought over.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
THORVALD GRAN

Abstract:John Searle has developed a strong theory of how speech acts and agreements generate institutions. How is the general theory specified for political institutions? He, like Max Weber, suggests that a government monopoly of soldiers is a condition for the existence of political institutions. However, governments' wielding of force is only political if those attacked consider the attack a responsible and a morally acceptable act. All political power in Searle's theory is deontic. It is assigned as a right, an obligation or the like, as a status function. If power wielding by a government is not assigned, it is beyond the political; it is only brute force. My contention is that this distinction limits the power of Searle's theory in the analysis of politics. From the idea of political institutions as ultimate institutions in a specific, bordered territory it is the strong idea of deonticity that is misleading. Ultimate institutions cannot by definition have externally assigned status. Leaders of other ultimate institutions can accept their existence, but then mainly because they have the military power to defend their borders. Nation states, demanding territorial sovereignty, therefore logically demand a monopoly of soldiers. This sovereignty seen over time suggests an evolutionary first principle of political institutions.


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