Mind and Brain: The Identity Hypothesis

1968 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 160-180
Author(s):  
R. J. Hirst
Keyword(s):  
Life Science ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Religious Experiences ◽  
Traditional Philosophy ◽  
Physiological Processes ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Fair Hearing ◽  
The Brain

Life Science Library now claims to examine ‘the most complex of all biological organs: the human mind’, and scientists quite commonly make no distinction between mind and brain — they delight in talking about the brain classifying, decoding, perceiving, deciding or giving orders. And while resisting the conceptual muddle involved in talking of the brain doing what persons do, the identity hypothesis tries to provide a philosophically respectable basis for the equation of mind and brain, maintaining that ‘mind’ is just a term for a group of activities and dispositions, and that these in turn are in some sense to be identified with brain activities or traces. On the other hand, from the point of view of religion and traditional philosophy the suggestion is completely unplausible — creative or inventive thought, and aesthetic, moral or religious experiences seem so far removed from mechanical or physiological processes that a good deal of softening up is necessary if any kind of identity theory is to get a fair hearing. This softening up is best carried out by considering the difficulties in the main rival philosophical view, interactionism.

scholarly journals Ecstasy from a physiological point of view

1982 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 74-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaj Björkqvist
Keyword(s):  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
Biological Study ◽  
Physiological Basis ◽  
Slowing Down ◽  
Psychosomatic Diseases ◽  
The Brain

The biological study of man is one of today's most rapidly advancing sciences. There is no reason for not utilizing these methodologies of research and the knowledge already gained when studying ecstasy and other similar religious phenomena. Drugs have been used in all parts of the world as an ecstasy technique. Since mental states and physiological correlates always accompany each other, it is obvious that the human mind can be affected by external means, for instance by drugs. But the opposite is also true; mental changes affect the body, as they do in the case of psychosomatic diseases. Ecstasy is often described as an extremely joyful experience; this pleasure must necessarily also have a physiological basis. It is of course too early to say anything for certain, but the discovery of pleasure centres in the brain might offer an explanation. It is not far-fetched to suggest that when a person experiences euphoric ecstasy, it might, in some way or other, be connected with a cerebral pleasure center. Can it be, for example, that religious ecstasy is attained only by some mechanism triggering off changes in the balance of the transmitter substances? Or is it reached only via a change in the hormonal balance, or only by a slowing down of the brain waves, or is a pleasure centre activated? When a person is using an ecstasy technique, he usually does so within a religious tradition. When he reaches an experience, a traditional interpretation of it already exists.

Is the Human Brain Unique?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack M. Gorman
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Human Brain ◽  
Brain Function ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Brain Diseases ◽  
Expression Of Genes ◽  
The Future ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Brain

Some scientists now argue that humans are really not superior to other species, including our nearest genetic neighbors, chimpanzees and bonobos. Indeed, those animals seem capable of many things previously thought to be uniquely human, including a sense of the future, empathy, depression, and theory of mind. However, it is clear that humans alone produce speech, dominate the globe, and have several brain diseases like schizophrenia. There are three possible sources within the brain for these differences in brain function: in the structure of the brain, in genes coding for proteins in the brain, and in the level of expression of genes in the brain. There is evidence that all three are the case, giving us a place to look for the intersection of the human mind and brain: the expression of genes within neurons of the prefrontal cortex.

Betekent de monteerbare mens de antropologische heilstaat? Systematisch-theologische vragen

2009 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-115
Author(s):  
Luco van den Brom
Keyword(s):  
Medical Technology ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Brain Functions ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Individual ◽  
God Machine ◽  
The Brain

Developments in medical technology summon the image of a novel ‘bionic’ humanity of the cyborg. Is it possible to entirely reproduce human beings and retain their identity? This technological enhancement aims at improving the physical make-up of the human phenomenon as an individual. Mankind thus assumes control over their mental evolution, creating a techno-sapiens. This prompts the question whether religious faith, emotion, intention or responsibility are physiological reproducible. Experiments with a ‘God Machine’ seem to evoke religious impressions and to deny the individual meaning of God and the human mind. Hick’s dualism of mind and brain as dancing partners is unsuccessful by actually personalizing the brain. This article proposes to describe mental and brain functions as complementary instead of tracing their physiological origin. Then, religious faith is not reduced to fides quae, as merely physiological reproducible information, but remains an existential attitude to life, as fides qua, by itself within the context of a community of believers.

scholarly journals The language system in the human mind and brain

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Paloma Batista Cardoso
Keyword(s):  
Parietal Cortex ◽  
Language Processing ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Language System ◽  
Minor Degree ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Language Network

In this text, we review the conference given by Evelina Fedorenko, entitled "The language system in the human mind and brain", given on May 6th, 2020 as part of the activities of the Abralin live event - linguists online. In her speech, the referred researcher discusses language processing, considering its physiological and cognitive aspects. Fedorenko defends the existence of the language network, which encompasses the surface of the frontal, temporal and parietal cortex; which function is language processing. This region of the brain responds, with a major or minor degree of intensity; to semantic and syntactic stimuli to compose meanings that are acceptable to speakers.

DIRECTIONS OF ASSOCIATIVE IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL NAMES

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (28) ◽  
pp. 118-128
Author(s):  
Olena Karpenko ◽  
Tetiana Stoianova
Keyword(s):  
Proper Names ◽  
Mental Lexicon ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Sound Symbolism ◽  
Personal Names ◽  
Communicative Process ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Scientific Value ◽  
The Brain

The article is devoted to the study of personal names from a cognitive point of view. The study is based on the cognitive concept that speech actually exists not in the speech, not in linguistic writings and dictionaries, but in consciousness, in the mental lexicon, in the language of the brain. The conditions for identifying personal names can encompass not only the context, encyclopedias, and reference books, but also the sound form of the word. In the communicative process, during a free associative experiment, which included a name and a recipient’s mental lexicon. The recipient was assigned a task to quickly give some association to the name. The aggregate of a certain number of reactions of different recipients forms the associative field of a proper name. The associative experiment creates the best conditions for identifying the lexeme. The definition of a monosemantic personal name primarily includes the search of what it denotes, while during the process of identifying a polysemantic personal name recipients tend have different reactions. Scientific value is posed by the effect of the choice of letters for the name, sound symbolism, etc. The following belong to the generalized forms of identification: usage of a hyperonym; synonyms and periphrases or simple descriptions; associations denoting the whole (name stimulus) by reference to its part (associatives); cognitive structures such as “stimulus — association” and “whole (stimulus) — part (associative)”; lack of adjacency; mysterious associations. The topicality of the study is determined by its perspective to identify the directions of associative identification of proper names, which is one of the branches of cognitive onomastics. The purpose of the study is to identify, review, and highlight the directions of associative identification of proper names; the object of the research is the names in their entirety and variety; its subject is the existence of names in the mental lexicon, which determines the need for singling out the directions for the associative identification of the personal names.

Subjectivity as a sentient perspective and the role of interoception

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helena De Preester
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Basic Form ◽  
Bodily States ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Phenomenological Point

This chapter argues that the most basic form of subjectivity is different from and more fundamental than having a self, and forwards a hypothesis about the origin of subjectivity in terms of interoception. None of those topics are new, and a consensus concerning the homeostatic-interoceptive origin of subjectivity is rapidly growing in the domains of the neurosciences and psychology. This chapter critically explores that growing consensus, and it argues that the idea that the brain topographically represents bodily states is unfit for thinking about the coming about of subjectivity. In the first part, four inherent characteristics of subjectivity are discussed from a philosophical phenomenological point of view. The second part explores whether a model of subjectivity in which interoception maintains its crucial role is possible without relying on topographical representations of the in-depth body, and giving due to the inherent characteristics of subjectivity.

Information-based decoding of the coupling among human brain activity and movement paths

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Shahul Mujib Kamal ◽  
Norazryana Mat Dawi ◽  
Hamidreza Namazi
Keyword(s):  
Brain Activity ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Physiological Signals ◽  
Human Walking ◽  
Eeg Signals ◽  
Rehabilitation Science ◽  
Information Contents ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Brain Reaction

BACKGROUND: Walking like many other actions of a human is controlled by the brain through the nervous system. In fact, if a problem occurs in our brain, we cannot walk correctly. Therefore, the analysis of the coupling of brain activity and walking is very important especially in rehabilitation science. The complexity of movement paths is one of the factors that affect human walking. For instance, if we walk on a path that is more complex, our brain activity increases to adjust our movements. OBJECTIVE: This study for the first time analyzed the coupling of walking paths and brain reaction from the information point of view. METHODS: We analyzed the Shannon entropy for electroencephalography (EEG) signals versus the walking paths in order to relate their information contents. RESULTS: According to the results, walking on a path that contains more information causes more information in EEG signals. A strong correlation (p= 0.9999) was observed between the information contents of EEG signals and walking paths. Our method of analysis can also be used to investigate the relation among other physiological signals of a human and walking paths, which has great benefits in rehabilitation science.

Human Mind and Its Carriers: Is It Possible to Transform Ourselves into Robots?

2021 ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Vadim V. Vasilyev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
John Searle ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Main Emphasis ◽  
Theories Of Mind ◽  
Continuous Stream ◽  
Previous State ◽  
The Brain

In this paper I discuss some aspects of the problem of carriers of human mind and person. The main emphasis is placed on the origin of our idea of the identi­cal self in the stream of perceptions, the need for a physical carrier of our self and person, and on possibility of replacing the biological carriers of self and per­son with artificial analogues. I argue that the idea of identical self is constructed by reflection on memories, that its truth is guaranteed by continuous stream of perceptions kept in memories, and that the stream of perceptions presupposes the presence of a normally functioning brain, which can be considered as a car­rier of our mind and person. Therefore, personal identity turns out to be depen­dent on the identity of the brain in time. An attempt to copy the structures of mind and person onto other possible carriers can thus only lead to creation of duplicates of the original person, but not to the continuation of its existence on another carrier. I argue that the gradual replacement of their components with artificial analogues is a more promising way of transforming the biological carri­ers of human person. To access the possible consequences of such a replacement I analyze arguments of John Searle and David Chalmers, designed to show, re­spectively, the disappearance of consciousness and person with such a replace­ment and, on the contrary, their preservation in a previous state. I explain why Searle’s arguments are unconvincing, and demonstrate that Chalmers’ arguments are based on a hidden premise, the confirmation of which is possible in the con­text of dubious theories of mind-body identity, epiphenomenalism or panpsy­chism only. I conclude that in the current situation it is impossible to predict which consequences for our person would follow such a replacement.

Еnactivist Criticism of the Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 76-80
Author(s):  
Anastasia O. Shabalina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Science Methods ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Critical Revision ◽  
Concept Of Information ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Person Experience

The article considers the main arguments against the neurobiological theory of consciousness from the point of view of the enactivist approach within the philosophy of mind. The neurobiological theory of consciousness, which reduces consciousness to neural activity, is currently the dominant approach to the mind-body problem. The neurobiological theory emerged as a result of advances in research on the phenomena of consciousness and through the development of technologies for visualizing the internal processes of mind. However, at the very heart of this theory, there is a number of logical contradictions. The non-reductive enactivist approach to consciousness, introduced in this article, contributes to the existing argumentation against the reduction of consciousness to neural processes with remonstrations that take into account the modern neuroscientific data. The article analyzes the argumentation of the sensorimotor enactivism developed by A. Noe and offers the account of the teleosemantic approach to the concept of information provided by R. Cao. The key problems of the neurobiological theory of consciousness are highlighted, and the objections emerging within the framework of the enactivist approach are analyzed. Since the main concepts on which the neural theory is based are the concepts of neural substrate, cognition as representation, and information as a unit of cognition, the author of the article presents three key enactivist ideas that oppose them. First, the enactivist concept of cognition as action allows us to consider the first-person experience as a mode of action, and not as a state of the brain substrate. Second, the article deals with the “explanatory externalism” argument proposed by Noe, who refutes the image of cognition as a representation in the brain. Finally, in order to critically revise the concept of information as a unit of cognition, the author analyzes Cao’s idea, which represents a teleosemantic approach, but is in line with the general enactivist argumentation. Cao shows that the application of the concept “information” to neural processes is problematic: no naturalized information is found in the brain as a physical substrate. A critical revision of beliefs associated with the neural theory of consciousness leads us to recognize that there are not enough grounds for reducing consciousness to processes that take place in the brain. That is why Noe calls expectations that the visualization of processes taking place in the brain with the help of the modern equipment will be able to depict the experience of consciousness the “new phrenology”, thus indicating the naive character of neural reduction. The article concludes that natural science methods are insufficient for the study of consciousness.

scholarly journals Perspectives from affective science on understanding the nature of emotion

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 239821281881262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine Fox
Keyword(s):  
Social World ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Scientific Study ◽  
Affective Neuroscience ◽  
Fundamental Nature ◽  
Scientific Consensus ◽  
Affective Science ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Brain

Emotions are at the heart of how we understand the human mind and of our relationships within the social world. Yet, there is still no scientific consensus on the fundamental nature of emotion. A central quest within the discipline of affective science is to develop an in-depth understanding of emotions, moods, and feelings and how they are embodied within the brain (affective neuroscience). This article provides a brief overview of the scientific study of emotion with a particular emphasis on psychological and neuroscientific perspectives. Following a selective snapshot of past and present research in this field, some current challenges and controversies in affective science are highlighted.

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