Supporters of standard teleosemantics argue that informational teleosemantics turns teleosemantics on its head, because functions are effects but a representation’s information relations concern its causes. In chapter 6, the author responds to this influential objection by explaining that, while functions must involve effects, this is not to the exclusion of triggering causes. According to the etiological theory, which is employed by most proponents of teleosemantics, functions are (roughly speaking) selected effects; however, they can also be selected dispositions or selected causal roles, and so can involve inputs as well as outputs. The author explains that there are response functions (functions to do something in response to something), that sensory-perceptual systems have them, and so can have information-processing functions, at least given a simple causal analysis of information. This clears the path for the causal-informational version of teleosemantics, which ties the contents of (nonconceptual) sensory-perceptual representations to their normal causes, as opposed to the so-called Normal conditions for their use.