The Circumstances of Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Standard Account ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Better Than

A new account of the Circumstances of Justice, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between the parties of a society, is developed in terms of convention. A standard account of the Circumstances of Justice widely attributed to Hume is criticized, partly on the grounds that Hobbes’ State of Nature and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are situations where the standard account conditions obtain and justice is impossible. These criticisms help to motivate the new game-theoretic account. Parties are in Generic Circumstances of Justice when (i) their underlying game has multiple optimal conventions they can achieve by all acting so as to contribute to a cooperative surplus, and (ii) each contributing party risks being let down if this party contributes and the others fail to contribute. These Generic Circumstances reflect Hume’s original account better than the standard account attributed to Hume.

Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game

Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
The Third ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Third Law

In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish the Foole, and even exclude her from the cooperative framework or take her life, if she defects once society is established, which is best expressed in the language of game theory by a grim strategy. That is, compared to existing game-theoretic interpretations of Hobbes, I argue that the sovereign plays a grim strategy with the citizens once society is established, and not the individuals with one another in the state of nature.

Hobbes, Conatus and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

1998 ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Juhani Pietarinen
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Sovereign Power ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Made In

I want to show the importance of the notion of conatus (endeavor) for Hobbes' political philosophy. According to Hobbes, all motion of bodies consists of elementary motions he called 'endeavors.' They are motions 'made in less space and time than can be given,' and they obey the law of persistence or inertia. A body strives to preserve its state and resist the causal power of other bodies. I call this the conatus-principle. Hobbes' argument for social contract and sovereign is based essentially on this model. He proves that the natural conatus makes people (i) strive to preserve their lives and therefore to get out of the destructive state of nature; (ii) commit to mutual contracts; (iii) keep the contracts unless some external cause otherwise determines; and (iv) establish a permanent sovereign power that Hobbes calls 'an artificial eternity of life.' All this is determined by the fundamental laws of nature, essentially, by the conatus-principle. I also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma interpretation of the Hobbesian state of nature does not represent all of the essential features of Hobbes' argument.

scholarly journals Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma among mobile agents performing 2D random walk

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Jurica Hižak
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Agents ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Mixed Population ◽  
Expected Number ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Detailed Derivation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Better Than

When Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma takes place on a two-dimensional plane among mobile agents, the course of the game slightly differs from that one in a well-mixed population. In this paper we present a detailed derivation of the expected number of encounters required for Tit-for-tat strategy to get even with Always-Defect strategy in a Brownian-like population. It will be shown that in such an environment Tit-for-Tat can perform better than in a well-mixed population.

scholarly journals Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-312
Author(s):  
Stephen Dobson ◽  
John Goddard
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Early Stages ◽  
Soccer Teams ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behaviour during the early stages of matches is typically superseded by non-cooperation during the latter stages. The propensity for violent play to take place in the latter stages of soccer matches is interpreted as novel non-experimental evidence that players typically resort to mutually detrimental non-cooperative forms of behaviour when the payoffs assume a prisoner’s dilemma structure.

Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods

1987 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Hampton
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Partial Analysis ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Willingness To Contribute

There has been a persistent tendency to identify what is called “the freerider problem” in the production of collective (or public) goods with the prisoner's dilemma. However, in this article I want to challenge that identification by presenting an analysis of what are in fact a variety of collective action problems in the production of collective goods. My strategy is not to consult any intuitions about what the free-rider problem is; rather I will be looking at the problematic game-theoretic structures of various situations associated with the production of different types of collective goods, thereby showing what sorts of difficulties a community concerned with their voluntary production would face. I call all of these dilemmas free-rider problems because in all of them certain individuals find it rational to take advantage of others' willingness to contribute to the good in a way that threatens its production. Some readers may feel that the term ‘free-rider problem’ is so identified with the prisoner's dilemma that my extension of the term in this way “jars”; if so, I invite them to coin another word for the larger phenomenon. My aim is not to engage in linguistic analysis but to attempt at least a partial analysis of the complicated structure of collective good production.

scholarly journals Decentralized Job Scheduling in the Cloud Based on a Spatially Generalized Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-751 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Gąsior ◽  
Franciszek Seredyński
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Job Scheduling ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Global Scheduling ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Job Scheduling Problem ◽  
Selfish Agents ◽  
Specific Number ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract We present in this paper a novel distributed solution to a security-aware job scheduling problem in cloud computing infrastructures. We assume that the assignment of the available resources is governed exclusively by the specialized brokers assigned to individual users submitting their jobs to the system. The goal of this scheme is allocating a limited quantity of resources to a specific number of jobs minimizing their execution failure probability and total completion time. Our approach is based on the Pareto dominance relationship and implemented at an individual user level. To select the best scheduling strategies from the resulting Pareto frontiers and construct a global scheduling solution, we developed a decision-making mechanism based on the game-theoretic model of Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma, realized by selfish agents operating in the two-dimensional cellular automata space. Their behavior is conditioned by the objectives of the various entities involved in the scheduling process and driven towards a Nash equilibrium solution by the employed social welfare criteria. The performance of the scheduler applied is verified by a number of numerical experiments. The related results show the effectiveness and scalability of the scheme in the presence of a large number of jobs and resources involved in the scheduling process.

scholarly journals How Does Misperception Affect Zero-Determinant Strategies In Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaoyang Cheng ◽  
Guanpu Chen ◽  
Yiguang Hong
Keyword(s):  
Linear Relationship ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies have attracted wide attention in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) games, since the player equipped with ZD strategies can unilaterally enforce the two players’ expected utilities subjected to a linear relation. On the other hand, uncertainties, which may be caused by misperception, occur in IPD inevitably in practical circumstances. To better understand the situation, we consider the influence of misperception on ZD strategies in IPD, where the two players, player X and player Y , have different cognitions, but player X detects the misperception and it is believed to make ZD strategies by player Y. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the ZD strategies in IPD with misperception, where there is also a linear relationship between players’ utilities in player X’s cognition. Then we explore bounds of players’ expected utility deviation from a linear relationship in player X’s cognition with also improving its own utility.

The Social Contract in Leviathan and the Prisoner's Dilemma Supergame

1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Game Theory

The familiar problem of whether Hobbesian men in the state of nature would ever abide by an agreement to obey a Sovereign is a version of the puzzle now known as ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’. The present paper has the following aims: (1) To establish that the game-theory approach is a legitimate way to study Hobbes. (2) To see whether a proposed ‘solution’ to the paradox of Prisoner's Dilemma applies to this example. The paradox is that individually rational self-interested calculations sum to an outcome that is suboptimal not only for society but also for every single member of it. The solution is the Supergame which consists of indefinitely repeated plays of the simple Prisoner's Dilemma game. (3) To compare the results of the above with the similar conclusions reached by a different route by recent arguments in sociobiology.

Universalizing and the we: endogenous game theoretic deontology

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Paul Studtmann ◽  
Shyam Gouri Suresh
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Autonomous Agents ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Moral Framework ◽  
Interacting Agents ◽  
Game Theoretic

Abstract The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting agents play Prisoner’s Dilemma using this moral framework, their material outcomes are a Pareto improvement over the Nash equilibrium.

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