Transcending the Emergence/Reduction Distinction: The Case of Biology
The groups of problems that fall under the titles ‘reduction’ and ‘emergence’ appear at the boundaries of seemingly independent and well-established scientific disciplines, such as chemistry and biology, biology and psychology, biology and political theory, and so on. They arise in this way:1. There is a widespread intellectual ‘urge’ towards developing a common discourse for adjacent disciplinary practices such as biology and chemistry, biology and psychology, law and psychiatry. To achieve this goal a unified and coherent system of concepts would be required that would be adequate to describe and to explain the phenomena which are the subject matter of both disciplines.2. There is a discontinuity between the concepts native to each of the adjacent disciplines in that predications from each to a common subject such as a sample of a material substance, or a process or a human being, appear to be incompatible. For example to describe a certain reaction as ‘reducing’ and to describe it in terms of the quantum states of molecular orbitals is an incompatible predication. For example to say that a brain is thinking and that that brain is taking up glucose is an incompatible predication since the criteria for these assertions are radically different. Or, to say that a human being is ill and to say that a human being is malfunctioning is an incompatible predication, since the former requires the speaker to treat the human being as a person, and the latter as an organism. Just what these various differences amount to will be the main aim of this paper.