Transcending the Emergence/Reduction Distinction: The Case of Biology

2005 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Rom Harré

The groups of problems that fall under the titles ‘reduction’ and ‘emergence’ appear at the boundaries of seemingly independent and well-established scientific disciplines, such as chemistry and biology, biology and psychology, biology and political theory, and so on. They arise in this way:1. There is a widespread intellectual ‘urge’ towards developing a common discourse for adjacent disciplinary practices such as biology and chemistry, biology and psychology, law and psychiatry. To achieve this goal a unified and coherent system of concepts would be required that would be adequate to describe and to explain the phenomena which are the subject matter of both disciplines.2. There is a discontinuity between the concepts native to each of the adjacent disciplines in that predications from each to a common subject such as a sample of a material substance, or a process or a human being, appear to be incompatible. For example to describe a certain reaction as ‘reducing’ and to describe it in terms of the quantum states of molecular orbitals is an incompatible predication. For example to say that a brain is thinking and that that brain is taking up glucose is an incompatible predication since the criteria for these assertions are radically different. Or, to say that a human being is ill and to say that a human being is malfunctioning is an incompatible predication, since the former requires the speaker to treat the human being as a person, and the latter as an organism. Just what these various differences amount to will be the main aim of this paper.

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 11-33
Author(s):  
Janusz Mariański

In this article, the issue of structural individualisation, which is one of the results of social modernisation, is adopted as the subject-matter. In the processes of individualisation, it is, first and foremost, the importance of an individual human being and matters relevant to their life, including the obligation to make constant choices in all the aspects of life, that is placed emphasis upon. In the aspect of values, the process of individualisation means transfer from values seen as responsibilities (related to duties) to values connected with self-fulfilment (self-development). The consequence of individualisation is the significant changes in the realm of morality: departing from traditional moral values and standards, permissivism and moral relativism, the destruction of normativity, and the secularisation of morality. On the other hand, it creates the opportunity to determine one's own moral choices and shapean autonomous moral personality.


2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miles Groth ◽  
Diederik F. Janssen

With far too many scholarly journals out there now, why launch yet another? Hurried readers may never recognize what THYMOS is about unless they get past the first word to what follows: Journal of Boyhood Studies. That may happen in quite a few cases at first, but we are convinced that once underway, THYMOS will take its place among the best interdisciplinary journals in English. Boys, we believe, have something to teach us about the body, sexuality, spirituality and the imagination and, for that reason, without wishing to be excessive, we want to emphasize our conviction that the subject matter of THYMOS—boys and boyhood—is central to everyone’s self-understanding as a human being in what will very soon be a thoroughgoing global culture.


Author(s):  
James Gouinlock

The philosophy of John Dewey is original and comprehensive. His extensive writings contend systematically with problems in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, aesthetics, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy and education, and philosophical anthropology. Although his work is widely read, it is not widely understood. Dewey had a distinctive conception of philosophy, and the key to understanding and benefiting from his work is to keep this conception in mind. A worthwhile philosophy, he urged, must be practical. Philosophic inquiry, that is, ought to take its point of departure from the aspirations and problems characteristic of the various sorts of human activity, and an effective philosophy would develop ideas responsive to those conditions. Any system of ideas that has the effect of making common experience less intelligible than we find it to be is on that account a failure. Dewey’s theory of inquiry, for example, does not entertain a conception of knowledge that makes it problematic whether we can know anything at all. Inasmuch as scientists have made extraordinary advances in knowledge, it behoves the philosopher to find out exactly what scientists do, rather than to question whether they do anything of real consequence. Moral philosophy, likewise, should not address the consternations of philosophers as such, but the characteristic urgencies and aspirations of common life; and it should attempt to identify the resources and limitations of human nature and the environment with which it interacts. Human beings might then contend effectively with the typical perplexities and promises of mortal existence. To this end, Dewey formulated an exceptionally innovative and far-reaching philosophy of morality and democracy. The subject matter of philosophy is not philosophy, Dewey liked to say, but ‘problems of men’. All too often, he found, the theories of philosophers made the primary subject matter more obscure rather than less so. The tendency of thinkers is to become bewitched by inherited philosophic puzzles, when the persistence of the puzzle is a consequence of failing to consider the assumptions that created it. Dewey was gifted in discerning and discarding the philosophic premises that create needless mysteries. Rather than fret, for instance, about the question of how immaterial mental substance can possibly interact with material substance, he went to the root of the problem by challenging the notion of substance itself. Indeed, Dewey’s dissatisfaction with the so-called classic tradition in philosophy, stemming at least from Plato if not from Parmenides, led him to reconstruct the entire inheritance of the Western tradition in philosophy. The result is one of the most seminal and fruitful philosophies of the twentieth century.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 246-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bergunder

Religious studies cannot agree on a common definition of its subject matter. To break the impasse, important insights from recent discussions about post-foundational political theory might be of some help. However, they can only be of benefit in conversations about “religion” when the previous debate on the subject matter of religious studies is framed slightly differently. This is done in the first part of the article. It is, then, shown on closer inspection of past discussions on “religion” that a consensus-capable, contemporary, everyday understanding of “religion,” here called Religion 2, is assumed, though it remains unexplained and unreflected upon. The second part of the article shows how Religion 2 can be newly conceptualized through the lens of Ernesto Laclau’s political theory, combined with concepts from Judith Butler and Michel Foucault, and how Religion 2 can be established as the historical subject matter of religious studies. Though concrete historical reconstructions of Religion 2 always remain contested, I argue that this does not prevent it from being generally accepted as the subject matter of religious studies. The third part discusses the previous findings in the light of postcolonial concerns about potential Eurocentrism in the concept of “religion.” It is argued that Religion 2 has to be understood in a fully global perspective, and, as a consequence, more research on the global religious history of the 19th and 20th centuries is urgently needed.


Author(s):  
Eva Erman ◽  
Niklas Möller

AbstractPolitical realists’ rejection of the so-called ‘ethics first’ approach of political moralists (mainstream liberals), has raised concerns about their own source of normativity. Some realists have responded to such concerns by theorizing a distinctively political normativity. According to this view, politics is seen as an autonomous, independent domain with its own evaluative standards. Therefore, it is in this source, rather than in some moral values ‘outside’ of this domain, that normative justification should be sought when theorizing justice, democracy, political legitimacy, and the like. For realists the question about a distinctively political normativity is important, because they take the fact that politics is a distinct affair to have severe consequences for both how to approach the subject matter as such and for which principles and values can be justified. Still, realists have had a hard time clarifying what this distinctively political normativity consists of and why, more precisely, it matters. The aim of this paper is to take some further steps in answering these questions. We argue that realists have the choice of committing themselves to one of two coherent notions of distinctively political normativity: one that is independent of moral values, where political normativity is taken to be a kind of instrumental normativity; another where the distinctness still retains a justificatory dependence on moral values. We argue that the former notion is unattractive since the costs of commitment will be too high (first claim), and that the latter notion is sound but redundant since no moralist would ever reject it (second claim). Furthermore, we end the paper by discussing what we see as the most fruitful way of approaching political and moral normativity in political theory.


1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 1086-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter G. Stillman

In “Abstract Right,” the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel criticizes the usual content and formulations of liberal theories of rights. In terms of content, Hegel argues that the subject of rights is only a narrow abstraction from the full human being; that he has limited self-determination and limited political freedom; and that, when he acts on his rights, he produces terror and destruction. In terms of formulations, Hegel argues that the pervasiveness of contract relations is inaccurate and undesirable; that the state cannot be derived from the natural man's alienating his right to punish; and that it is inaccurate to conceptualize civil society as only limiting natural man's freedoms. By transforming natural to abstract rights, Hegel retains much of the substance of rights, while concurrently preparing for the later sections of his text which try to overcome the inadequacies of a political theory based only on rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 188 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-60
Author(s):  
Tomasz Jakubczyk

The specificity of the 21st century filled with economic and social problems, acts of terror as well as armed conflicts downrightly necessitates undertaking the research in the field of security sciences. However, each time defining a subject of scientific research is of the utmost importance in order to systemize research works and mainly concretize interests. Such the aim was chosen by the author of the current article who, while presenting the orientations of individual scientific theoreticians and researchers dealing with security issues, answers the subject matter question: What does constitute the subject of the research in security sciences? The author’s inquiries were preceded by the explanation of the types of security and its scope within individual cases, which includes the essence of national and international security. In the further part of the article the author’s attention was focused on the sphere of methodology in security sciences. The author notices that the subject of research in the security science is of multidimensional character hence explanation, description, analyzing, assessing and forecasting the consequences of ongoing processes and events in the security sphere, together with initiation of activities which serve for ensuring security, require applying the knowledge from various scientific disciplines, domains and fields. In the following part of the article the attempt to define the subject of research in security sciences and drawing the conclusions within that field was undertaken. The author cites the orientations by A. Dawidczyk and T. Jemiolo according to whom the subject of research in security sciences is defined as the threat coming from human surroundings and all the activities aiming at ensuring and maintaining security for a man. The article is summarized by the conclusions where it was determined that in security sciences, the security, its components, ratio, level and relations with respect to the subject of research are studied.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-112
Author(s):  
Vasily N Novikov

The subject matter of the treatise is desktop films, a young but gradually gaining popularity format whose elements can be encountered in films of various genres. The author debates if this technology, which suggests using a different visual esthetics, has any potential, what elements this technology is based on and how it transforms the idea of a human being reflected in virtual reality.


2006 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-52
Author(s):  
Aage Schiøler

Det hele menneske og en kristologisk funderet forsynstanke: Om brugen af “Sjæl” og “Støv” i to grundtvigsalmer[The whole human being and a Christologically based belief in providence: On the use of “Soul” and “Dust” in two of Grundtvig’s hymns]By Aage SchiølerThe reading of two of Grundtvig’s hymns, one much used and one less known, uncovers the influence of Old Testament material on his ideas of basic human conditions and on the wording of Christological dynamics within his notions about Divine Providence. First, the use of “Soul” and “Dust” is briefly surveyed. Then the hymns are analysed in order to clarify the impact of the terms on Christology as the crucial element determining the subject-matter of his view on Divine Providence. The outcome of the analysis is that only through inclusion of the existence of the individual person into the destiny of Christ as our equal and brother in life, death and resurrection, the hard questions posed by human existence can be challenged by reference to a God characterized by omnipotence, omniscience, and supreme goodness.The omission of this Christological element, which in Grundtvig’s context is presented through the Preaching of the Gospel, granted the individual through Baptism, and continually maintained through The Lords Supper, would leave Divine Providence as idle talk or mere chance. Finally a modification of the concept of complementarity is used as a means to clarify the term Christian Hope as the liberating potentiality in Grundtvig’s ideas about Divine Providence.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 2-9
Author(s):  
Chris Berger

In order to find a thorough treatment of the good life, arguably the subject of political science, we must have recourse to the ancients.  Aristotle directly addresses and thematizes the concept of “the good life” in his Nicomachean Ethics, wherein it is suggested that the best possible life for a human being is one that is lived in accordance with a human being’s natural function, that is, logos.  This paper implements Aristotle’s definition of the good life in order to suggest that it presents us with not merely a viable but a superior alternative to the relativistic language of “lifestyles” and “values” that dominates contemporary political theory.  This paper will first establish a framework within which the best life for a human being may be understood, then proceed to explain the inadequacy of relativism as a way of conceiving of the best life and the relationship between the best life and the best person.  The argument will conclude by making a case for the importance of the best life as a topic worthy of pursuit in both theory and practice.


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