INFLATION TARGETING, CREDIT FLOWS, AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN A REGIME CHANGE MODEL

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (S1) ◽  
pp. 59-89
Author(s):  
Marco Gross ◽  
Willi Semmler

Recent papers point to the problem that inflation-targeting models do not as of yet consider financial market stability that can considerably derail inflation-targeting monetary policy, implying significant nonzero crisis probabilities that could come along with large negative output and employment gaps. Credit flows and the instability of credit appear to be at the root of the financial instability problem. On the other hand, some authors recently questioned whether a too early and too strong leaning against the wind policy by central banks might have higher costs than benefits in terms of output and employment losses. In our paper, we include in an inflation targeting model a financial stabilization goal. In contrast to infinite horizon and two-period models, we propose a finite horizon model. The model is solved by using a new global solution algorithm, called Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (NMPC), exploring stabilizing/destabilizing effects of price and nonprice (credit volume) drivers of the output gap, inflation, and credit flows. We substantiate the theoretical part of the paper by approaching the subject empirically, relying to that end on a regime-switching structural vector autoregressive (VAR) for the euro area. The empirical model contains standard macroeconomic variables along with credit flows and loan interest rates, the central bank policy rate, and European Central Bank (ECB) balance sheet variables. The regime-switching feature of the model is meant to capture the state-dependent relationship between the variables, with specific nonlinearities having direct counterparts in the theoretical model. Based on a sign restriction methodology, we explore conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks, loan supply, and demand shocks, under different regime assumptions to reveal the state-dependent effects of both interest rate and volume-based policies. The empirical results are used as guidance for the calibration of the theoretical model variants.

Author(s):  
Mykola Pasichnyi

The research subject includes the theoretical basis and mechanisms of monetary policy formation and realization as an instrument of macroeconomic regulation. The aim of the study is to determine the features of domestic monetary policy and to systemize the policy’s stages under economic transformations. Methods. In order to achieve the appropriate tasks, we used a set of methods and approaches, that helped to ensure the conceptual unity of our investigation. The dialectical, systemic and structural approaches, methods of analysis and synthesis, comparison, generalization, scientific abstraction are applied. Results. The peculiarities of formation and realization of monetary policy of Ukraine under economic transformations are determined. The main stages of national monetary policy’s development are systemized. The dynamics of monetization, exchange rate and index of consumer price from 1992 to 2018 is investigated. Practical implications. Monetaryl policy and instruments of its implementation. Conclusions. Nowadays, the monetary policy has a formed institutional mechanism in order to reach the main goal and tasks. We identified the main phases of monetary policy of Ukraine. In the initial stage the main elements of monetary architectonics are established, also the powers and tasks of central bank are defined. The stage of functional improvement characterized by the restriction on central bank repayment of bonds on the primary market, decreasing the monetization of national economy, introducing the currency exchange corridor. At the steady development phase, we determined the exchange rate stability and gradual increasing of monetization level. Within the transitional stage of modification, the raising of monetization was continued, moreover, the combined using of methods on the currency market was carried out to stabilize it. Also, National bank defined the priority directions to enhance the bank system. The stage of institutional modernization is characterized by the monetary strategy formation, increasing the central bank institutional and financial independence, the adoption of inflation targeting regime, the improving of basic statements of currency transaction, the developing of macroprudential regulation to ensure financial stability.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil ◽  
Alessio Fotia

AbstractThis chapter introduces conventional monetary policy, i.e. monetary policy during periods of economic and financial stability and when short-term interest rates are not constrained by the zero lower bound. We introduce the concept of an operational target of monetary policy and explain why central banks normally give this role to the short-term interbank rate. We briefly touch macroeconomics by outlining how central banks should set interest rates across time to achieve their ultimate target, e.g. price stability, and we acknowledge the complications in doing so. We then zoom further into monetary policy operations and central bank balance sheets by developing the concepts of autonomous factor, monetary policy instruments, and liquidity-absorbing and liquidity providing balance sheet items. Subsequently we explain how these quantities relate to short-term interest rates, and how the central bank can rely on this relation to steer its operational target, and thereby the starting point of monetary policy transmission. Finally, we explain the importance of the collateral framework and related risk control measures (e.g. haircuts) for the liquidity of banks and for the conduct of central bank credit operations.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Roger E. A. Farmer ◽  
Pawel Zabczyk

This paper is about the effectiveness of qualitative easing, a form of unconventional monetary policy that changes the risk composition of the central bank balance sheet. We construct a general equilibrium model where agents have rational expectations, and there is a complete set of financial securities, but where some agents are unable to participate in financial markets. We show that a change in the risk composition of the central bank’s balance sheet affects equilibrium asset prices and economic activity. We prove that, in our model, a policy in which the central bank stabilizes non-fundamental fluctuations in the stock market is self-financing and leads to a Pareto efficient outcome.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Ergys Misha

The Taylor’s Rule Central Banks is applying widely today from Central Banks for design the monetary policy and for determination of interest rates. The purpose of this paper is to assess monetary policy rule in Albania, in view of an inflation targeting regime. In the first version of the Model, the Taylor’s Rule assumes that base interest rate of the monetary policy varies depending on the change of (1) the inflation rate and (2) economic growth (Output Gap).Through this paper it is proposed changing the objective of the Bank of Albania by adding a new objective, that of "financial stability", along with the “price stability”. This means that it is necessary to reassess the Taylor’s Rule by modifying it with incorporation of indicators of financial stability. In the case of Albania, we consider that there is no regular market of financial assets in the absence of the Stock Exchange. For this reason, we will rely on the credit developmet - as a way to measure the financial cycle in the economy. In this case, the base rate of monetary policy will be changed throught: (1) Targeting Inflation Rate, (2) Nominal Targeting of Economic Growth, and (3) Targeting the Gap of the Ratio Credit/GDP (mitigating the boom cycle, if the gap is positive, and the contractiocycle if the gap is negative).The research data show that, it is necessary that the Bank of Albania should also include in its objective maintaining the financial stability. In this way, the contribution expected from the inclusion of credit gap indicators in Taylor’s Rule, will be higher and sustainable in time.


2019 ◽  
pp. 94-100
Author(s):  
T.S. Hudima ◽  
V.A. Ustymenko

The article is devoted to identifying the peculiarities of the central bank digital currency (CBDC), explaining their impact on the monetary policy of the state, and identifying the prospects for the transformation of domestic banking legislation in connection with the implementation of the CBDC. It is noted that the scope of competence of the Central Bank and the legal basis for the issuance of the CBDC will depend on the economic and legal features of the digital currency, the degree of its impact on the monetary policy, the financial stability of the country’s economy and so on. In the process of forming the appropriate legal field and defining the conceptual apparatus in the sphere of emission and circulation of the CBDC, the peculiarities of the use of the latter in economic transactions and the specific functions not inherent in ordinary means of payment should be taken. СBDC initiatives will help: 1) progressively narrow the banking system at the level of the Central Banks (such as the Chicago Plan) by allowing individuals and businesses to deposit directly into the accounts of the Central Banks; 2) increasing confidence of economic entities and individuals in the financial system; 3) strengthening the financial stability of the economy (both domestically and globally). Granting business entities or individuals the right to store digital money directly with the Central Bank can give rise to two main directions of influence on monetary policy: first, to strengthen its transmission mechanism; secondly, lead to banks being disrupted. This may lead to some legal issues regarding (1) the NBU’s area of competence; (2) the constitutional foundations of the legal economic order (Article 5 of the ECU). In particular, it cannot be ruled out that centralization of the production, servicing, and management of the СBDC turnover may violate the principles of competition in business activities, prevent abuse of monopoly position in the market, etc. Keywords: monetary policy, central bank digital currency, financial stability, competence, legal framework, economic operations, issue.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1159-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Caldas Montes ◽  
Cristiane Gea

Purpose The evidence concerning the effects of the inflation targeting (IT) regime as well as greater central bank transparency on monetary policy interest rates is not conclusive, and the following questions remain open. What is the effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of monetary policy interest rate? Does central bank transparency affect the level of the monetary policy interest rate and its volatility? Are these effects greater in developing countries? The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by answering these questions. Hence, the paper analyzes the effects of IT and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Design/methodology/approach The analysis uses a sample of 48 countries (31 developing) comprising the period between 1998 and 2014. Based on panel data methodology, estimates are made for the full sample, and then for the sample of developing countries. Findings Countries that adopt the IT regime tend to have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. The effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is smaller in developing countries. Besides, countries with more transparent central banks have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. In turn, the effect of central bank transparency on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is greater in developing countries. Practical implications The study brings important practical implications regarding the influence of both the IT regime and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Originality/value Studies have sought to analyze whether IT and central bank transparency are effective to control inflation. However, few studies analyze the influence of IT and central bank transparency on interest rates. This study differs from the few existing studies since: the analysis is done not only for the effect of transparency on the level of the monetary policy interest rate, but also on its volatility; the central bank transparency index that is used has never been utilized in this sort of analysis; and the study uses panel data methodology, and compares the results between different samples.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-116
Author(s):  
Csaba Lentner

This study outlines the development of Hungary’s monetary policy, and the course and changes in its objectives and instruments since the beginning of the market economy transition in the late 1980s. The author’s basic thesis is that the period since the two-level banking system was reinstated after four decades of a planned economy system, in 1987, can be basically divided into three development phases with significantly different characteristics. The first phase was an ‘attempt to introduce’ an imported monetary mechanism, or perhaps an urge to comply with it, while the second phase was an approach of a monetary regime change launched in 2013 and supporting economic growth and financial stability strongly and directly, which lasted until the appearance of the traumatic elements of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis. The third phase is evolving today, under the circumstances of adapting to the conditions of the real essence of the twenty-first century, i.e. a new type of international competitiveness, which is pursued by the Central Bank of Hungary as stipulated by the Fundamental Law and the cardinal Central Bank Act of Hungary.


2014 ◽  
pp. 1284-1302
Author(s):  
Yıldız Özkök

Today, Central Banks' primary target is to maintain the price stability. In that context, through their monetary policy, they intervene in the money market with different tools. The Analytical Balance Sheet was created upon summing up and offsetting Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) in order to represent specific monetary aggregates. By means of that, CBRT aims to make the balance sheet more understandable and simple. In this chapter, firstly the sub items of the Analytical Balance Sheet are explained; secondly, the economic crises of Turkey during 2000-2009 is mentioned; finally, effects of these crises on the CBRT's Analytical Balance Sheet, changes in monetary aggregates which are Currency Issued, Reserve Money, Monetary Base, and Central Bank's Money, and in this context structure of the monetary policy of the CBRT in this period is analyzed.


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

Many central banks took on additional responsibilities. Inadequate self-assessments remain unfinished almost a decade after the crisis erupted. Government-central bank relationships need to be conditioned on whether times are normal versus crisis conditions. Transparency confronts ambiguity when central banks must communicate the outlook and the conditionality of their decisions. Forward guidance was taken too far and ended up being futile. Central bankers simply exhausted their ability to influence behavior through mere words or ambiguous statements. This is a self-inflicted wound for institutions that are seen as overburdened. These forces leave central banking more vulnerable than is commonly acknowledged. Squaring the conventional objectives of monetary policy with the unclear aims of financial stability is difficult. Adequate limitations on the authority of central banks have yet to be thoroughly debated. We are nowhere near resolving the inherent tensions between old and new sets of central bank objectives.


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

This chapter provides an overview of the macroeconomic environment since 2000. The era is broken down into three periods: 2000–2006, 2007–2010, and 2011–present. Warnings of an imminent crisis were present before 2007, but generally they were ignored by self-satisfied policymakers. Pre-crisis, inflation control was the once rising and, seemingly, preeminent monetary policy strategy. A review, both pre- and post-GFC, of a wide variety of macroeconomic and financial indicators is included, with discussion of lesser known variables such as proxies for central bank communication and balance sheet indicators. These clearly enable us to identify interventions by central banks while also highlighting areas of continuing concern. In some respects (e.g. concerns about financial stability), everything has changed post-crisis, but in other respects (e.g. monetary policy strategy) fewer changes are apparent. The chapter concludes by arguing that there are reasons to be apprehensive about the current state of monetary policy and central banking.


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