Becoming a Good Citizen for a Better Life: Why Does the Middle Class Prefer Negotiation over Rightful Resistance in Shanghai?

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
YIHAN XIONG

Abstract‘Rightful resistance’ has become a mainstream theoretical framework for understanding social protests in contemporary China. However, the middle class in Shanghai is more inclined to protect its rights through ‘loyal appealing’ than rightful resistance. The middle class has had to express its loyalty and its ‘voice’ at the same time to minimize its political risk. Rightful resistance and ‘loyal appealing’ differ in several respects. First, rightful resistance professes loyalty only to the central government, whereas loyal appealing professes loyalty to the local government. Second, rightful resistance considers the local government an object to confront, whereas loyal appealing considers it a potential ally. Finally, activists who engage in rightful resistance use central government policies as their weapon, whereas activists who engage in loyal appealing use the local government's political performance as a bargaining chip. However, the middle class has not completely relinquished its right to rightful resistance; instead, rightful resistance is a backup to ensure the effectiveness of loyal appealing.

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dian Wardiana Sjuchro

Democratization of broadcasting that is characterized by the diversity of ownership and diversity of content is the aspiration that stated in Law 32/2002 on Broadcasting. However, the enormous of political and business battles that follow the enactment of the broadcasting regulations have hampered its implementation in Indonesia. Now, after nearly 15 years of implementation of the Broadcasting Law in Indonesia, the time to evaluating the implementation of regulation of legislative products in the regions have arrived. Evaluations are directed more to an objective opportunities of local people to access the ownership of local television, and the impact on the content of television local to the communities. The research applied qualitative method and the data is collected by utilizing a survey to the broadcasting stakeholders in 10 areas that is determined purposively. The object of the research is local government, regional broadcasting commissions, community leaders, journalists, lecturers, and the owners of local television licensed. The results show that broadcasting regulations are relatively unworkable in the regions due to various central government policies that do not widely open the opportunities for regional people to access broadcasting licenses. This limitation also led to complaints from the region regarding the content of national television broadcasts that many harm local communities and cultures. Research respondents suggested to have more pro-regional broadcasting regulation and involving local people in the making of policies and regulations of regional broadcasting.


Wajah Hukum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 582
Author(s):  
Muhammad Jaelani

In carrying out his duties as Governor, which is an extension of the central government in each province, the Jambi Governor must control the policies that have been imposed by the regional government at the city and district levels in tackling COVID-19. However, in reality until now the system of government in the regional government is still running its own government so it does not coordinate with the Governor as the leader in his regional province. This condition is certainly a problem in running the government system so that it needs to be studied more deeply related to the role of the Governor of Jambi. The subject matter studied in this study is related to the role of the Governor of Jambi in controlling local government policies. So in this case the research method used is a legislative and analytical approach. The research materials used are primary, secondary and tertiary legal materials and data collection techniques, namely literature studies and qualitative analysis techniques. The results of the discussion are that until now the role of the Governor of Jambi has not been carried out in controlling local government policies because the regional government in running its own government is still alone so that it lacks synergy in running the government system in order to cope with the spread of covid-19. 


2002 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Donnelly ◽  
Kenneth B. Scott

Police accountability in Scotland is examined in two aspects. First, the changing constitutional arrangements in Scotland are explored in terms of the tripartite system; local government reform, devolution, the Scottish Parliament and the new Justice Ministry. Comparisons are also made between the policing systems in Scotland and England and Wales, with respect to the police reforms of the 1990s. It is argued that recent constitutional change and central government policies have significantly increased centralisation of the policing function in Scotland by non-statutory means. The impact of these changes on police authorities, joint police boards and policing is evaluated.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antung Deddy Radiansyah

Gaps in biodiversity conservation management within the Conservation Area that are the responsibility of the central government and outside the Conservation Areas or as the Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA) which are the authority of the Regional Government, have caused various spatial conflicts between wildlife /wild plants and land management activities. Several obstacles faced by the Local Government to conduct its authority to manage (EEA), caused the number and area of EEA determined by the Local Government to be still low. At present only 703,000 ha are determined from the 67 million ha indicated by EEA. This study aims to overview biodiversity conservation policies by local governments and company perceptions in implementing conservation policies and formulate strategies for optimizing the role of Local Governments. From the results of this study, there has not been found any legal umbrella for the implementation of Law number 23/ 2014 related to the conservation of important ecosystems in the regions. This regulatory vacuum leaves the local government in a dilemma for continuing various conservation programs. By using a SWOT to the internal strategic environment and external stratetegic environment of the Environment and Forestry Service, Bengkulu Province , as well as using an analysis of company perceptions of the conservation policies regulatary , this study has been formulated a “survival strategy” through collaboration between the Central Government, Local Governments and the Private Sector to optimize the role of Local Government’s to establish EEA in the regions.Keywords: Management gaps, Essential Ecosystems Area (EEA), Conservation Areas, SWOT analysis and perception analysis


2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Edward Hutagalung

The fi nancial relationship between central and local government can be defi ned as a system that regulates how some funds were divided among various levels of government as well as how to fi ndsources of local empowerment to support the activities of the public sector.Fiscal decentralization is the delegation of authority granted by the central government to theregions to make policy in the area of   fi nancial management.One of the main pillars of regional autonomy is a regional authority to independently manage thefi nancial area. State of Indonesia as a unitary state of Indonesia adheres to a combination of elementsof recognition for local authorities to independently manage fi nances combined with the element oftransferring fi scal authority and supervision of the fi scal policy area.General Allocation Fund an area allocated on the basis of the fi scal gap and basic allocation whilethe fi scal gap is reduced by the fi scal needs of local fi scal capacity. Fiscal capacity of local sources offunding that comes from the area of   regional revenue and Tax Sharing Funds outside the ReforestationFund.The results showed that the strengthening of local fi scal capacity is in line with regional autonomy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-162
Author(s):  
Budi Setiyono ◽  
Dio Satrio Jati ◽  
Teten Jamaludin

Cepu Block located between Centre Jawa and East Java. It is known as a rich block because it has a source of oil and gas. Block Cepu, where geographically located between three districts, Blora (Centre Java), Bojonegoro and Tuban (East Java) has given a contribution to national budget (APBN) and respected local government budget (APBD). About 33 per cent of the land of Cepu Block is owned by Blora, 67 per cent owned by Bojonegoro and the rest is owned by Tuban. Ironically, however, although 33 per cent of the Block belongs to Blora, the district does not receive any financial income from the oil exploration. There is no resources share fund from Cepu Block. Moreover, the district has to deal with the negative impacts of exploration activities at the Block Cepu such as damaging of infrastructure, environmental pollution, and social disturbance. Blora District has protested to Centre Government, but so far there is no outcome. Centre Government asked that this problem should be studied first. The central government argue that if it is approved, then there will be domino impact: other districts will do the same like Blora. Blora district is struggling to get equality in resources share fund (dana bagi hasil). Efforts have done, seminars and workshops, lobby to DPD (Upper House) to find a solution. Now the district government is proposing judicial review to constitution court. This research examines the history of Block Cepu. It reveals the history of the block from the colonial era up to the reformation era. Further, the research aims to know how the tension between local government (Blora Government) and central government regarding Blok Cepu oil exploration. The research suggests that there is injustice in the distribution of revenue from the exploration and it is understandable if Blora district government struggle to get proportional revenue sharing.


Author(s):  
R. A. W. Rhodes

The core executive is a new concept replacing the conventional debate about the power of the prime minister and the Cabinet. It refers to all those organizations and procedures that coordinate central government policies, and act as final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the government machine. In brief, the ‘core executive’ is the heart of the machine. The chapter reviews the several approaches to studying the British executive: prime ministerial government; prime ministerial cliques; Cabinet government; ministerial government; segmented decision-making; and bureaucratic coordination. It then discusses several ways forward by developing new theory and methods. The Afterword discusses the core executive as interlocking networks, and the fluctuating patterns of executive politics.


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