The WTO core agreement, non-trade issues and institutional integrity

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENT JONES
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Labor Standards ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Multilateral Negotiation ◽  
Global Institutions ◽  
The Core ◽  
Trade Sanctions ◽  
Environmental Goals ◽  
Wto Agreements

WTO member countries understand the core agreement of the organization to consist of binding reciprocal market access achieved through multilateral negotiation, and supported by a system of trade policy rules and dispute settlement. Attempts to introduce social chapters into the WTO would compromise the core agreement. Specifically, authorizing the use of trade sanctions to pursue non-trade goals would diminish the value of the WTO to its members, and undermine the global trading system. WTO agreements and rules can be reconciled with environmental goals, the improvement of labor standards and the promotion of human rights through the development and strengthening of international institutions dedicated to these issues. Efforts by governments to promote new global institutions and international agreements would thereby remove political barriers to trade liberalization.

Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 792-832 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Charnovitz
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Salient Feature ◽  
Trading System ◽  
International Economic Law ◽  
The World ◽  
Significant Step ◽  
Trade Sanctions ◽  
The One ◽  
Mixed Blessing

The most salient feature of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the possibility of authorizing a trade sanction against a scofflaw member government. This feature, however, is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it fortifies WTO rules and promotes respect for them. On the other hand, it drains away the benefits of free trade and provokes “sanction envy.” Undoubtedly, putting teeth in the WTO was one of the key achievements of the Uruguay Round ending in 1994, and a very significant step in the evolution of international economic law.1 Yet after six years of experience, WTO observers are questioning whether the availability of trade enforcement is sensible.2 This article undertakes an appraisal of trade sanctions as a WTO instrument, and concludes that this practice undermines the trading system. In view of this dysfunction, the article explores alternatives to trade enforcement and points to some softer measures that might have promise.

To What Extent Should Labor and Environmental Standards Be Linked to Trade?

2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Magda Shahin
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Labor Standards ◽  
Environmental Standards ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
Development Agenda ◽  
The World ◽  
General Exceptions ◽  
Wto Agreements

The re-emergence of the ever-lingering trade linkage debate, falling between the prevailing financial crisis unprecedented in its worldwide implications and the persistent failure of the negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), underscores the contentiousness of incorporating non-trade values on labor and the environment as standards in the rules-based trading system. Is the World Trade Organization (WTO) ready and well disposed to enter into full-fledged negotiations to devise additional rules to deal with labor and the environment? Is the timing ripe to add new obligations onto member states when they are struggling with the "development round" and there is hardly an end in sight?This paper assesses the `real possibility' and the `extent' to which social and environmental standards should be incorporated in the rules-based trading system. The paper argues that at present there is no need for elaboration or the explicit accommodation of particular environmental or labor standards within WTO agreements. Nor is there any indication that consensus on the content of such standards could be achieved. The constructive ambiguity which is so characteristic to multilateralism at play, and the provisions in existing WTO agreements, in particular General Exceptions Article XX, already provide sufficient and flexible accommodation for these key values. The inclusion of specific and rigid standards governing non-trade matters in the WTO would be opening a Pandora's Box and if hastily addressed could have long-term and dangerous implications for the system as a whole, and its developing country members in particular.

Regulatory convergence and dispute settlement in the WTO

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-162
Author(s):  
Niall Meagher
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Regulatory Measures ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Regulatory Convergence ◽  
Wto Agreements

Purpose – This paper aims to examine the issues faced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system in disputes involving questions of regulatory convergence. The traditional focus of the WTO has been on increasing market access and eliminating discrimination in trade. Now, as tariffs have been all but eliminated and Members rarely impose obviously discriminatory trade barriers, attention increasingly turns to questions of regulatory convergence. Leaving aside questions as to the overall benefits of regulatory convergence between markets, these developments pose a significant challenge to the organs of the WTO dispute settlement – and it is here that this paper focuses. Design/methodology/approach – While General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO law has fairly well-developed tools for identifying discrimination in trade, the tools necessary for assessing whether regulatory measures maintain the requisite balance or proportionality between sovereign/domestic concerns and trade concerns are less clear. The paper discusses this latter point. Findings – The WTO agreements are frequently not clear on where or how this balance between sovereign/domestic concerns and trade concerns is to be determined. To date, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have preferred to focus on whether they can identify any discriminatory aspects of a measure. However, they will increasingly be called to pronounce on non-discriminatory regulatory policy choices of Members. Originality/value – This paper contributes to the literature on the Appellate Body, and argues that Members will need to develop a credible and consistent balance between policy space and trade restrictiveness.

Who Settles Disputes? Treaty Design and Trade Attitudes Toward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyeonho Hahm ◽  
Thomas König ◽  
Moritz Osnabrügge ◽  
Elena Frech
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
Transatlantic Trade ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Trade And Investment

AbstractWhat type of trade agreement is the public willing to accept? Instead of focusing on individual concerns about market access and trade barriers, we argue that specific treaty design and, in particular, the characteristics of the dispute settlement mechanism, play a critical role in shaping public support for trade agreements. To examine this theoretical expectation, we conduct a conjoint experiment that varies diverse treaty-design elements and estimate preferences over multiple dimensions of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) based on a nationally representative sample in Germany. We find that compared to other alternatives, private arbitration, known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), generates strong opposition to the trade agreement. As the single most important factor, this effect of dispute settlement characteristic is strikingly large and consistent across individuals’ key attributes, including skill levels, information, and national sentiment, among others.

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

scholarly journals Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 89-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drusilla K Brown
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Labor Standards ◽  
Labor Regulation ◽  
National Sovereignty ◽  
The Past ◽  
Trade Sanctions ◽  
Technical Advice ◽  
Intense Debate

During the past decade, universal labor standards have become the focus of intense debate. Advocates argue from humanitarian concerns and the interests of industrialized-country labor, seeking enforcement with WTO sanctions. Opponents regard labor regulation as a matter of national sovereignty, challenge the effectiveness of trade sanctions, and prefer the ILO emphasis on dialogue, monitoring and technical advice. This paper analyzes the labor standards debate, with specific attention to the analytical underpinnings of universal rules; evidence linking weak labor protections in developing countries to industrialized country wages; and the role of labor standards in WTO negotiations.

Legalization in context: The design of the WTO’s dispute settlement system

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Elsig
Keyword(s):  
Rational Design ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

This article asks why the dispute settlement provisions of the multilateral trading system underwent significant reforms during the negotiations that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Why did the leading trading powers accept a highly legalized system that departed from established political–diplomatic forms of settling disputes? The contribution of this article is threefold. First, it complements existing accounts that exclusively focus on the United States with a novel explanation that takes account of contextual factors. Second, it offers an in-depth empirical case study based on interviews with negotiators who were involved and novel archival evidence on the creation of the new WTO dispute settlement system. Third, by unpacking the long-standing puzzle of why states designed a highly legalized system, it addresses selected blind spots of the legalization and the rational design literatures with the aim of providing a better understanding about potential paths leading toward significant changes in legalization.

The International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for Global Labor Rights

2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Hyde
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Labor Standards ◽  
Labor Rights ◽  
Labor Organization ◽  
International Labor Organization ◽  
Trading System ◽  
International Labor ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Theoretical Developments

The International Labor Organization (ILO) is not an effective force for raising labor standards in the developing world and could become considerably more effective by taking account of two of the most important and interrelated recent theoretical developments in understanding labor standards. First, countries derive no comparative advantage in the global trading system from most very low labor standards. The ILO should therefore concentrate its energies on lifting these, rather than (as it so often does) concentrating on labor standards that are a source of comparative advantage, the elimination of which is resisted strongly and effectively. Second, the tools of game theory may be used to identify the collective action problems that prevent countries from lifting their own labor standards, and create a role for a transnational agency that may assist them.

scholarly journals Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 877-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Bagwell ◽  
Robert W Staiger
Keyword(s):  
Market Access ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Domestic Production ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The World ◽  
World Trading System ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Multilateral Trading System

We provide a first formal analysis of the international rules that govern the use of subsidies to domestic production. Our analysis highlights the impact of the new subsidy disciplines that were added to GATT rules with the creation of the WTO. While GATT subsidy rules were typically viewed as weak and inadequate, our results suggest that the key changes introduced by the WTO subsidy rules may ultimately do more harm than good to the multilateral trading system by undermining the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market access to more efficient levels.

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