scholarly journals What is not so Cool about US–COOL Regulations? A critical analysis of the Appellate Body's ruling on US–COOL

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ◽  
KAMAL SAGGI
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Country Of Origin ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
Mixed Origin

AbstractIn US–COOL, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) found that the US measure imposing country of origin labelling (COOL) requirements on livestock of domestic, foreign, and mixed origin was in violation of the obligation to avoid discrimination embedded in Article 2.1 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). We argue that the AB could not and should not have reached this decision based on the information available to it. The AB adopted an erroneous methodology: under its view, the consistency of a measure coming under the purview of the TBT can be examined under Article 2.1 irrespective of its evaluation under Article 2.2 thereby making the two obligations distinct. The AB also failed to address the central question raised by this dispute: Does there exist an alternative to COOL that is less trade restrictive? We argue that the over-arching issue in this case should have been to determine what, if anything, the TBT Agreement did to alter or enhance the obligation of non-discrimination that was already embedded in the arsenal of the multilateral trading rules. Unless the AB asks this question in subsequent case law pertaining to the TBT, we risk seeing repetitions of similar mistakes in the future.

International Trade in Carbon Units under GATT 1994 and Free Trade Agreements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Munro
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Free Trade Agreements ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Gatt 1994

Chapter 4 examines whether carbon units qualify as ‘goods’/‘products’ under GATT 1994 and free trade agreements covering goods. Despite complexities, the analysis of Chapter 4 concludes that, on balance, the better view is that ‘carbon units’ do qualify as ‘products’ and ‘goods’ under GATT 1994 and free trade agreements covering goods. This is because they can be possessed, stored, traded across borders, and hold economic value. The most challenging aspect is the lack of obvious ‘production’ involved in some classes of units. However, since some units are clearly ‘produced’, and since all units are fungible and are, to some degree, in a competitive market relationship with one another, regardless of how they are created, it would be anomalous if only some classes of carbon units were covered. If, however, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization were to determine—contrary to existing case law—that tangibility is a threshold requirement of ‘goods’/‘products’, it is clear that no carbon units would qualify.

Appellate Body Report, United States – Clove Cigarettes

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benn McGrady
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The United States ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Tobacco Products ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World

In September 2011, the World Trade Organization (WTO) released the report of a panel tasked with considering a complaint brought by Indonesia concerning prohibitions on certain flavored tobacco products implemented by the United States (US). The panel concluded that the US violated WTO law and recommended that the US be asked to bring its laws into conformity with WTO law.The US appealed the panel's decision. The Appellate Body of the WTO upheld the panel report on April 4, 2012. This case note gives a brief overview of the Appellate Body's report and examines the implications for tobacco control and public health more generally.

Is the ISO/IEC OOXML Standard an International Standard under the TBT Agreement?

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Barrios Villarreal
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Technical Barriers To Trade ◽  
International Standard ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
Standardization Process

The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement requires that national regulations and standards are based on international standards; however, it fails to define the terms international standard and international standardizing body (ISB). As of today, the panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have put more emphasis on the requirement that a standard is adopted by an ISB than the process through which it is adopted to be considered as ‘international' for the TBT Agreement. This article shows, using the standardization process of the OOXML in the ISO/IEC JTC1 as an example, that an ISB may adopt standards that are not necessarily international for the Agreement purposes. Hence, the importance that in future disputes the panels and the Appellate Body follow the path opened in the US-Tuna II case in which the Appellate Body stated that there may be additional procedural conditions that must be met for a standard to be considered international for the TBT Agreement.

Russian Policy of Agriculture Support and the Necessity of Its Modification after WTO Accession

2012 ◽  
pp. 132-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Uzun
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Agricultural Production ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
Wto Accession ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Agriculture Support

The article deals with the features of the Russian policy of agriculture support in comparison with the EU and the US policies. Comparative analysis is held considering the scales and levels of collective agriculture support, sources of supporting means, levels and mechanisms of support of agricultural production manufacturers, its consumers, agrarian infrastructure establishments, manufacturers and consumers of each of the principal types of agriculture production. The author makes an attempt to estimate the consequences of Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization based on a hypothesis that this will result in unification of the manufacturers and consumers’ protection levels in Russia with the countries that have long been WTO members.

Diversity and Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization’s Bench

2020 ◽  
pp. 427-445
Author(s):  
Cosette D Creamer ◽  
Zuzanna Godzimirska
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Academic Experience ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter sheds light on the relationship between the composition of the bench and the sociological legitimacy of the judicial branch of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Two identity characteristics are consistently part of the criticism of the WTO’s bench: the lack of female adjudicators as well as individuals with academic experience. Overall, however, the identity of the bench does not appear to matter greatly for how WTO Members evaluate its exercise of authority. We suggest that the role of the WTO’s Legal Affairs Division and the Appellate Body Secretariat in streamlining outcomes and procedures may best explain this, as it helps prevent such diversity from manifesting in dispute rulings. Alternatively, it tells us that judicial diversity matters more for the bench’s normative legitimacy—and for scholars—than it does for governments.

scholarly journals The Future of Amicus Participation at the WTO: Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions for Further Developments

2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Keller
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Public Access ◽  
Democratic Participation ◽  
Global Society ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

In today's increasingly interdependent global society, international institutions formerly committed to operating as insular systems recognizing only states as legitimate participants have come under pressure to open their processes to public view and participation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and democratic participation. Nowhere has this criticism been more prevalent than in the arena of dispute settlement. The controversy over the acceptance of amicus briefs at the WTO reflects the tensions among WTO members and non-members concerning greater public access to dispute settlement proceedings. This battle has been fought primarily through the Appellate Body and its important series of decisions on amicus briefs.

Exploring the Meaning of Trade-Restrictiveness in the WTO

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
TANIA VOON
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Careful Analysis ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Alternative Measure ◽  
Precise Meaning ◽  
The World ◽  
General Exceptions ◽  
Domestic Products

AbstractTrade-restrictiveness is a familiar concept across various provisions and agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but its precise meaning remains vague. In many WTO disputes, the existence or degree of trade-restrictiveness of a challenged measure is simply assumed or addressed in a few brief sentences. Yet whether a measure is more trade-restrictive than necessary, or more trade-restrictive than a proposed alternative measure, is crucial to the legality of a range of measures currently in place around the world, some under challenge in the WTO. A careful analysis of the existing case law and treaty text – focusing on Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the general exceptions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services – demonstrates that while the existence of discrimination is likely to restrict trade, discrimination is not necessary to establish trade-restrictiveness, which also necessarily arises from direct barriers to market access such as import bans. In the absence of an explicit barrier to imports, a WTO panel is likely to focus on the extent to which a challenged measure negatively affects the competitive opportunities of imported products vis-à-vis domestic products.

Learning to Dispute: Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputation at the World Trade Organization

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (03) ◽  
pp. 625-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Conti
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Mixed Method ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Dynamic Learning ◽  
The World ◽  
Panel Review ◽  
Repeat Participation ◽  
Method Analysis ◽  
Selection Of

This mixed‐method analysis examines the effects of repeat participation on disputing at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Differences between disputants in terms of their experience with WTO disputing processes affect the likelihood of a dispute transitioning to a panel review in distinct ways, depending upon the configuration of the parties. More experienced complainants tend to achieve settlements, while more experienced respondents tend to refuse conciliation. Strategies of experienced respondents are derived from the expertise generated from repeated direct participation and the normalcy of disputing for repeat players as well as the benefits accruing from a reputation for being unlikely to settle. Repeat players also seek to avoid disputes expected to produce unfavorable jurisprudence but do not actively try to create new case law through the selection of disputes. This research demonstrates a dynamic learning process in how parties use international legal forums and thus extends sociolegal scholarship beyond the nation‐state.

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