scholarly journals The Eternal Territory? The Crimean Crisis and Ukraine's Territorial Integrity as an Unamendable Constitutional Principle

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 542-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaniv Roznai ◽  
Silvia Suteu
Keyword(s):  
General Level ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Territorial Integrity ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
External Risk ◽  
Crimean Crisis ◽  
To Receive ◽  
East Central European

AbstractThis article reflects on the protection of territorial integrity in the Ukrainian constitution, especially on its provision of unamendability, against the backdrop of the 2014 Crimean crisis. At the general level, we examine whether constitutional theory can offer answers when confronted with the apparent inefficacy of a constitutional claim to eternity. More specifically, we focus on what the Ukrainian case can teach us about the implications of designating territorial integrity or indivisibility of a state as an eternal/unamendable constitutional principle. Building on insights from the Crimean crisis, we argue that the unamendable protection of territorial integrity is an especially ineffective type of eternity clause because it is subject to both the internal threat of secession and the external risk of forceful annexation, The preservative promise of unamendable territorial integrity is severely curtailed by this double vulnerability, even when backed by a constitutional court with far-reaching powers of judicial review. Territorial integrity as an eternal constitutional principle then remains merely aspirational. Moreover, we argue that the act of entrenching territorial protection as an unamendable principle is in clear tension with the idea of popular sovereignty and with mechanisms for expressing popular will.East-Central European constitutions play like songs of the liturgy on a very old gramophone. You hear the expected music performed in the service of constitutionalism, but you hear it with a crackle in the background. The performance is old-fashioned in order to receive thenulla obstatof the Council of Europe and sometimes (when territorial integrity comes up) the soprano's voice suffers from hysteria.

Hijacked Airplanes: May They Be Shot Down?

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 582-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatjana Höörnle
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Deadly Force ◽  
General Level ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
Private Individual

The article examines whether force against a hijacked airplane is permissible if uninvolved passengers are killed. It takes a recent ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court as its starting point, but addresses the relevant issues on a more general level with arguments drawn from moral philosophy, criminal law theory and constitutional theory, and political philosophy. The author concludes that a private individual who applies deadly force against the plane would commit a criminal wrong but should be excused. If, however, state officials act to protect the lives of other citizens, protective rights stand against defensive rights. Because such conflicts cannot be resolved within a discourse about rights, it is legitimate to save the greater number of persons.

Non-ideal theory of constitutional adjudication

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
RONI MANN
Keyword(s):  
Normative Theory ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
The One ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication ◽  
Hard Cases

Abstract:When a constitutional court faces opposition from other branches of government or significant segments of the public, should it always hold fast to what it considers constitutionally right, even where this would potentially harm its status and perceived legitimacy? Or are constitutional compromises sometimes justified? Such ‘institutionally hard’ cases – those characterised by a sharp tension between constitutional principle and institutional prudence – pose a true dilemma for constitutionalism. This article advances a realistic, yet principled, liberal-constitutional approach to this dilemma, put forth in the vein of Rawlsian non-ideal theory. It addresses a troubling gap between, on the one hand, theidealisingdiscourse of constitutional theory – which overlooks or downplays the actual social and political pressures that courts must confront – and, on the other, a growing political science literature which, in the name of ‘realism’, views judges solely as strategic actors, leaving no role for principled reasoning. What has stepped into the gap in normative theory is a vague notion of ‘judicial statesmanship’, which praises or criticises judges post hoc, on an intuitive basis, without any tangible prescriptive bite. Developing evaluative and prescriptive guidelines for institutionally-hard cases, a non-ideal theory of constitutional adjudication should construct principles thatbothreinforce the commitment to ideal constitutional principle,andproperly situate constitutional courts within the real – contingent and often very non-ideal – social and political contexts in which they operate.

A RECOMENDAÇÃO (2000)19 DO CONSELHO DA EUROPA E O INQUÉRITO Nº 4.781 DO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERALTHE COUNCIL OF EUROPE RECOMMENDATION REC (2000)19 AND THE BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT INVESTIGATION Nº 4.781

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
Author(s):  
Túlio Fávaro Beggiato
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Council Of Europe

A análise a respeito da (in)adequação de procedimento investigatório instaurado e conduzido pela Corte Constitucional brasileira demanda a utilização de standards internacionais. A convergência internacional em temas que dizem respeito aos direitos humanos deve ser levada a sério na interpretação doméstica do modelo acusatório implementado pela Constituição de 1988. A maturação de novos horizontes culturais com a expansão material da proteção dos direitos humanos solidificou a radical separação de funções entre o órgão de acusação e o órgão julgador. A especialização de um órgão que conduz ou supervisiona a investigação e realiza a acusação assegura o interesse público no enfrentamento da criminalidade ao tempo que garante a imparcialidade do julgador. A condição de terceiro do órgão julgador evita a concentração de poderes com potenciais abusos em face de suspeitos, como garantia do devido processo legal. A contextualização a respeito da autoridade e do prestígio da recomendação Rec(2000)19 advinda do Conselho da Europa faz-se necessária para fins de aquilatar o valor da complementaridade entre a acusação e o órgão julgador, com a decorrente autocontenção judicial, como fator de legitimação da justiça criminal e de proteção aos direitos humanos.

scholarly journals A Populist Monster and the future of Constitutional Democracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.

scholarly journals De la ‘libertad informática’ a la constitucionalización de nuevos derechos digitales (1978-2018) // From «computing freedom» towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights (1978-2018).

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artemi Rallo Lombarte
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Digital Rights ◽  
European Directive ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
New Framework

Resumen:La referencia a la informática en la Constitución de 1978 reconoció trascendencia constitucional a la necesidad de protección del individuo frente a los riegos derivados de los avances tecnológicos. Cuatro décadas después, la sociedad contemporánea afronta el reto de constitucionalizar nuevos derechos digitales. En España, sendas leyes (LORTAD y LOPD) desarrollaron el precepto constitucional que consagra la garantía de los derechos frente al uso de la informática. Para preservar a los individuos frente a los riesgos y amenazas de latecnología, el Tribunal Constitución dedujo del artículo 18.4 CE un derecho fundamental autónomo a la protección de datos personales. Las leyes españolas de protección de datos son el resultado de la obligación de cumplir compromisos internacionales (Convenio 108 del Consejo de Europa de 1981) y europeos (Directiva 95/46, artículo 8 de la CDFUE 41 y Reglamento UE 2016/679). Sin embargo, el reconocimiento constitucional o europeo, legal o constitucional, del derecho fundamental a la protección de datos no agota la necesidad de establecer un nuevo marco de protección de los ciudadanos en la era digitalen el que se reconozcan nuevos derechos digitales.SummaryI. Introduction. II. The misleading constitutionalization of «computing ». III. Convention 108 of the council of europe (1981). IV. Data protection right as an autonomous fundamental right. V. LORTAD (1992), LOPD (1999) and its reform. VI. The europeanization of data protection right: Directive 95/46, art. 8 CDFUE and regulation EU 2016/679. VII. Towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights.Abstract:The reference to computing in the Spanish Constitution (1978) recognized constitutional significance to the need for protection against the technological risks. Four decades later, the contemporary society faces the challenge of constitutionalising new digital rights. In Spain, two laws (LOPD and LORTAD) developed the constitutional article that enshrined the guarantee of rights against the use of computers. The Constitutional Court inferred from article 18.4 CE an autonomous fundamental right to the protection of personal data. Spanish data protection laws are the result of the obligation to comply withinternational (Convention 108 of the Council of Europe from 1981) and European (Directive 95/46, article 8 of the CDFUE and Regulation EU 2016/679) commitments. However, the European, legal or constitutional, recognition of the fundamental right to data protection does not exclude the need to establish a new framework for the protection of citizens in the digital age in which new digital rights should be recognized.

scholarly journals Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi sebagai Tata Konstitusional Abnormal dan Implikasi Yuridis Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 36/PUU-XV/2017

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 130
Author(s):  
Titon Slamet Kurnia
Keyword(s):  
Classical Model ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Status

Artikel ini mencerminkan pendapat penulis yang tidak setuju dengan keberadaan KPK dan Teori Konstitusi yang mendasarinya. Artikel ini didasarkan pada teori trias politica klasik dan mengajukan pendapat bahwa keberadaan badan-badan yang bersifat eksekutif harus sesuai dengan preskripsi teori unitary executive. Sesuai dengan teori unitary executive, presiden harus diberikan kewenangan to appoint and remove setiap pejabat eksekutif secara eksklusif. Kaidah ini didasarkan pada status presiden sebagai Chief Executive. Berdasar pengertian ini, KPK, sebagai badan independen, inkonstitusional. Seturut dengan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 yang mengkualifikasikan KPK sebagai eksekutif, tata konstitusional kita yang abnormal, dengan keberadaan KPK, harus dinormalkan sesuai dengan teori unitary executive. This article expresses the author’s view to disagree with the existence of the KPK and its supporting Constitutional Theory. This article is based on classical model of the trias politica theory and suggests that the existence of executive bodies should conform with the prescription of unitary executive theory. According to the unitary executive theory, the president should have the power to appoint and remove any executive official exclusively. This norm is based on the status of the president as the Chief Executive. According to this notion, the KPK, as independent agency, is unconstitutional. In line with the Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017, qualifying the KPK as executive, our abnormal constitutional order, with the existence of the KPK, should be normalized in accordance with the unitary executive theory.

scholarly journals AKIBAT HUKUM PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI NOMOR 69/PUU-XIII/2015 TERHADAP HAK TANAH PELAKU KAWIN CAMPUR

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jihan Khairunnisa
Keyword(s):  
Land Ownership ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Mixed Marriages ◽  
Ownership Of Land ◽  
To Receive

Land ownership for Indonesian citizens the result of mixed marriages without marriage agreement Indonesian citizen can only use the use rights and lease rights to buildings in the ownership of land. This study uses a normative juridical approach. It can be concluded that according to Law No. 5/1960 for Indonesian citizens, mixed marriages may own land with a status other than use rights and lease rights to buildings if there is a marriage agreement before or at the time of marriage. However, after the Constitutional Court ruling number 69 / PUU-XIII / 2015 gave a breath of fresh air for mixed marriages to still be able to receive their constitutional rights by making marriage agreements during the marriage.

scholarly journals Addressing local government issues in the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation during the implementation of municipal reform in Russia

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-147
Author(s):  
Aleksey Andreevich Amiantov
Keyword(s):  
Russian Federation ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Municipal Reform ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Regional Authorities ◽  
Legal Consequences

The presented study is devoted to the study of the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in relation to issues of local self-government in the context of the municipal reform of 2014-2015. and its legal consequences. The aim of this work is to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on the identified problems of the work of local authorities in the period following the start of municipal reform. The research methodology is built by combining descriptive analysis elements and a case study. It is concluded that the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has consistently maintained its position on the constitutional nature of the reform of local authorities. The provisions of the relevant regulatory legal acts are limited only partially and only in relation to first-level municipalities - municipal authorities of settlements. Given the deprivation of the latter a significant part of the powers and the observed transition to a singlelevel system of local self-government, the adoption of these restrictions does not significantly affect the implementation of the reform. Of fundamental importance is the position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation regarding the new powers of regional authorities in relation to municipalities. The increase in the arsenal of legal instruments of the influence of the leadership of the constituent entities of the federation on the heads of local self-government was not interpreted as a violation of the constitutional principle of the independence of municipalities. The latter opens up the possibility for further legalization of the process of embedding municipal bodies in the structure of the informal “power vertical”.

scholarly journals What has the Constitutional Court Given Us? Afriforum v University of the Free State 2018 (4) BCLR 387 (CC)

Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mokgadi Margaret Mokgokong ◽  
Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Further Education ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Official Language ◽  
National Party ◽  
The Right ◽  
To Receive

The history of South Africa is an unpleasant one. It was a society based on racial segregation with the promotion of Afrikaner culture and the Afrikaans language above all other languages. This can be traced to the architect of apartheid, the Afrikaner National Party, which introduced apartheid. Afrikaans-speaking people, through the Afrikaner National Party, dominated South Africa politically. Their language too, was promoted above all other languages. For example, Afrikaans enjoyed more privileges than other languages in that it was used for drafting laws, as the language of record in the courts and was also the only compulsory subject for learning. The apartheid government, through its racial policies, used the Afrikaans language as a tool to control Black South Africans in almost all spheres of life, including education, which had to be undertaken in Afrikaans. It is therefore no surprise that there were five universities that offered education mainly in Afrikaans. These are Stellenbosch University, University of the Free State, University of Pretoria, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (now North-West University) and Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (now University of Johannesburg). The use of the Afrikaans language as an instrument for social control was not sustainable. The new constitutional dispensation ushered in an era wherein respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms is at the top of the South African agenda. The right to further education is constitutionally recognised in section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 29(2) of the Constitution further recognises and embraces the diversity of South African society and provides that “everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public education institutions where that education is reasonably practicable” (s 29(b) of the Constitution). The State has an obligation to take reasonable measures on a progressive basis to ensure that further education is available and accessible (s 29(1)(b) of the Constitution). In ensuring “effective access to and implementation” of the right to further education, It is notable that, in its endeavour to make further education available and accessible, the State is required to consider several factors such as language policies. In an effort to facilitate the realisation of the right to further education, the Higher Education Act (101 of 1997) was enacted in order inter alia to “redress past discrimination and ensure representivity and equal access to higher education institutions” (preamble to the Act).In the UFS case (CC), the Constitutional Court applied section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution, which provides for the right to further education and the “right to receive education in the official language or languages of [one’s] choice”. This note centres on this decision and seeks to critically discuss and analyse both the majority and minority decisions of the Constitutional Court. The question presented is whether the Constitutional Court has given the public a solution to the issue surrounding the use of either Afrikaans or English as a language medium of instruction in the higher education sector and what the effect of this has been on the development of other languages. The case note is divided into five sections. The facts of the case, the issues put before the court for consideration and the finding of the court are discussed in part 2. Part 3 contains an analysis of the minority and majority judgments. Part 4 considers whether the court has given us any solutions. Part 5 sets out the authors’ recommendations and their conclusions.

Sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit: Verfassungstheoretische Bedeutung, verfassungsrechtliche Reaktionen

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-210
Author(s):  
Konstantin Chatziathanasiou
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Social Dimension ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Minimum Requirements ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Der Beitrag behandelt sozio-ökonomische Ungleichheit als verfassungsrelevante Herausforderung unter dem Grundgesetz. Theoretisch sind unterschiedliche Wirkzusammenhänge zwischen Verfassung und sozio-ökonomischer Ungleichheit möglich. Insbesondere kann sozio-ökonomische Gleichheit als faktische Legitimitätsressource und als demokratische Funktionsbedingung wirken. Empirisch deutet die ökonomische Ungleichheitsforschung auf eine wachsende Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland hin. Verfassungstheorie und empirische Zustandsbeschreibung treffen sich in der Auslegung des geltenden Verfassungsrechts, das im Hinblick auf das Soziale nur schwach determiniert ist. Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts formuliert Mindestanforderungen, überlässt die Konkretisierung des Sozialen aber weitgehend der Politik. Die Verfassungsrechtswissenschaft sollte diesen Prozess konstruktiv begleiten, dabei aber zwischen Recht und Theorie unterscheiden. The article addresses socio-economic inequality as a constitutional challenge under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Theoretically, several causal relationships between the constitution and socio-economic inequality are possible and plausible. In particular, socio-economic equality can be a resource of de facto legitimacy and a condition of democracy. Empirically, current economic research indicates growing wealth inequality in Germany. Constitutional theory and empirical description meet in the interpretation and application of actual constitutional law, whose social dimension is only weakly determined. The Federal Constitutional Court formulates minimum requirements, but leaves the concretization of the social dimension essentially to the political branches of government. Constitutional law scholarship should analyse this process constructively, while distinguishing between law and theory.

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