The top 10 global institutions for 2018

Nature ◽  
2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Kok-Chor Tan

The ‘institutional approach’ to justice holds that persons’ responsibility of justice is primarily to support, maintain, and comply with the rules of just institutions. Within the rules of just institutions, so long as their actions do not undermine these background institutions, individuals have no further responsibilities of justice. But what does the institutional approach say in the non-ideal context where just institutions are absent, such as in the global case? One reading of the institutional approach, in this case, is that our duties are primarily to create just institutions, and that when we are doing our part in this respect, we may legitimately pursue other personal or associational ends. This ‘strong’ reading of our institutional duty takes it to be both a necessary and sufficient duty of justice of individuals that they do their part to establish just arrangements. But how plausible is this? On the one hand this requirement seems overly inflexible; on the other it seems overly lax. I clarify the motivation and context of this reading of the institutional duty, and suggest that it need not be as implausible as it seems.


Author(s):  
Alexander Ovodenko

Climate change, tropical deforestation, biodiversity loss, ozone depletion, hazardous wastes, and ocean pollution are among the environmental issues that have bought national governments together in a common purpose. As they have worked to mitigate these global problems, national governments have developed a wide variety of environmental regime designs. They have created complex systems of global rules and institutions to enable and incentivize private and public actors to meet the challenges posed by global pollution. Why have national governments created different international rules and institutions to address global environmental issues? This book demonstrates that national governments have developed different institutional responses to global issues because the markets producing environmental pollution impose varying constraints and create varying opportunities for change. The nature and scale of those constraints and opportunities depend on the capital resources and industrial concentrations of producers and the demand characteristics of consumers in the markets that governments seek to regulate. Global institutions are designed to match the basic elements of the markets producing global environmental pollution. In global governance, not only are oligopolistic businesses politically influential in shaping policy outcomes, but they are also efficient implementers of environmental regulation. They face a double-edged sword arising from their wealth and market concentrations. Although they are able to shape regulatory policy, these powerful businesses are targeted for stringent global regulation. The sources of their political influence make them the best options for mitigating global pollution.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 80-85
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky

After four years of not simply inaction but significant retrogression in U.S. climate change policy, the Biden administration has its work cut out. As a start, it needs to undo what Trump did. The Biden administration took a step in that direction on Day 1 by rejoining the Paris Agreement. But simply restoring the pre-Trump status quo ante is not enough. The United States also needs to push for more ambitious global action. In part, this will require strengthening parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement; but it will also require actions by what Sue Biniaz, the former State Department climate change lawyer, likes to call the Greater Metropolitan Paris Agreement—that is, the array of other international actors that help advance the Paris Agreement's goals, including global institutions such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Montreal Protocol, and the World Bank, as well as regional organizations and non-state actors. Although the Biden administration can pursue some of these international initiatives directly through executive action, new regulatory initiatives will face an uncertain fate in the Supreme Court. So how much the Biden Administration is able to achieve will likely depend significantly on how much a nearly evenly-divided Congress is willing to support.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Henry Farrell ◽  
Abraham L. Newman

Abstract Scholars and policymakers long believed that norms of global information openness and private-sector governance helped to sustain and promote liberalism. These norms are being increasingly contested within liberal democracies. In this article, we argue that a key source of debate over the Liberal International Information Order (LIIO), a sub-order of the Liberal International Order (LIO), is generated internally by “self-undermining feedback effects,” that is, mechanisms through which institutional arrangements undermine their own political conditions of survival over time. Empirically, we demonstrate how global governance of the Internet, transnational disinformation campaigns, and domestic information governance interact to sow the seeds of this contention. In particular, illiberal states converted norms of openness into a vector of attack, unsettling political bargains in liberal states concerning the LIIO. More generally, we set out a broader research agenda to show how the international relations discipline might better understand institutional change as well as the informational aspects of the current crisis in the LIO.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert O. Keohane

Abstract Michael Zürn's A Theory of Global Governance is a major theoretical statement. The first section of this essay summarizes Zürn's argument, pointing out that his Global Politics Paradigm views contestation as generated endogenously from the dilemmas and contradictions of reflexive authority relationships. Authoritative international institutions, he maintains, have difficulty maintaining their legitimacy in a world suffused with democratic values. The second section systematically compares Zürn's Global Politics Paradigm with both Realism and Cooperation Theory, arguing that the three paradigms have different scope conditions and are therefore as much complementary as competitive. The third section questions the relevance of Zürn's argument to contemporary reality. Great power conflict and authoritarian populism in formerly democratic countries generate existential threats to multilateralism and global institutions that are more serious than Zürn's legitimacy deficits.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Aart Scholte ◽  
Soetkin Verhaegen ◽  
Jonas Tallberg

Abstract This article examines what contemporary elites think about global governance and what these attitudes might bode for the future of global institutions. Evidence comes from a unique survey conducted in 2017–19 across six elite sectors (business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, research) in six countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, the United States) and a global group. Bearing in mind some notable variation between countries, elite types, issue-areas and institutions, three main interconnected findings emerge. First, in principle, contemporary leaders in politics and society hold considerable readiness to pursue global-scale governance. Today's elites are not generally in a nationalist-protectionist-sovereigntist mood. Second, in practice, these elites on average hold medium-level confidence towards fourteen current global governance institutions. This evidence suggests that, while there is at present no legitimacy crisis of global governance among elites (as might encourage its decline), neither is there a legitimacy boom (as could spur its expansion). Third, if we probe what elites prioritize when they evaluate global governance, the surveyed leaders generally most underline democracy in the procedures of these bodies and effectiveness in their performance. This finding suggests that, to raise elites' future confidence in global governance, the institutions would do well to become more transparent in their operations and more impactful problem-solvers in their outcomes.


1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 492-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Bayne

IN MY GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION/LEONARD SCHAPIRO lecture in 1993 I attempted an incomplete analysis of international economic relations after the end of the cold war, in particular the unexpected tensions and difficulties. The end of superpower confrontation had not only removed one incentive for Western countries to settle their economic disputes. It had also lowered the priority given to security issues, where national governments were in control, and had exposed their dwindling ability to take economic decisions, because of the extent of the interdependence which was the price paid for their prosperity. I could not think of a single area of domestic policy immune from international influence. Professor Susan Strange has developed a more trenchant analysis of this trend in her Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro lecture this year.


2001 ◽  
Vol 44 (10) ◽  
pp. 1579-1601 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL ALAN SACKS ◽  
MARC J. VENTRESCA ◽  
BRIAN UZZI
Keyword(s):  

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