scholarly journals Expectations of reward and efficacy guide cognitive control allocation

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Frömer ◽  
H. Lin ◽  
C. K. Dean Wolf ◽  
M. Inzlicht ◽  
A. Shenhav

AbstractThe amount of mental effort we invest in a task is influenced by the reward we can expect if we perform that task well. However, some of the rewards that have the greatest potential for driving these efforts are partly determined by factors beyond one’s control. In such cases, effort has more limited efficacy for obtaining rewards. According to the Expected Value of Control theory, people integrate information about the expected reward and efficacy of task performance to determine the expected value of control, and then adjust their control allocation (i.e., mental effort) accordingly. Here we test this theory’s key behavioral and neural predictions. We show that participants invest more cognitive control when this control is more rewarding and more efficacious, and that these incentive components separately modulate EEG signatures of incentive evaluation and proactive control allocation. Our findings support the prediction that people combine expectations of reward and efficacy to determine how much effort to invest.

Author(s):  
R. Frömer ◽  
H. Lin ◽  
C. K. Dean Wolf ◽  
M. Inzlicht ◽  
A. Shenhav

AbstractThe amount of mental effort we invest in a task is influenced by the reward we can expect if we perform that task well. However, some of the rewards that have the greatest potential for driving these efforts (e.g., jobs, grants) are partly determined by factors beyond one’s control. In such cases, effort has more limited efficacy for obtaining rewards. We have proposed that people integrate information about the expected reward and efficacy for effort to determine the expected value of control, and then adjust their control allocation (i.e. mental effort) accordingly. Here we test this theory’s key behavioral and neural predictions. We show that participants invest more control when this control is more rewarding and more efficacious, and that these incentive components separately modulate EEG signatures of incentive evaluation and proactive control allocation. Our findings support the prediction that people combine worth and worthwhileness to determine how much effort to invest.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amitai Shenhav ◽  
Mahalia Prater Fahey ◽  
Ivan Grahek

Achieving most goals demands cognitive control, yet people vary widely in their success at meeting these demands. While motivation is known to be fundamental to determining these successes, what determines one’s motivation to perform a given task remains poorly understood. Here, we describe recent efforts towards addressing this question using the Expected Value of Control model, which simulates the process by which people weigh the costs and benefits of exerting mental effort. By functionally decomposing this cost-benefit analysis, this model has been used to fill gaps in our understanding of the mechanisms of mental effort and to generate novel predictions about the sources of variability in real-world performance. We discuss the opportunities the model provides for formalizing hypotheses about why people vary in their motivation to perform tasks, as well as for understanding limitations in our ability to test these hypotheses based on a given measure of performance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-314
Author(s):  
Amitai Shenhav ◽  
Mahalia Prater Fahey ◽  
Ivan Grahek

Achieving most goals demands cognitive control, yet people vary widely in their success at meeting these demands. Although motivation is known to be fundamental to determining success at achieving a goal, what determines motivation to perform a given task remains poorly understood. Here, we describe recent efforts toward addressing this question using the expected-value-of-control model, which simulates the process by which people weigh the costs and benefits of exerting mental effort. This model functionally decomposes this cost-benefit analysis and has been used to fill gaps in understanding of the mechanisms of mental effort and to generate novel predictions about the sources of variability in real-world performance. We discuss the opportunities the model provides for formalizing hypotheses about why people vary in their motivation to perform tasks, as well as for understanding limitations in researchers’ ability to test these hypotheses using a given measure of performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Van den Bussche ◽  
K. Vanmeert ◽  
B. Aben ◽  
D. Sasanguie

AbstractBased on the attentional control theory, math anxiety has been explained in terms of impaired inhibition, a key cognitive control function associated with the central executive. Inhibition allows us to suppress task-irrelevant interference when needed. Inspired by the Dual Mechanisms of Control theory, the current study aimed to disentangle the effect of math anxiety on two cognitive control aspects that can be identified in inhibition. Reactive control occurs after interference is detected and is mostly used in a context where interference is scarce. Proactive control is used to prevent and anticipate interference before it occurs and is preferred in contexts where interference is frequent. We used an arrow flanker task where the proportion of interference was manipulated to stimulate the use of a reactive or proactive control strategy. The results showed that response times on trials containing interference increased with math anxiety, but only in a reactive task context. In a proactive task context response times were not influenced by math anxiety. Our results suggest that math anxiety impairs reactive control. We hypothesize that this finding can be explained by a higher state of distractibility, triggered both by the reactive context and by math anxiety.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debbie Marianne Yee ◽  
Sarah L Adams ◽  
Asad Beck ◽  
Todd Samuel Braver

Motivational incentives play an influential role in value-based decision-making and cognitive control. A compelling hypothesis in the literature suggests that the brain integrates the motivational value of diverse incentives (e.g., motivational integration) into a common currency value signal that influences decision-making and behavior. To investigate whether motivational integration processes change during healthy aging, we tested older (N=44) and younger (N=54) adults in an innovative incentive integration task paradigm that establishes dissociable and additive effects of liquid (e.g., juice, neutral, saltwater) and monetary incentives on cognitive task performance. The results reveal that motivational incentives improve cognitive task performance in both older and younger adults, providing novel evidence demonstrating that age-related cognitive control deficits can be ameliorated with sufficient incentive motivation. Additional analyses revealed clear age-related differences in motivational integration. Younger adult task performance was modulated by both monetary and liquid incentives, whereas monetary reward effects were more gradual in older adults and more strongly impacted by trial-by-trial performance feedback. A surprising discovery was that older adults shifted attention from liquid valence toward monetary reward throughout task performance, but younger adults shifted attention from monetary reward toward integrating both monetary reward and liquid valence by the end of the task, suggesting differential strategic utilization of incentives. Together these data suggest that older adults may have impairments in incentive integration, and employ different motivational strategies to improve cognitive task performance. The findings suggest potential candidate neural mechanisms that may serve as the locus of age-related change, providing targets for future cognitive neuroscience investigations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Jenny R. Rieck ◽  
Giulia Baracchini ◽  
Cheryl L. Grady

Cognitive control involves the flexible allocation of mental resources during goal-directed behavior and comprises three correlated but distinct domains—inhibition, shifting, and working memory. The work of Don Stuss and others has demonstrated that frontal and parietal cortices are crucial to cognitive control, particularly in normal aging, which is characterized by reduced control mechanisms. However, the structure–function relationships specific to each domain and subsequent impact on performance are not well understood. In the current study, we examined both age and individual differences in functional activity associated with core domains of cognitive control in relation to fronto-parietal structure and task performance. Participants ( N = 140, aged 20–86 years) completed three fMRI tasks: go/no-go (inhibition), task switching (shifting), and n-back (working memory), in addition to structural and diffusion imaging. All three tasks engaged a common set of fronto-parietal regions; however, the contributions of age, brain structure, and task performance to functional activity were unique to each domain. Aging was associated with differences in functional activity for all tasks, largely in regions outside common fronto-parietal control regions. Shifting and inhibition showed greater contributions of structure to overall decreases in brain activity, suggesting that more intact fronto-parietal structure may serve as a scaffold for efficient functional response. Working memory showed no contribution of structure to functional activity but had strong effects of age and task performance. Together, these results provide a comprehensive and novel examination of the joint contributions of aging, performance, and brain structure to functional activity across multiple domains of cognitive control.


2021 ◽  
pp. 216769682110549
Author(s):  
Morgan M. Taylor ◽  
Hannah R. Snyder

Poor cognitive control has been associated with maladaptive thinking, like rumination and worry, that increase risk for internalizing psychopathology. However, little research has investigated how cognitive control is associated with commonalities between rumination and worry (i.e., repetitive negative thinking; RNT). The current study aimed to investigate how cognitive control predicts engagement in a common component of RNT over time via an indirect mechanism of dependent stress generation in a one-semester longitudinal study of emerging adult college students ( N = 224). Executive functioning task performance and self-reported attentional control (not working memory capacity task performance) prospectively predicted RNT, mediated by dependent stress, but did not predict change in stress or RNT from baseline. These findings suggest that aspects of cognitive control relevant for successful goal pursuit may be involved with maintaining levels of stressful life events and subsequent RNT.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathy T. Do ◽  
Paul B. Sharp ◽  
Eva H. Telzer

Heightened risk taking in adolescence has long been attributed to valuation systems overwhelming the deployment of cognitive control. However, this explanation of why adolescents engage in risk taking is insufficient given increasing evidence that risk-taking behavior can be strategic and involve elevated cognitive control. We argue that applying the expected-value-of-control computational model to adolescent risk taking can clarify under what conditions control is elevated or diminished during risky decision-making. Through this lens, we review research examining when adolescent risk taking might be due to—rather than a failure of—effective cognitive control and suggest compelling ways to test such hypotheses. This effort can resolve when risk taking arises from an immaturity of the control system itself, as opposed to arising from differences in what adolescents value relative to adults. It can also identify promising avenues for channeling cognitive control toward adaptive outcomes in adolescence.


2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (9) ◽  
pp. 2058-2073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott A. Wylie ◽  
K. Richard Ridderinkhof ◽  
Theodore R. Bashore ◽  
Wery P. M. van den Wildenberg

Processing irrelevant visual information sometimes activates incorrect response impulses. The engagement of cognitive control mechanisms to suppress these impulses and make proactive adjustments to reduce the future impact of incorrect impulses may rely on the integrity of frontal–basal ganglia circuitry. Using a Simon task, we investigated the effects of basal ganglia dysfunction produced by Parkinson's disease (PD) on both on-line (within-trial) and proactive (between-trial) control efforts to reduce interference produced by the activation of an incorrect response. As a novel feature, we applied distributional analyses, guided by the activation–suppression model, to differentiate the strength of incorrect response activation and the proficiency of suppression engaged to counter this activation. For situations requiring on-line control, PD (n = 52) and healthy control (n = 30) groups showed similar mean interference effects (i.e., Simon effects) on reaction time (RT) and accuracy. Distributional analyses showed that although the strength of incorrect response impulses was similar between the groups PD patients were less proficient at suppressing these impulses. Both groups demonstrated equivalent and effective proactive control of response interference on mean RT and accuracy rates. However, PD patients were less effective at reducing the strength of incorrect response activation proactively. Among PD patients, motor symptom severity was associated with difficulties in on-line, but not in proactive, control of response impulses. These results suggest that basal ganglia dysfunction produced by PD has selective effects on cognitive control mechanisms engaged to resolve response conflict, with primary deficits in the on-line suppression of incorrect responses occurring in the context of a relatively spared ability to adjust control proactively to minimize future conflict.


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