Mind Over Matter? II: Implications for Psychiatry

2001 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 488-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Schimmel
Keyword(s):  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Brain System ◽  
Causal Processes ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

Objective: To explore concepts of causality within the mind and aetiology of psychiatric disorders in the light of the proposed formulation of the mind–brain problem. Method: Taking the two propositions of this formulation as ‘first principles’ a logical analysis is attempted. Results and conclusions: Neural activity cannot in principle be regarded as causing mental activity, or vice versa. Causal processes are most coherently conceptualised in terms of the ‘mind–brain’ system. Determination of causal and aetiological effects will always necessitate consideration of contextual evidence. Because of the ‘explanatory gap’ between explanation in neurophysiological terms and ‘mentalistic’ terms, whenever formulation in mentalistic terms is possible this will carry greater explanatory power; that is, it will carry meaning in the way a neural formulation cannot.

Why Thomas Reid Matters to the Epistemology of the Social Sciences

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (279) ◽  
pp. 282-301
Author(s):  
Laurent Jaffro ◽  
Vinícius França Freitas
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Action ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
The Social ◽  
Political Reasoning ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Little attention has been paid to the fact that Thomas Reid's epistemology applies to ‘political reasoning’ as well as to various operations of the mind. Reid was interested in identifying the ‘first principles’ of political science as he did with other domains of human knowledge. This raises the question of the extent to which the study of human action falls within the competence of ‘common sense’. Our aim is to reconstruct and assess Reid's epistemology of the sciences of social action and to determine how it connects with the fundamental tenets of his general epistemology. In the first part, we portray Reid as a methodological individualist and focus on the status of the first principles of political reasoning. The second part examines Reid's views on the explanatory power of the principles of human action. Finally, we draw a parallel between Reid's epistemology and the methodology of Weberian sociology.

What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders?

2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (6) ◽  
pp. 1143-1150 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. S. Kendler ◽  
P. Zachar ◽  
C. Craver
Keyword(s):  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Biological Species ◽  
Physiological Mechanisms ◽  
Socially Constructed ◽  
Causal Processes ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Different Cultures

This essay explores four answers to the question ‘What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders?’Essentialist kindsare classes whose members share an essence from which their defining features arise. Although elegant and appropriate for some physical (e.g. atomic elements) and medical (e.g. Mendelian disorders) phenomena, this model is inappropriate for psychiatric disorders, which are multi-factorial and ‘fuzzy’.Socially constructed kindsare classes whose members are defined by the cultural context in which they arise. This model excludes the importance of shared physiological mechanisms by which the same disorder could be identified across different cultures. Advocates ofpractical kindsput off metaphysical questions about ‘reality’ and focus on defining classes that are useful. Practical kinds models for psychiatric disorders, implicit in the DSM nosologies, do not require that diagnoses be grounded in shared causal processes. If psychiatry seeks to tie disorders to etiology and underlying mechanisms, a model first proposed for biological species,mechanistic property cluster(MPC)kinds, can provide a useful framework. MPC kinds are defined not in terms of essences but in terms of complex, mutually reinforcing networks of causal mechanisms. We argue that psychiatric disorders are objectively grounded features of the causal structure of the mind/brain. MPC kinds are fuzzy sets defined by mechanisms at multiple levels that act and interact to produce the key features of the kind. Like species, psychiatric disorders are populations with central paradigmatic and more marginal members. The MPC view is the best current answer to ‘What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders?’

Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification

Dialogue ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Champagne
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Qualitative Dimension

ABSTRACT: This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability toprescindqualities from occurrences.

scholarly journals Angel in “the Cartesian theatre” – Aquinas and the mind-body problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 66-79
Author(s):  
Tomasz Stępień
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Body ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

One of the solutions of the mind-body problem, which returns to the philosophical discussion on consciousness is the “soul hyphotesis”. Existence of the soul can clear the “explanatory gap”, but it brings yet another problems in explanation of how consciousness works. The magiority of those issues exist because of very specific understanding of the mind-body relations in Cartesian way as two separated substances. Some of the schoars propose to overlap the Cartesian approach by returning to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. This article shows that in the writings of Aquinas we can find exact analogy of the Cartesian view of the body-soul relations in the description of how immaterial angel assums the body. For Aquinas angel exist and acts in assumed human body in the very same way as Descartes describes the soul acting in human body, and angel’s mode of perception is similar to what is usually called as “the Cartesian theatre”. For Aquinas angel in assumed body cannot perfom any human action, it only pretends to perform it, because it operates bodily organs as the form, which is not united with this specific body. St Thomas explanation of the relation of body and soul in human being relies on the claim of unity of body and soul, which together are one substance. Such approach was even called biological, because of the stress on the role which body plays in human actions. Therefore Aquinas proposition could be perceived the way of overcoming the dualism and removing some of the dilemas which are linked with “soul hypothesis” understood in traditional way.

scholarly journals Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-63
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Multiple Realizability ◽  
Ongoing Research ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Conceivability Arguments ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Methodological Reflection

This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.

Functionalism and qualia

2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-26
Author(s):  
Zivan Lazovic
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Current State ◽  
Specific Proposal ◽  
Brain States ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Functionalist Approach ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
In Virtue Of

The more recent mind-body debate depicts the problem of consciousness as a problem of the explanatory gap. Established correlations between physical brain states and particular conscious experiences may give us a strong reason to believe that one depends upon the other, but they don't in themselves give us an understanding of how the mental and the physical fit together. This paper falls into two main parts. In the first, the author outlines a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate. In the second, he defends a functionalist approach with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Namely, he argues that there are no a priori reasons against the possibility of a functionalist analysis that will characterize a set of functionalist conditions that could be satisfied only by systems with genuine qualia. This thesis is supported by an example which shows how a physical system's state could have very specific causal role (function) in virtue of its phenomenal property.

Russellian Monism and Epistemic Pessimism

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ståle Gundersen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Other Minds Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Russellian Monism

AbstractRussellian monism is any view that proposes that we cannot solve the mind-body problem because natural science cannot tell us about the aspects of physical reality that are necessary to know to explain consciousness. I argue that Russellian monism should be combined with the Heil-Martin theory about dispositions. However, this combination becomes a theory with some profound epistemic pessimistic consequences, namely that we cannot bridge the explanatory gap between physical and conscious states and that we cannot solve the other minds problem. However, this epistemic pessimism does not constitute an unacceptable kind of “mystery-mongering” because we can also find analogous results in the well-established sciences. This may make it easier to accept Russellian monism’s epistemic pessimism.

scholarly journals God, Physicalism, and the Totality of Facts

Philosophy ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Christofidou
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Distinct Entity ◽  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Absolute Conception ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Completeness Of Physics

AbstractThe paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the ‘explanatory gap’ is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible way forward in the search for an understanding of both physical and mental reality is a recognition of the mind as a metaphysically distinct entity.

scholarly journals Cross-species neuroscience: closing the explanatory gap

2020 ◽  
Vol 376 (1815) ◽  
pp. 20190633
Author(s):  
Helen C. Barron ◽  
Rogier B. Mars ◽  
David Dupret ◽  
Jason P. Lerch ◽  
Cassandra Sampaio-Baptista
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Functional Neuroimaging ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Temporal Precision ◽  
Common Space ◽  
Non Invasive ◽  
Spatio Temporal ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

Neuroscience has seen substantial development in non-invasive methods available for investigating the living human brain. However, these tools are limited to coarse macroscopic measures of neural activity that aggregate the diverse responses of thousands of cells. To access neural activity at the cellular and circuit level, researchers instead rely on invasive recordings in animals. Recent advances in invasive methods now permit large-scale recording and circuit-level manipulations with exquisite spatio-temporal precision. Yet, there has been limited progress in relating these microcircuit measures to complex cognition and behaviour observed in humans. Contemporary neuroscience thus faces an explanatory gap between macroscopic descriptions of the human brain and microscopic descriptions in animal models. To close the explanatory gap, we propose adopting a cross-species approach. Despite dramatic differences in the size of mammalian brains, this approach is broadly justified by preserved homology. Here, we outline a three-armed approach for effective cross-species investigation that highlights the need to translate different measures of neural activity into a common space. We discuss how a cross-species approach has the potential to transform basic neuroscience while also benefiting neuropsychiatric drug development where clinical translation has, to date, seen minimal success. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Key relationships between non-invasive functional neuroimaging and the underlying neuronal activity’.

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