scholarly journals Can we say what we mean?

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesús Navarro-Reyes

The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle’s account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility (PE henceforth). In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity (1) and its relevance for the philosophy of language (2), mind (3), society and action (4). In the critical part, the notion of Background is taken into account in order to re-evaluate two basic distinctions: the one between sentence and utterance meanings (5), and the one between native and type speakers (6). PE is reconsidered in the light of the previous arguments as a methodological strategy that does not prevent uses of language from eventual semantic excesses and deficits (7), and a complementary Principle of Expression Fallibility is finally proposed (8).

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julio Carvalho

AbstractIn this Article, I have analyzed the philosophical grounds on which stands the conception of law implied in legal transplants. On the one hand, behind the idea of legal transplants lurks the misleading assumption that two different legal cultures share common epistemological accounts of what is meant by law; on the other, the idea that a certain legal institution verbally framed may be exported to another culture and touch off similar interpretations and conceptual performances reflects, at its core, a conception of language based on an isomorphic correspondence between legal words and the meanings those words are to stand for. My goal has been to critically expose the philosophical backdrop that lies behind the conception of law implied in the idea of a legal transplant with an eye to the cultural perspective. To this end, I have availed myself of different but convergent perspectives gathered from Wittgenstein’s pragmatic philosophy of language, Geertz’s cultural anthropology, Eco’s semiology, Harris’ integrational epistemology, and Rosen’s cultural theory of law, as a methodological strategy to spotlight different facets of the problem in three dimensions: Language, knowledge, and law.


Author(s):  
Marc Hooghe ◽  
Anna Kern

This chapter evaluates the claim that the decline of legitimacy is due to a decline of social capital. The idea that voluntary associations play an important role in establishing social cohesion and political support is a traditional insight in the field of political sociology. The basic assumption is that voluntary associations function as a training ground for democracy, where citizens involved acquire democratic norms and skills that they subsequently apply in their relation with the political system. If this argument is correct, political support should be at least partly influenced by citizens’ participation in civil society organizations. Using European Social Survey data from 2006 and 2012 the authors demonstrate that there is a clear and significant correlation between social involvement on the one hand and satisfaction with the working of democracy and political trust on the other, which largely survives the introduction of a range of control variables.


Author(s):  
Marta Dynel

AbstractThis article gives a comprehensive theoretical account of deception in multimodal film narrative in the light of the pragmatics of film discourse, the cognitive philosophy of film, multimodal analysis, studies of fictional narrative and – last but not least – the philosophy of lying and deception. Critically addressing the extant literature, a range or pertinent notions and issues are examined: multimodality, film narration and the status of the cinematic narrator, the pragmatics of film construction (notably, the characters’ communicative level and the one of the collective sender and the recipient), the fictional world and its truth, the recipient’s film engagement and make believing, as well as narrative unreliability. Previous accounts of deceptive films are revisited and three main types of film deception are proposed with regard to the two levels of communication on which it materialises, the characters’ level and the recipient’s level, as well as the intradiegetic and/or the extradiegetic narrator involved. This discussion is illustrated with multimodally transcribed examples of deception extracted from the American television seriesHouse.In the course of the analysis, attention is paid to how specific types of deception detailed in the philosophy of language (notably, lies, deceptive implicature, withholding information, covert ambiguity, and covert irrelevance) are deployed through multimodal means in the three types of film deception (extradiegetic deception, intradiegetic deception, and a combination of both when performed by both cinematic and intradiegetic narrators). Finally, inspired by the discussion of Hitchcock’s controversial lying flashback scene inStage Fright, as well as films relying on tacit intradiegetic, unreliable narrators (focalising characters) an attempt is made to answer the thorny question of when the extradiegetic (cinematic) narrator can perform lies (through mendacious multimodal assertions) addressed by the collective sender to the recipient, and not just only other forms of deception, as is commonly maintained.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Freytag

This work undertakes a systematic reconstruction of the debates that took place over the course of several decades up to the beginning of the 21st century between Derrida on the one hand and Searle and Habermas on the other. It shows that the linguistic theories and the theories of communicative understanding developed by Searle and Habermas are based on inferences from the contingent individual case to the general. Searle draws ontological, Habermas anthropo-political conclusions, both with essentially naturalistic signatures. Derrida, on the other hand, raises epistemological objections and consequently develops a metaphysics of free subjects for whom conversation cannot necessarlily be presumed. The explicit dedication to ethics in Derrida's late work is due to his insight that the possibility of language and understanding is due to silence. Derrida's lasting merit lies in enriching the philosophy of language with a secretology. This study has been awarded the Kant Prize of the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Bonn and the "Prix de la République Française", awarded by the French Embassy and the University of Bonn.


Author(s):  
Michael O'Rourke

This chapter presents a critical review of research on referential intentions, in the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, focusing both on what makes them referential and how they function as intentions. This project is distinctively philosophical—the concept referential intention combines elements of language with those of action, and a full account of it should blend theoretical work on reference in linguistics and the philosophy of language with theoretical work on intention in psychology and the philosophy of action. While such an account is beyond the scope of this chapter, the aim is to make progress toward it by outlining ways in which referential intentions are conceptually constrained by reference on the one side and intention on the other. The goal is to supply an overview of these states that does justice to their variety while introducing constraints on their implementation in semantic and pragmatic theories of natural language.


LingVaria ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2(32)) ◽  
pp. 259-279
Author(s):  
Mateusz Kowalski

Can History and Philology Competently Address Their Tasks without a Close Connection with Philosophy, Namely Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Language? The thesis by Jan Baudouin de Courtenay published here is probably the oldest of the texts by the Polish linguist. The text was submitted in 1864 as a part of the logic and philosophy course taught at the Warsaw Main School by Henryk Struve. It clearly shows an attempt by the young researcher to embark on a scholarly path, which turns out to be far from the one Baudouin de Courtenay took later in his academic activity. The future linguist argues here in defence of linguistics as a so-called physical science (a natural skill, as he often calls it in his dissertation), thus contrasting it with philology and history.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-114
Author(s):  
Anna Kuźnik

This paper aims to provide an account of our survey on the semiotic nature of the concept of translation among young Polish native speakers. The methodological strategy adopted is a con­structive replication of Sandra Halverson’s survey conducted in Norway in 1997. We claim, in our main hypothesis (stemming from a theoretical background of prototype semantics, which we used for measuring our object), that the concept of translation is not uniform and includes different semiotic types of translation, some of which are perceived as central (prototypical), and others as peripheral. According to our additional hypothesis, young Polish native speakers have a broad notion of translation (encompassing a wide range of intralingual and intersemiotic translations), even broader than their Norwegian counterparts, more than twenty years ago. Our data has been collected in 2018 using a seven-item questionnaire (seven different text pairs) with a seven-value scale from 103 subjects. While the main hypothesis has been confirmed, the additional hypothesis was rejected, with Polish respondents conceiving the concept of translation more narrowly. The methodological format of a replication produced an ambivalent effect: on the one hand, it yielded positive incentive, and on the other hand, it became our principal hindrance.


Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Blomberg ◽  
Przemysław Żywiczyński

AbstractBuddhist schools of thought share two fundamental assumptions about language. On the one hand, language (śabda) is identified with conceptual thinking (kalpanā), which according to the Buddhist doctrine (dharma) separates us from the momentary and fleeting nature of reality (satya, “truth”). Language is comprised of generally applicable forms, which fuel the reificatory proclivity for clinging to the distorted – and ultimately fictious – belief in substantial existence. On the other hand, the distrust of language is mitigated by the doctrine of ineffability (anirdeśya), which although asserts that reality is beyond the scope of linguistic description, submits that philosophical analyses of key Buddhist concepts is a means of overcoming the limitations that language imposes on our experience and facilitating insight into the nature of reality (bodhi). This paper provides an overview of Buddhist philosophy of language, with an emphasis on the dialectical view of language as indispensable but ultimately insufficient for contemplation. The Buddhist discussions of ineffability are explicated and compared with its treatment in modern Occidental thought, specifically the similarities and differences with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-123
Author(s):  
Melanie Uth

AbstractThis article examines the relation between the philosophy of language proposed by the later Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, and his ambition to cure philosophy from the mapping of linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic entities, on the one hand, and Chomsky's statements regarding language, meaning, and thought, and regarding the sense and non-sense of different fields of linguistic research, on the other. After a brief descriptive comparison of both approaches, it is argued that Chomsky's criticism on Wittgenstein's theory of meaning (Chomsky 1974 – 1996), or on Wittgenstein's basic concepts such as e. g. rule-following (Chomsky 2000 onwards), respectively, is (a) unwarranted and (b) caused by a fundamental misconception. Moreover, it is argued that the hypothesis evoked by Grewendorf (1985: 126), according to which „Chomsky would like to explain what Wittgenstein describes“, is misleading since the objects of investigation of Chomsky and Wittgenstein are in complementary distribution one to the other.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Francisco Naishtat

Invisible, but suggestive and fruitful; deprived of any reference to doctrine or ultimate assertive foundations, but nevertheless used in Benjamin like written images, crystallized as “images of thought”; as doctrinally mute as it is heuristically audible, Benjamin’s use of theology reminds us of the ironical use that Jorge Luis Borges himself made of theology and metaphysics as part of his own poetic forms. As such, these images of thought are located both in the place of philosophical use and in the one of methodological cunning or Metis, across the various levels of the corpus: a metaphysics of experience, literary criticism, philosophy of language, theory of history and Marxism. Therefore, accepting that criticism (Kritik) is the visible organon and the object of Benjaminian philosophy, is not theology, then, its invisible organon? What seems to be particular to Benjamin, however, is the agonistic but nevertheless heuristic way in which he intends to use theology in order to upset, disarray, and deconstruct the established philosophy, and specially its dominant trends in the field of the theory of history: historicism, positivism, and the evolutionary Hegelian–Marxist philosophy of history. In this article we try to demonstrate how this theological perspective is applied to a Benjaminian grammar of time. We conclude agonistically, confronting the resulting Benjaminian notion of historical past against Heiddeger’s own vision of historical time.


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