Israel: National Security Decision-Making in a Leaky Political Fishbowl

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-132
Author(s):  
Charles (Chuck) D. Freilich
Author(s):  
Kevin Riehle

This book identifies 88 Soviet intelligence officers who defected from 1924 to 1954 and provides an aggregate analysis of their information to uncover Soviet strategic priorities and concerns. When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state, and thereby they open a window into a closed national security decision making system. The book provides the most comprehensive list of Soviet intelligence officer defectors compiled to date representing a variety of specializations. Through the information they provided in now-declassified debriefings, documents they brought with them, and post-defection publications and public appearances, this book shows the evolution of Soviet threat perceptions and the development of the "main enemy" concept in the Soviet national security system. It also shows fluctuations in the Soviet recruitment and vetting of personnel for sensitive national security positions, corresponding with fluctuations in the stability of the Soviet government. The shifting motivations of these officers also reveals the pressures that they were experiencing at the time, leading to their choice to break with the Soviet Union.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Forcese

The expression "national security" or its close similes lacks a precise meaning, even in the public policy literature. Nevertheless, the concept appears in over 30 federal statutes. In most instances, the term is undefined, an important oversight in light of the significant powers these statutes accord the government. Under these circumstances, how courts review government invocations of "national security" is of real importance. With some exceptions, courts applying s. 7 of the Charter and standard administrative law doctrines have accorded substantial deference to government national security determinations. When largely deferential substantive review of the ambiguous concept of national security is coupled with the ex parti and in camera context in which these cases are often heard, the net effect is to leave government with a freer hand in national security matters than in other domains of administrative decision making. Several possible responses to this problem are proposed.


Author(s):  
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar ◽  
Jerry L. Mashaw

The economic analysis of regulation is a broad topic, with implications for environmental protection, communications and technology policy, public health, immigration, national security, and other areas affecting risk and welfare in society. This chapter covers only a portion of the relevant ground, focusing on the following essential topics: First, what do we mean by “economic analysis” and what do we mean by “regulation”? Second, why has this topic become an important one, not only the United States, but in most advanced democracies? Third, why is economic analysis and regulation a contested, even contentious, aspect of modern regulatory activity? Finally, and most important, how is economic analysis structured into regulatory decision-making, and how might existing arrangements evolve over time?


The Last Card ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 328-343
Author(s):  
Richard H. Immerman

This chapter argues—using the Eisenhower administration as a model of peacetime national security decision making—that the surge decision-making process displayed by the oral histories was idiosyncratic, excessively compartmentalized, and profoundly flawed. No president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has fully adopted his model, and each has tailored procedures appropriate for his needs. The Bush process had to take into account his lack of expertise in military affairs, an increasingly polarized political climate, the legacy of the Vietnam War, the proliferation of leaks of sensitive information in the new media age, the resistance of the uniformed military leadership, and most important, Rumsfeld. Administration insiders argue that for these reasons Bush jettisoned fundamental tenets of Eisenhower's system in an effort to make a virtue out of necessity. Yet the evidence suggests that Eisenhower's best practices are just that—best practices. It further suggests that their rigorous application would have benefited Bush's process by expediting the instigation of a comprehensive review, co-opting opponents of a change in strategy, mitigating politicization, facilitating the exchange of information and advice, and accelerating implementation.


Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (9) ◽  
pp. 17-19
Author(s):  
Paul W. Blackstock

Under a new title, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), Professor Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University has thoroughly revised and up-dated his original work, Central Intelligence and National Security, which first appeared in 1958. The result is a highly readable, well-informed survey of the intelligence community (including a new chapter on the British intelligence system), plus penetrating essays on the nature of intelligence, its relationship to national policy and decision-making, surveillance by Congress, and the related problems of administration and executive control.


2006 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles D. Freilich

This article presents a first of its kind typology of Israeli national security decision-making processes, focusing on five primary pathologies and a number of strengths. It will demonstrate that these pathologies are the product of an extraordinarily compelling external environment and domestic structural factors: chiefly, the extreme politicization of the decision-making process stemming from the proportional representation electoral system, the consequent need to govern through coalition cabinets, and the absence of effective cabinet-level decision-making support capabilities.


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