Gulliver unbound. Possible electoral reforms and the 2008 Italian election: Towards an end to ‘fragmented bipolarity’?

Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Floridia
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
The Political ◽  
Systemic Effects ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Strategic Adaptation ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
Italian Politics ◽  
Run Up

This article considers the systemic effects of the electoral reform approved by the centre-right in December 2005, and the factors that led to the crisis of the Prodi government, highlighting the way in which the issue of electoral reform and the likelihood of an electoral referendum contributed decisively to the breakdown of the fragile coalition maintaining the Prodi government in office. The article then analyses the ‘game’ surrounding possible electoral reforms, examining the interweaving of the preferences and vetoes of the various political actors, showing how these were influenced by the strategic aims of each actor and by the process of re-structuring of the party system. Finally, the new configuration of the political supply as it took shape in the run up to the 2008 general election is analysed, showing how this new format derives from the actors’ strategic adaptation to the electoral rules in force, and how the election may signal the end of a period of Italian politics marked by ‘fragmented bipolarity’.

scholarly journals RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, AND CONSTITUTION MAKER IN INDONESIA

2020 ◽  
pp. 91-101
Author(s):  
Adfin Rochmad Baidhowah
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Party System ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Literature ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism

Most political literature argues that outcomes in Indonesian constitutional reform 1999-2002 were determined mainly by the political actors. Notwithstanding the existing research providing insightful evidence, there is still a gap in which those literature discount the role of the party system in shaping and constraining the way the political actors within a party behave. Drawing on one of the new institutionalism concepts – ‘rational choice institutionalism' – the argument puts forth here is that Indonesian multi-party system (independent variable) forced the political parties (intermediary variable) to form a winning-coalition which finally produced a compromised outcome (dependent variable) of constitutional reform on the articles about relations between president and legislature.

scholarly journals La reforma electoral de 1996 en Uruguay:

2020 ◽  
pp. 21-36
Author(s):  
Diego Luján
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
State Level ◽  
The State ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Electoral Rules

The article outlines a model to analyze the strategies of the Nacional and Colorado parties during the electoral reform of 1996 in Uruguay. Based on the Analytic Narratives (Bates et al, 1998), the author analyzes the strategy of these parties, which consisted in adapting the electoral rules to the party system format. This strategy allowed the reformist parties continue to operate in terms of co-participation within the state level.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 902-920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik S. Herron
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Soviet Society ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Institutional Instability ◽  
Political Outcomes

For electoral systems to exert expected effects on voters, candidates, and parties, institutions should be durable and consistent. If political actors believe that the rules are likely to change, they may pursue strategies and tactics that seem to be at odds with the electoral system’s underlying incentive structure. This chapter evaluates how changing electoral rules in a transitional, post-Soviet society has affected political outcomes. Ukraine serves as an important case for scholars of electoral systems to illustrate consequences of institutional instability. The specific rules that Ukraine has used, coupled with a tendency to alter electoral systems after one or two elections, has promoted an inchoate and volatile party system and short-term strategic planning by politicians.

Pathways to Parliament

2019 ◽  
pp. 59-79
Author(s):  
Shirin M. Rai ◽  
Carole Spary
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Life Stories ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Environment ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Political Movements ◽  
Family Networks ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Narrative Structures

This chapter focuses on the different routes women political actors take to get to the Parliament. It outlines four such routes—kinship and family networks, social and political movements, the party system, and the struggle over quotas for women. Building on the methodological discussion of narrative structures, this chapter shows how through a close reading of the changes in the political environment of the country as well as of the life stories of women members of Parliament we can piece together the complex layers of negotiations that women make to be successful.

Voting after the change: A natural experiment on the effect of electoral reform on party system fragmentation

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-286
Author(s):  
Pedro Riera
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
System Size ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Synthetic Control ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
Number Of Parties

This article analyses the causal effect of the 1993 electoral reform in New Zealand on party system fragmentation using the ‘synthetic’ control method. Previous studies using cross-national evidence suggest that electoral reforms change the number of parties. However, they do not take into account possible endogeneity problems and usually focus on their short-term effects. Since the electoral system in use in this country before the change was first past the post (FPTP), I can create a ‘synthetic’ control democracy that had the same institutional framework but did not modify the rules of the game. The results indicate that the electoral reform produced the expected effects on party system size at the electoral level, but that these effects tended to disappear in the long run. In contrast, electoral system effects at the legislative level were larger and stickier over time.

Das tschechische Parlament in der Pandemie: Zum Krisenmanagement einer Minderheitsregierung

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 860-877
Author(s):  
David Jágr
Keyword(s):  
Czech Republic ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Approach ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The pandemic crisis occurred while illiberal populist leaders governed in Central and East­ern Europe . The Czech Republic was faced with a simultaneous crisis of political parties and the transformation of its party system . The onset of these trends was triggered by the global financial crisis during which the established parties were weakened and the way to parliaments and governments was opened for populists parties . The fight against the pandemic brought changes to the functioning of parliaments and the need for parliamentary adaptations . The Czech case is the least likely of government dominance in a pandemic . Due to the weakness of the minority cabinet and the unprecedented fragmented Chamber of Deputies, the cabinet had to opt for temporary ad hoc alliances with different parties . Over the course of the pandemic, the political actors changed their political approach from cooperation to conflict, leading to government instability and the failure to effectively con­trol the spread of the pandemic, with the Czech Republic becoming one of the worst affect­ed countries in the world .

Party System Effects on Electoral Systems

2017 ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
Josep M. Colomer
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Relative Strength ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Strategic Decisions ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Electoral Reforms

A long tradition of empirical studies has focused on the consequences of electoral systems on party systems. A number of contributions have turned this relationship upside down by postulating that it is the parties that choose electoral systems and manipulate the rules of elections. The most remote shaping of innovative electoral rules, the choice of electoral systems in new democracies, and further electoral reforms in well-established regimes can be explained on the basis of political parties’ relative strength, expectations, and strategic decisions. In a broader institutional context, political parties can also trade off electoral systems with choices and changes of other institutional rules.

Party system determinants of electoral reform in post-communist states

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Bielasiak ◽  
John W. Hulsey
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Electoral Volatility ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Rule Changes ◽  
Electoral Rule ◽  
Electoral Cycles

The article examines how the structure of party systems, that is, effective number of political actors, electoral volatility, and shares of dominant party votes and seats, affect the initiation and direction of electoral reform in post-communist democracies. Based on a dataset of electoral rule changes in post-communist democracies from 1992 to 2008, we analyze the frequency and direction of reforms over time. The findings reveal that the frequency of reforms declines with successive electoral cycles but not to the degree suggested by theories of institutional inertia. Countries with high levels of voter volatility are more likely to engage in reforms; however, the findings in this article demonstrate that politicians react to volatility by inconsistently choosing between permissive and restrictive responses.

scholarly journals El sistema electoral de Bélgica y sus reformas electorales

2020 ◽  
pp. 503
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández-Esquer
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Turn Of The Century ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
El Sistema

El presente artículo aborda el estudio del sistema electoral de la Cámara de Representantes belga y sus reformas electorales. Bélgica fue el primer país europeo en adoptar un sistema de representación proporcional y, desde entonces, sus elementos centrales han exhibido una extraordinaria estabilidad. Sin embargo, con el cambio de siglo, el gobierno de coalición liderado por el liberal Guy Verhofstadt situó el debate sobre las reformas institucionales en el centro de la agenda política. Ello condujo a una reforma electoral que supuso la «provincialización» del mapa electoral, el establecimiento de una barrera electoral del 5 por ciento y la reducción a la mitad del peso de voto de lista. En 2012, se produjo la última reforma electoral, que consistió en la división de la polémica circunscripción de Bruselas-Halle-Vilvoorde. Este último episodio evidencia la complejidad del modelo federal belga, de carácter consociacional, bipolar y con dinámicas centrífugas.This paper deals with the study of the electoral system of the Belgian House of Representatives and its electoral reforms. Belgium was the first European country to adopt an electoral system of proportional representation and, since then, its main elements have exhibited extraordinary stability. However, with the turn of the century, the coalition government headed by the liberal Guy Verhofstadt put the debate on institutional reforms at the center of the political agenda. This led to an electoral reform that involved several novelties: the «provincialization» of the electoral map, the establishment of a 5 percent threshold and the reduction of the list vote weight by half. In 2012, there was the last electoral reform, which consisted of the division of the controversial constituency of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. This last episode shows the complexity of the Belgian federal model, consociational, bipolar and with centrifugal dynamics. 

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