The Dismemberment and Revival of the Ashanti Confederacy

1968 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Tordoff

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Britain joined other European nations in the scramble for territory in Africa. Guided largely by strategic considerations, she showed little interest in exploiting the areas which she had acquired. In what might be called the first phase of colonial rule, lasting until about 1914, a thinly staffed colonial administration was preoccupied in each tropical African dependency with maintaining law and order and achieving economic self-sufficiency. To this end Africans were encouraged to grow crops such as cocoa and coffee, while a rudimentary communications system was established so that produce might find its distant markets. European plantation agriculture was allowed in only a few enclaves, such as the highlands of Kenya, but substantial mining concessions were widely granted to European companies. Politically, normal British policy was to retain and rule through such large traditional units of government as existed; among them were Buganda and the emirates of northern Nigeria. This policy was substantially modified in Ashanti, which therefore furnishes an important exception to the general pattern.British policy remained essentially empirical throughout the second colonial phase, which roughly coincides with the interwar years. With the growth, however, of the notion of trusteeship, the British Government recognized a duty not only to govern but also to develop its dependencies economically, socially, and politically. After 1918 a modest expansion of government agricultural, medical, and educational programmes therefore took place — mainly financed, however, from local revenues.

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (158) ◽  
pp. 230-246
Author(s):  
William Butler

AbstractThis article explores the problems encountered in the formation of the Ulster Home Guard, supposedly a direct equivalent to its well-known British counterpart, as part of the paramilitary Ulster Special Constabulary in Northern Ireland, during the Second World War. Predictably, the Ulster Home Guard became an almost exclusively Protestant organisation which led to many accusations of sectarianism from a variety of different national and international voices. This became a real concern for the British government, as well as the army, which understandably wished to avoid any such controversy. Though assumptions had previously been made about the numbers of Catholics in the force, this article explores just how few joined the organisation throughout the war. Additionally, the article investigates the rather awkward constitutional position in which the Ulster Home Guard was placed. Under the Government of Ireland Act, the Stormont administration had no authority on matters of home defence. It did, however, have the power to raise a police force as a way to maintain law and order. Still, the Ulster Home Guard, although formed as part of the Ulster Special Constabulary, was entrusted solely with home defence and this had wider implications for British policy towards Northern Ireland throughout the Second World War.


Worldview ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 24 (7) ◽  
pp. 11-13
Author(s):  
Paul F. Power

Late last year the British Government emerged with its principles intact from a contest of wills with a Provisional IRA hunger-striker who sought changes in the prison treatment of those claiming political motivations for their acts of violence. When the hunger-striker broke his fast, it appeared that the British policy was vindicated. But as usual in Northern Ireland, the ascendency of British law and order did not go untested for long. In the spring of 1981 the Ulster situation erupted again when another IRA hunger-striker induced his own death after failing to produce any modification of prison rules. Although the Thatcher government had held firm once again, the tradition of Irish self-sacrifice was reborn. Bobby Sands, M.P., became the thirteenth Republican prisoner since 1920 to die on a hunger strike in jail, the first in the Republic itself.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Young

AbstractIn analysing British policy towards the creation of the European Council from 1973-1975, this article will argue that British leaders were supporters of the idea of regular summits regardless of party affiliation and that policy on this issue suggests that, in this area at least, British policy was consistent and positive about European Community membership. In so doing, the article will also show how the British government wrestled with the idea of how to make leaders-level meetings work most effectively — in terms of frequency, organization and atmosphere — as a means of doing business in an international organization. The result was the creation of a system of serial summits that helped the Community to escape the economic doldrums of the 1970s.


Author(s):  
V. Kashin ◽  
T. Shaumyan

Parliamentary elections in India were held from April 7 to May 12, 2014 and ended with a convincing victory of conservative Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), leader of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), and a crushing defeat for the Indian National Congress (INC) from the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) created in 2004. BJP won 282 seats in Parliament for the first time in 30 years which was sufficient for the formation of a single-party government, while Congress has only 44 seats – the lowest result for all years of the independence of Republic of India. The election results are natural and reflect the real balance of power in the political arena of the country at the moment. BJP victory was largely achieved thanks to the wide support its leader Narendra Modi received from the Indian electorate. The defeat of the Congress shows a deep and prolonged crisis in the party and the inability of the current representatives of the dynasty of Nehru-Gandhi to cope with it due to lack of political will and constructive ideas that meet the modern needs of the society. Numerous regional parties are still limited in scope, which narrows the chance of their political influence to the borders of one state and prevents the creation of a coalition that is ready to compete with the NDA and UPA. The key issue for Narendra Modi as Prime Minister will be the problem of development, economic growth and achievement of economic self-sufficiency – the slogan is highly attractive to the younger generation of voters. Being an explicit pragmatist, Modi is going to manage the country on the principle that if something does not serve the interests of India, especially the interests of economic growth, India would not do this. According to many experts, his government in the short and long term context will focus on such areas as agriculture, energy, law and order, administrative reform and international relations. Narendra Modi describes Russia as a "time-tested and reliable friend, who supported India in difficult periods of its history, and a major partner in building the foundations of India's defense capability." He intends to raise the Russian-Indian relations to a higher level and is looking for a meeting with V. Putin before the end of this year.


Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody

Chapter 1 examines how British policy-makers viewed the arrival of tactical nuclear weapons, employing as a vehicle in the 1950s debate on the relative merits of the opposing strategic theories of ‘graduated deterrence’ and ‘massive retaliation’. It shows how the British government rejected any suggestion to draw distinctions in peacetime between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons because of a strong belief that such an announcement would undermine the overall deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Gripped by a ‘deterrence habit of mind’, civilian leaders viewed tactical nuclear weapons not as meaningful military tools, but as weapons of escalation whose use would trigger a strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers. The rejection of any kind of graduated deterrence through the use of tactical nuclear weapons set a precedent in how British policy-makers conceived the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, which would have important consequences in the following debates about NATO strategy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 69-105
Author(s):  
Deana Heath

Focusing on the role of atrocity facilitators, particularly colonial officials and the British government, in the governmentalization of torture by the police and other officials in colonial India, this chapter examines the ways in which, following the transfer of India’s governance from the East India Company to the Crown in 1858, the extra-legal violence of torture became systematized as a technology of colonial rule. Beginning with an analysis of what led to the perpetration of torture by state officials, the existence of which had long been known in both India and Britain, to erupt into scandal in 1854, the chapter interrogates how the commission set up to investigate torture led to the emergence of a new facilitatory discourse that served both to deny the existence of torture and the structural violence that underpinned it, as well as to displace blame for it from the colonial regime to its Indian subordinates. The chapter further explores how police reform in the commission’s aftermath was designed not to eradicate torture or ensure the welfare of the Indian populace but to safeguard the coercive and terrorizing powers of the colonial state


1965 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Rohdie

The article discusses the contacts between the proto-nationalist Gold Coast Aborigines' Rights Protection Society and left-wing and Communist organizations in Europe and in Britain during the 1930s. The Society represented the interests of chiefs, merchants and barristers who found their political and economic positions threatened by the depression and by the tightening up of colonial rule. The Society reacted by petitioning the British Government for greater political representation and for redress of specific grievances. Left-wing groups in Europe at first regarded the Society as a popular nationalist body and offered it support. The Profintern attempted to influence it, while organizations such as the League Against Imperialism helped the Society in its petitions to the Colonial Office and to the House of Commons. But the narrow social base of the Society made it deaf to a radical socialist programme, and incapable of organizing a mass movement which could effectively pressure the British Government.


2000 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS B. HARDING

Recent interest in the early-modern British composite state has neglected Hanover, despite evidence of frequent and informal co-operation between the countries in foreign affairs. This article explores one aspect of diplomacy with particular import for the British–Hanoverian union, British policy in North Africa, and finds a greater degree of integration in trade policy than has been hitherto recognized. Britain's government came to recognize and treat Hanoverians in Morocco as British subjects during the eighteenth century, a policy which was expanded to the rest of North Africa and elsewhere after the acquisition of the maritime state of East Friesland at the Congress of Vienna increased the Hanoverian government's commercial responsibilities beyond its ability to cope. British policy did not reflect a consensus, and it was criticized by some who regarded Hanover as an entirely foreign state beyond the purview of the British government. But British sponsorship of Hanoverian trade prevailed over such dissent until the union's end, so that Britain's experience of composite statehood lasted until 1837.


1995 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Simms

ABSTRACTThe essay aims to close a longstanding gap in the political historiography of later Georgian Britain by examining the ‘Hanoverian Crisis’ of 1806. Drawing on a broad range of British, Hanoverian and Prussian records, the essay demonstrates that the British–Prussian conflict of that year was caused not – as conventionally assumed – by the closure of the North Sea ports to British shipping, but by the Prussian occupation of George III's electoral land of Hanover. The essay then shows how the commitment of the British government to its restitution was largely motivated by the desire of Charles James Fox and the incoming Ministry of All the Talents to build bridges to the crown. This stance was in complete contradiction both to the broad thrust of the new ‘maritime’ foreign policy of the Talents and to Fox's previous policy in matters Hanoverian. Subsequently the implications of this for our understanding of Fox's political biography are assessed. Finally, the essay illuminates the existence of a coherent ‘Hanoverian Faction’ in London headed by Count Münster which together with a highly activist George III was often able to tip the balance in the formulation of British policy.


1967 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. E. Yapp

The establishment of a British political agent at Baghdad marked an important shift in British policy in the area of the Persian Gulf. It underlined the changing interest from trade to politics, the recognition of the strategic problem of Indian defence, and the assertion by the British Government in India of a policy towards the Ottoman Empire which was in contrast to that of the Government in England. During the period of office of the first Resident, Harford Jones, these changes were but dimly perceived through the fog of personal feuds which surrounded him. None the less these feuds did ultimately reflect significant divisions about policy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document