4. The case for secularism

Author(s):  
Andrew Copson

The secular systems of different states have varied according to the nature of their own particular society and their religious, cultural, and political history. Even so, the same types of arguments have been used each time to advance secularism as the best religion–state arrangement to provide individual freedom, equality, peace, and democracy in a modern society. ‘The case for secularism’ considers these points in turn and concludes that the case for secularism is cumulative and deals with what is the best possible outcome, not the perfect outcome; it involves compromise and mutual accommodation. One thing all these arguments do is to assert the value of an impartial state that mediates the differences of its citizens.

2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 493-510
Author(s):  
Qianfan Zhang

This article discusses the Daoist contribution to the idea of human dignity in the classical Chinese philosophy, particularly in aspects that had been ignored by the Confucians and the Moists. By criticizing the traditional morality and reviving the faith in a primitive, self-sufficient life, Laozi and Zhuangzi add an important dimension to the classical understanding of human dignity: individual freedom, particularly the freedom of living under minimum burden, direction, and oppression of the state. By comparing the Daoist conception of human dignity with those of the Confucians and Moists, the article concludes that all three classical schools, if rationally construed, should support the view that the establishment of a liberal constitutional scheme is necessary to preserve and protect minimum/basic dignity in both physical and spiritual well-being of every human person who lives in a modern society.


2021 ◽  
pp. 133-162
Author(s):  
Jennie Germann Molz

This chapter explores how worldschoolers cope with loneliness, homesickness, and unrootedness on the road by creating new kinds of community. As the children, especially teenagers, crave connection with their peers, parents reconcile their competing desires for individual freedom and a sense of belonging by seeking out what worldschoolers call a “tribe of rebels.” In contrast to the isolating effects of the “new individualism” that pervades late modern society, worldschoolers establish a “new togetherness” in communities that are mobile and mediated, temporary and intermittent, intentional, curated, and commodified. The chapter argues that even though these communities provide a source of communal belonging, they are essentially a lifestyle choice whose primary purpose is to support worldschoolers in their individualized pursuit of freedom. The “come-and-go” sociality that worldschoolers demonstrate in these communities also offers some insight into the kinds of social skills their children are learning, things like collaborating in diverse and temporary teams, maintaining nomadic friendships, and sustaining social relations through mediated channels. These are the kinds of competencies children will need to navigate their social and professional lives in a mobile future.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-104
Author(s):  
Michael Löwy

Martin Buber was a creative and heterodox socialist thinker. His socialist utopia was based on the idea of a new community that does not hark back to ancient forms, but wants to overcome modern society while incorporating its achievements, such as the principle of individual freedom. It is not bound, like the old Gemeinschaft—the tribe, the clan, the religious sect—by one single word or opinion that soon freezes into dogma and rigid law, but by a common life characterized by freedom and creativity, which require a diversity of opinions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 185-189
Author(s):  
Воробьев ◽  
Sergey Vorobev

In the article the author discusses some approaches to the definition of freedom of conscience as a legal category. Freedom of conscience as legal basis for individual freedom in modern society is analyzed. Some aspects of the relationship of meaningful and essential components of freedom of conscience and individual freedom in legal state are presented. General theoretical argument of formation characteristics of freedom of conscience as a subjective right is given. The possibility and the need for inclusion of the category of freedom of conscience in the category of law; its definition is clarified with such a position. Conclusions are made about the diversity of freedom of conscience, multidimensional research and opportunities of formation of architectonic freedom of conscience as a legal category of law to choose the subject of legal relations.


Author(s):  
Gregory S. Alexander

Many people assume that what morally justifies private ownership of property is either individual freedom or social welfare, defined in terms of maximizing personal preference-satisfaction. This book offers an alternative way of understanding the moral underpinning of private ownership of property. Rather than identifying any single moral value, this book argues that human flourishing is property’s moral foundation. It develops a theory that connects ownership and human flourishing with obligations. Owners owe obligations to members of the communities that have enabled the owners to live flourishing lives by cultivating in their community members certain capabilities that are essential to leading a well-lived life. These obligations are rooted in the interdependence that exists between owners and their community members, a condition that is inherent in the human condition. Obligations have always been inherent in ownership. The human flourishing theory explains why owners at times owe obligations that enable their fellow community members to develop certain necessary capabilities. This book considers implications for a wide variety of property issues of importance both in the literature and in modern society. These include questions such as: When is a government’s expropriation of property legitimate? May the owner of a historic house destroy it without restriction? Do institutions that owned African slaves or otherwise profited from the slave trade owe any obligations to the African American community? What insights may be gained from the human flourishing concept into resolving current housing problems like homelessness, eviction, and mortgage foreclosure?


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Claudiu DĂNIȘOR ◽  
Mădălina-Cristina DĂNIȘOR

Modern society is based on the predominance of organic solidarity over mechanical solidarity and, consequently, on the predominance of the law, which ensures cooperation between autonomous subjects from repressive law, which sanctions, through penalty, any deviation from the standards of the common conscience. Modern society is “civilized”, i.e. it is firstly and foremost based on “civil” law, the repressive law only being exceptional, which translates into three principles: that of the subsidiarity of criminal law, that of the necessity and legality of offences and penalties, and that of the additional protection of individual freedom when the subject is criminally charged. The consequence thereof is that, in modern liberal democracies, all repressive law is criminal, that any charge which may lead to the application of a repressive sanction is a criminal charge and that the law-maker cannot assign to the administration the competence regarding the application of repressive sanctions. Under these circumstances, the transformation of some repressive norms into norms of administrative law is a violation of the fundamental principles that structure the legal order of modern liberal states. Nonetheless, this type of practice is becoming more common. In order to ensure individual freedom, this tendency must be corrected. As politicians are not willing to do so, naturally this is a task for the judicial courts, that can rely for this endeavour on the European Court of Human Rights’ constructive jurisprudence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 454-474
Author(s):  
Sebastian Muders ◽  
Philipp Schwind

In Axel Honneth?s Freedom?s Right (FR) personal relations, among which Honneth includes not only family and partner relationships but friendship as well, enable the realization of one ?specific form of freedom, which is difficult to specify? (FR 233). This assertion constitutes one of the main thesis of Freedom?s Right. Accordingly, ?freedom in the sense of individual autonomy? should, among countless different ?conceptions of freedom? be understood as the only one that has the power to shape modern society, while all other values effective within modernity should be understood as ?aspects of the constitutive idea of individual autonomy? (FR 35). In this paper we argue that Honneth?s discussion of the value of friendship does not accomplish its aim for three reasons: first, Honneth is compelled by his argument to postulate one radical cleavage internal to the concept of friendship, by way of an exaggerated contrast between ancient and modern forms of friendship. Second, in his discussion Honneth marginalizes other existing axiologies of friendship, which attribute some other important instrumental, constitutive and final values to this term. Third, even a weaker thesis, one that treats the value of friendship as the precondition of individual freedom as a primus inter pares, seems to lose sight of the central importance that friendship has for us.? Honneth?s key thesis about the unique value of friendship in our society is thereby challenged.


2001 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 494-495
Author(s):  
Rodney Cotterill
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