scholarly journals 13.A. Workshop: Responding to COVID19 in Europe: a tale of five countries

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽  
Author(s):  

Abstract Since emerging from a market in Wuhan China in December 2019, SARS-CoV-2, the pathogen causing COVID-19, has spread worldwide. On January 30th 2020 the World Health Organization declared the COVID19 outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, and declared it a pandemic on March 11th 2020. With over 2.4 million cases and 180,000 deaths reported by mid-June, Europe has been the second most affected region in the world. Individual countries such as Italy and the UK have been amongst the hardest hit in the world. However, the COVID19 situation in Europe is marked by wide variations both in terms of how countries have been affected, and in terms of how they have responded. The proposed workshop will provide compare and contrast the situation and response in five countries in the European region: The UK, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden, moderated by a firm and charismatic chair. This interactive workshop will enable better understanding of the disease's spread and trajectory in different EU countries. International comparisons will help to describe the growth and scale of the pandemic in the selected EU countries. The choice of countries reflects those that have reported high and low incidence and mortality, as well as represent a range in the strictness of the control measures implemented, from full lockdown to the most permissive. The session will go beyond describing those and will be an opportunity to discuss the pros and cons of these different approaches and lessons learnt around the different components of the response such as case identification, contact tracing, testing, social distancing, mask use, health communication and inequalities. We plan to have short and effective 5 min presentations followed by a longer and constructively provocative moderated discussion. Importantly, the five European case studies will offer ground to discuss the public health principles behind outbreak management preparedness and balancing public health with other imperatives such as economic ones, but also social frustration. The audience will be engaged through a Q&A session. Key messages The approach to managing the COVID19 outbreak has varied among European countries, and the optimal approach is likely to be context specific. The effect of the pandemic will be long term and public health imperatives must take population attitudes and behavior as well as economic and indirect health effects into account.

2020 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 481-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Meng ◽  
F. Hua ◽  
Z. Bian

The epidemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), originating in Wuhan, China, has become a major public health challenge for not only China but also countries around the world. The World Health Organization announced that the outbreaks of the novel coronavirus have constituted a public health emergency of international concern. As of February 26, 2020, COVID-19 has been recognized in 34 countries, with a total of 80,239 laboratory-confirmed cases and 2,700 deaths. Infection control measures are necessary to prevent the virus from further spreading and to help control the epidemic situation. Due to the characteristics of dental settings, the risk of cross infection can be high between patients and dental practitioners. For dental practices and hospitals in areas that are (potentially) affected with COVID-19, strict and effective infection control protocols are urgently needed. This article, based on our experience and relevant guidelines and research, introduces essential knowledge about COVID-19 and nosocomial infection in dental settings and provides recommended management protocols for dental practitioners and students in (potentially) affected areas.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuli Chen ◽  
Yibeltal Assefa

Abstract It has been more than one year since the World Health Organization declared the pandemic of COVID-19. Countries around the world are still struggling to control their epidemics. Australia has shown its resilience in the fight against the epidemic by providing a comprehensive response involving the whole-of-government and whole-of-society. Despite the overall successful national response, the epidemic in Australia has been heterogeneous across states. We conducted a mixed-methods study to analyze the epidemic and explain the variable manifestation of the epidemic across states in Australia. Most of the COVID-19 cases and deaths were in Victoria and New South Wales states due to differences in governance of the epidemic and public health responses (quarantine and contact tracing) among states. Countries could learn not only from Australia’s overall successful response, through good governance, effective community participation, adequate public health and health system capacity and multisectoral actions, but also from the heterogeneity of the epidemic among states. Successful response to epidemics in countries with a decentralized administration requires multi-level governance with alignment and harmonization of the response.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2 (Supp)) ◽  
pp. 288-299
Author(s):  
Shubha DB ◽  
Malathesh Undi ◽  
Rachana Annadani ◽  
Ayesha Siddique

Since the emergence of Corona Virus Disease 19 (COVID 19) in China in December 2019, a lot of significant decisions have been taken by the World Health Organization (WHO) and several countries across the globe. As the world reels under the threat of rapid increase in the number of cases and is planning strategies with the limited information available on the virus, it is essential to learn from the experience of countries across the globe. Hence, we selected a few countries in five WHO regions based on their COVID 19 caseload, management strategies and outcome and compared some of the important measures taken by them to contain the spread of infection. Strategies like extensive testing and contact tracing, strict quarantine and isolation measures, Hospital preparedness, complete restriction of non-essential travel, strict border control measures and social distancing measures play a vital role in containment of the spread. All the countries faced the novel strain of virus and implemented similar strategies as per the guidance of WHO, but the extent of preparedness, swiftness with which the decisions were made and the scale of measures made the difference.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tushna Vandrevala ◽  
Amy Montague ◽  
Philip Terry ◽  
Mark D. Fielder

Abstract Background: The World Health Organization declared the rapid spread of COVID-19 around the world to be a global public health emergency. The spread of the disease is influenced by people’s willingness to adopt preventative public health behaviours, such as participation in testing programmes and risk perception can be an important determinant of engagement in such behaviours. Methods: In this study, we present the first assessment of how the UK public (N=778) perceive the usefulness of testing for coronavirus and the factors that influence a person’s willingness to test for coronavirus.Results: None of the key demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, disability, vulnerability status, or professional expertise) were significantly related to the respondents’ willingness to be tested for coronavirus. However, closely following the news media was positively related to willingness to be tested. Knowledge and perceptions about Coronavirus significantly predicted willingness to test, with three significantly contributing factors: worry about the health and social impacts to self and family; personal susceptibility; and concerns about the impacts of coronavirus on specific demographic groups. Views on testing for coronavirus predicted willingness to test, with the most influential factors being importance of testing by need; negative views about widespread testing and mistrust in doctor’s advice about testing. Conclusions: Implications for effective risk communication and localised public health approach to encouraging public to put themselves forward for testing are discussed. We strongly advocate for effective communications and localised intervention by public health authorities, using media outlets to ensure that members of the public get tested for SARs-CoV2 when required.


Author(s):  
Yai-Ellen Gaye ◽  
Christopher Agbajogu ◽  
Reida El Oakley

As the world fights the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the World Health Organization (WHO) reports that over 17 million people globally were infected with SARS-CoV-2 as of 1 August 2020. Although infections are asymptomatic in 80% of cases, severe respiratory illness occurs in 20% of cases, requiring hospitalization and highly specialized intensive care. The WHO, under the International Health Regulations, declared this pandemic a public health emergency of international concern; it has affected nearly all health systems worldwide. The health system in Egypt, similar to many others, was severely challenged when confronted with the need for urgent and major expansion required to manage such a significant pandemic. This review uses publicly available data to provide an epidemiological summary of the COVID-19 pandemic behavior during the first wave of the outbreak in Egypt. The article covers mathematical modeling predictions, Egypt’s healthcare system, economic and social impacts of COVID-19, as well as national responses that were crucial to the initial containment of the pandemic. We observed how the government managed the outbreak by enhancing testing capacity, contact tracing, announcing public health and social measures (PHSMs), as well as allocating extra funds and human resources to contain SARS-COV-2. Prospectively, economic losses from major sources of revenues—tourism, travel, and trade—may be reflected in future timelines, as Egypt continues to control cases and loss of life from COVID-19. Overall, trends indicate that the spread of COVID-19 in Egypt was initially contained. Revalidation of prediction models and follow-up studies may reveal the aftermath of the pandemic and how well it was managed in Egypt.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 145-153
Author(s):  
John S. Mackenzie ◽  
David W. Smith

A cluster of cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology emerged in Wuhan, China, at the end of December 2019. The cluster was largely associated with a seafood and animal market. A novel Betacoronavirus was quickly identified as the causative agent, and it is shown to be related genetically to SARS-CoV and other bat-borne SARS-related Betacoronaviruses. The number of cases increased rapidly and spread to other provinces in China, as well as to another four countries. To help control the spread of the virus, a “cordon sanitaire ” was instituted for Wuhan on January 23, 2020, and subsequently extended to other cities in Hubei Province, and the outbreak declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern by the Director General of the World Health Organization on January 30, 2020. The virus was named SARS-CoV-2 by the International Committee for the Taxonomy of Viruses, and the disease it causes was named COVID-19 by the World Health Organization. This article described the evolution of the outbreak, and the known properties of the novel virus, SARS-CoV-2 and the clinical disease it causes, and the major public health measures being used to help control it’s spread. These measures include social distancing, intensive surveillance and quarantining of cases, contact tracing and isolation, cancellation of mass gatherings, and community containment. The virus is the third zoonotic coronavirus, after SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, but appears to be the only one with pandemic potential. However, a number of important properties of the virus are still not well understood, and there is an urgent need to learn more about its transmission dynamics, its spectrum of clinical severity, its wildlife origin, and its genetic stability. In addition, more research is needed on possible interventions, particularly therapeutic and vaccines.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tushna Vandrevala ◽  
Amy Montague ◽  
Philip Terry ◽  
Mark D. Fielder

Abstract Background: The World Health Organization declared the rapid spread of COVID-19 around the world to be a global public health emergency. The spread of the disease is influenced by people’s willingness to adopt preventative public health behaviours, such as participation in testing programmes and risk perception can be an important determinant of engagement in such behaviours. Methods: In this study, we present the first assessment of how the UK public (N=778) perceive the usefulness of testing for coronavirus and the factors that influence a person’s willingness to test for coronavirus.Results: None of the key demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, disability, vulnerability status, or professional expertise) were significantly related to the respondents’ willingness to be tested for coronavirus. However, closely following the news media was positively related to willingness to be tested. Knowledge and perceptions about Coronavirus significantly predicted willingness to test, with three significantly contributing factors: worry about the health and social impacts to self and family; personal susceptibility; and concerns about the impacts of coronavirus on specific demographic groups. Views on testing for coronavirus predicted willingness to test, with the most influential factors being importance of testing by need; negative views about widespread testing and mistrust in doctor’s advice about testing. Conclusions: Implications for effective risk communication and localised public health approach to encouraging public to put themselves forward for testing are discussed. We strongly advocate for effective communications and localised intervention by public health authorities, using media outlets to ensure that members of the public get tested for SARs-CoV2 when required.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2 (Supp)) ◽  
pp. 306-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giriyanna Gowda ◽  
Ramesh Holla ◽  
Balaji Ramraj ◽  
Kishore Shettihalli Gudegowda

Covid 19 caused by SARS-coV-2 is a novel corona virus. This began in Wuhan city, China at the end of December 2019 and had spread to the rest of the world. World Health Organization (WHO) declared Covid 19 as Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on 30th Jan 2020 and later declared as pandemic on 11th march 2020. 1 The disease is mainly spread from human to human through small droplets from nose or mouth when a person with Covid 19 coughs or exhales and through the surface contact. Community surveillance plays significant role in prevention of spread of disease. It includes isolation of the positive case, quarantine of the high risk and low risk contacts and community disinfection.1, 2             The period of communicability is estimated with the current data to be from 2 days before the onset of symptoms and up to 2 weeks after onset. Hence the initial few asymptomatic days turns out to be crucial period in containing the spread of infection. By the time a Covid 19 patient is diagnosed and isolated, there are quite a number of primary and secondary contacts. Government of India focus has been on Community Surveillance activities which mainly comprises of Contact Tracing and Quarantine.3, 4 This article focuses on the various measures taken to trace the contacts, quarantine measures and on the challenges faced.


Author(s):  
Elena Semino

As I write this piece, many countries around the world are being described as experiencing a «second wave» of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, on 19 September 2020, the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: «We are now seeing a second wave coming in. We’ve seen it in France, in Spain, across Europe. It’s been absolutely inevitable, I’m afraid, that we would see it in this country». Metaphors are crucial tools for communication and thinking, and can be particularly useful in public health communication. For example, the «second wave» metaphor suggests that there is renewed danger and threat from the virus, and may therefore encourage compliance with measures aimed at reducing transmission. However, all metaphors have both strengths and limitations, and the potential to be used both to enlighten and to obfuscate. The metaphor of the pandemic as a series of waves suggests that changes in the number of infections are due to the virus itself (cf. the idea that it may be seasonal), rather than the result of actions taken to slow its spread. In this sense, this metaphor is inaccurate. As Dr. Margaret Harris from the World Health Organization put it, «We are in the first wave. There is going to be one big wave». In addition, precisely because waves follow one another uncontrollably, this metaphor can be used strategically to present new increases in infection as inevitable, as in Boris Johnson’s statement, and thus to deflect responsibility from governments and their policies. As with any other complex and long-term problem, different metaphors are needed to capture different aspects of the pandemic, convey different messages, and address different audiences. Based on the analysis of two different datasets (the #ReframeCovid multilingual metaphor collection – an open-source repository of non-war-related language on COVID-19 – and the English Coronavirus Corpus – a multi-million-word database of news articles in English since January 2020 – I suggest that the metaphor of COVID-19 as a fire, and specifically a forest fire, is particularly apt and versatile. Forest fires are dangerous and hard to control. However, they can be controlled, with prompt and appropriate action. They can even be prevented, by looking after the land properly, protecting the environment, and educating citizens to behave responsibly. Indeed, forest fire metaphors for COVID-19 have been used since the start of the pandemic for multiple purposes, including to: convey danger and urgency (e.g., COVID-19 as a «forest fire that may not slow down»); distinguish between different phases of the pandemic (e.g., «a fire raging» vs. «embers» that must be stopped from causing a new fire); explain how contagion happens and the role of individuals within that (e.g., people as trees in a forest catching fire one after the other, or as breathing out «invisible embers»); justify measures for reducing contagion (e.g., social distancing as «fire lines» in a forest); connect the pandemic with health inequalities (e.g., pointing out that, like a fire, COVID-19 spreads more easily when people live in overcrowded conditions); and outline post-pandemic futures (e.g., when an Italian commentator pointed out that everyone has to contribute to the reclamation of the soil – bonifica del terreno – after the end of the pandemic, to prevent future ones). Of course, no metaphor is suitable for all purposes or all audiences. For example, the metaphor of people as trees in a forest fire does not easily account for asymptomatic transmission. And the use of forest fire metaphors may be inappropriate in parts of the world that have been dramatically affected by literal fires, such as some parts of Australia in 2019-2020. However, a well-informed and context-sensitive approach to metaphor selection can be an important and effective part of public health messaging.


2004 ◽  
Vol 359 (1447) ◽  
pp. 1131-1132 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Harper

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been described as the first major emerging infectious disease of the twenty–first century. Having initially emerged, almost unnoticed, in southern China, it rapidly spread across the globe. It severely tested national public health and health systems. However, it also resulted in rapid, intensive international collaboration, led by the World Health Organization, to elucidate its characteristics and cause and to contain its spread. The UK mounted a vigorous public health response. Some particular issues concerned: the practicalities of implementing exit screening had this been required; the likely efficacy of this and other control measures; the legal base for public health action; and the surge capacity in all systems should the disease have taken hold in the UK. We have used this experience of 2003 to inform our preparation of a framework for an integrated, escalating response to a future re–emergence of SARS according to the levels of disease activity worldwide. Recent cases confirm that SARS has not ‘gone away’. We cannot be complacent about our contingency planning.


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