12. US foreign policy in the Middle East 1

Author(s):  
Toby Dodge

This chapter examines the main dynamics that have transformed U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East over the last eighty-five years, from Woodrow Wilson to Barack Obama. It first considers the applicability of realist, Marxist, and constructivist theories of international relations before discussing the role that the Cold War, oil, and Israel have played in shaping U.S. foreign policy. It shows how, in each of these three areas, U.S. tactical approach to the Middle East has produced unintended consequences that have increased resentment towards America, destabilized the region, and undermined its long-term strategic goals. The chapter also explores the Bush Doctrine, launched after 9/11 and the resultant invasion of Iraq. It concludes by assessing Obama’s attempts to overcome the tensions and suspicion causes by previous U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

Author(s):  
Toby Dodge

This chapter examines the main dynamics that have transformed US foreign policy towards the Middle East since World War I from the time of Woodrow Wilson to that of Donald Trump. It first considers the applicability of realist, Marxist, and constructivist theories of international relations before discussing the ways in which the Cold War, oil, and Israel have shaped American foreign policy. In particular, it shows how the United States’ tactical approach to the Middle East has increased resentment towards the Americans, destabilized the region, and undermined the USA’s long-term strategic goals. The chapter also explores the Bush Doctrine, launched after 9/11, the invasion of Iraq, and President Barack Obama’s attempts to deal with the Middle East during and after the Arab Spring. Finally, it asks whether the Trump administration’s policy toward the Middle East represents a radical change or a continuity with previous presidents.


Author(s):  
Daniel Deudney

The end of the Cold War left the USA as uncontested hegemon and shaper of the globalization and international order. Yet the international order has been unintentionally but repeatedly shaken by American interventionism and affronts to both allies and rivals. This is particularly the case in the Middle East as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the nuclear negotiations with Iran show. Therefore, the once unquestioned authority and power of the USA have been challenged at home as well as abroad. By bringing disorder rather than order to the world, US behavior in these conflicts has also caused domestic exhaustion and division. This, in turn, has led to a more restrained and as of late isolationist foreign policy from the USA, leaving the role as shaper of the international order increasingly to others.


Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella A. Del Sarto ◽  
Nathalie Tocci

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.


1996 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark N. Katz

AbstractSince the breakup of the USSR in 1991, there has been significant change in Moscow's Middle East policy. During much of the Cold War, Moscow sought to project Soviet influence throughout even the far off Arab region of the Middle East. In the post-Cold War era, though, Russian foreign policy has focused on that part of the Middle East closest to the former USSR-the Northern Tier. This article will examine the major aspects of post-Cold War Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East in order to identify Moscow's multiple goals in the region and discuss Moscow's capacity for achieving them. First, though, a brief review of the different stages of Imperial and Soviet foreign policy toward the region is necessary in order to show the extent to which post-Cold War Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East has and has not changed.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-255
Author(s):  
Hillel Nossek

AbstractThis article seeks to ask the question why, when and how the BBC World Service Hebrew Section broadcast became part of British media diplomacy towards Israel and integral to British foreign policy towards the Middle East and the Cold War. It also seeks to understand why it was closed down and how it became a professional training ground for Israel's public broadcasting system tasked with enhancing democracy as a part of BBC WS' policy. The article tries to answer these questions by analyzing background documents and transcripts of the broadcasts at several critical moments, and by interviewing a key professional who served on the Israeli staff of the BBCWS Hebrew section in its last three years. The points in time were: the establishment of the service, 1949; the Suez/Sinai Campaign of 1956; the Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem, 1961; Ten Years to the Suez/Sinai Campaign, 1966; the Six Day War, 1967; and the closure of the service in 1968.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-135
Author(s):  
Liudmila Maksimovna Samarskaia

The period between the publication of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and League of Nations mandates official assignment to Great Britain in 1922 was not lengthy, but highly eventful. All this time England was maneuvring between the Jewish and the Arab national movements, which also gradually formed their own demands and objectives. The problem was, pursuing British interests was possible through maneuvring only, as support of just one local force was not quite strategically advantageous. Britains official commitment to the Balfour Declaration remained at the core of its policy, however it could not completely ignore the demands of the Arab polutaion of Palestine. Although there were quite a number of British administrators and imperial politicians, who were sympathetic towards the Zionist cause and thus were ready to meet their requests to a certain extent, adherence to the British Middle East interests remained crucial to them. The idea of a Jewish national home (not a state, though) in Palestine did not come into contradiction with the general policy of Great Britain in the Middle East: it was rather its integral part. At the same time implementing the Zionist project had to be in line with it: any relatively radical (from the British administrators point of view) proposals were rejected or postponed indefinitely. Towards the Arabs of Palestine Great Britain was conducting mainly declarative policy without any serious consideration of their problems and grievances, although trying to appease their demands to a certain extent. Even the Arab riots of 1920 and 1921 did not cause a serious change in the British political course in Palestine, although they did contribute to the emergence of Churchills White Paper in 1922, declaring certain concessions to the Arab national movement, which never accepted the document. At the same time British policy in general was neither pro-Zionist, nor pro-Arab: England was pursuing its long-term strategic goals in the Middle East, skillfully utilizing Zionist and Arab national movements to achieve them.


Author(s):  
Richard V. Damms

Probably no American president was more thoroughly versed in matters of national security and foreign policy before entering office than Dwight David Eisenhower. As a young military officer, Eisenhower served stateside in World War I and then in Panama and the Philippines in the interwar years. On assignments in Washington and Manila, he worked on war plans, gaining an understanding that national security entailed economic and psychological factors in addition to manpower and materiel. In World War II, he commanded Allied forces in the European Theatre of Operations and honed his skills in coalition building and diplomacy. After the war, he oversaw the German occupation and then became Army Chief of Staff as the nation hastily demobilized. At the onset of the Cold War, Eisenhower embraced President Harry S. Truman’s containment doctrine and participated in the discussions leading to the 1947 National Security Act establishing the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense. After briefly retiring from the military, Eisenhower twice returned to public service at the behest of President Truman to assume the temporary chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then, following the outbreak of the Korean War, to become the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, charged with transforming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into a viable military force. These experiences colored Eisenhower’s foreign policy views, which in turn led him to seek the presidency. He viewed the Cold War as a long-term proposition and worried that Truman’s military buildup would overtax finite American resources. He sought a coherent strategic concept that would be sustainable over the long haul without adversely affecting the free enterprise system and American democratic institutions. He also worried that Republican Party leaders were dangerously insular. As president, his New Look policy pursued a cost-effective strategy of containment by means of increased reliance on nuclear forces over more expensive conventional ones, sustained existing regional alliances and developed new ones, sought an orderly process of decolonization under Western guidance, resorted to covert operations to safeguard vital interests, and employed psychological warfare in the battle with communism for world opinion, particularly in the so-called Third World. His foreign policy laid the basis for what would become the overall American strategy for the duration of the Cold War. The legacy of that policy, however, was decidedly mixed. Eisenhower avoided the disaster of global war, but technological innovations did not produce the fiscal savings that he had envisioned. The NATO alliance expanded and mostly stood firm, but other alliances were more problematic. Decolonization rarely proceeded as smoothly as envisioned and caused conflict with European allies. Covert operations had long-term negative consequences. In Southeast Asia and Cuba, the Eisenhower administration’s policies bequeathed a poisoned chalice for succeeding administrations.


Author(s):  
Yacov Livne

Abstract This article focuses on the strategies that Moscow chose during the first decade after World War II to overcome the obstacles created by the West to its entrance into the Middle East. The cases of Israel in 1948 and Egypt in 1955 show two different entry strategies used by Moscow and reflect significant changes in Soviet foreign policy that occurred between Stalin and Khrushchev toward developing countries. In 1948 Stalin chose an indirect and often tacit support of Israel, while in 1955 Khrushchev opted for a more direct approach with Egypt. Khrushchev’s confident tactics presented Moscow with new opportunities in the Middle East and the developing nations but also created long term challenges for the Soviet regime. At the same time, Israel and Egypt successfully maneuvered between Moscow and the West to gain maximum benefits for their national security needs by using both camps of the Cold War.


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