International Politics in the Age of Existential Threats

Author(s):  
Nathan Alexander Sears

Abstract Humans in the twenty-first century live under the specter of anthropogenic existential threats to human civilization and survival. What is the significance of humanity’s capacity for self-destruction to the meaning of “security” and “survival” in international politics? The argument is that it constitutes a material “revolution” in international politics—that is, the growing spectrum of anthropogenic existential threats represents a radical transformation in the material context of international politics that turns established truths about security and survival on their heads. The paper develops a theoretical framework based in historical security materialism, especially the theoretical proposition that the material circumstances of the “forces of destruction” determine the security viability of different “modes of protection”, political “units” and “structures”, and “security ideologies” in international politics. The argument seeks to demonstrate the growing disjuncture (or “contradiction”) between the material context of anthropogenic existential threats (“forces of destruction”); and the security practices of war, the use of military force, and the balance-of-power (“modes of protection”); the political units of nation-states and structure of international anarchy (“political superstructure”); and the primacy of “national security” and doctrines of “self-help” and “power politics” in international politics (“security ideologies”). Specifically, humanityapos;s survival interdependence with respect to anthropogenic existential threats calls into question the centrality of national security and survival in international politics. In an age of existential threats, “security” is better understood as about the survival of humanity.

Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter summarizes key findings in the proponents of the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” which contend that nuclear weapons are transformative because they greatly reduce the need for countries to engage in intense security competition. It emphasizes that although nuclear weapons are the greatest tools of deterrence ever created, they do not automatically confer national security benefits on their owners, much less guarantee enduring safety from foreign threats. The chapter looks into the unfortunate reality of international politics in the shadow of nuclear weapons, in which countries must still pay close attention to the balance of power, search for ways to change the balance when they find themselves at a disadvantage and contemplate and plan for war in order to protect vital national interests. It explains how fears that tragically drove international politics for centuries still exist and how those fears are justified. The nuclear age remains an age of power politics.


Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

This chapter explores the role of “power politics”—the domain of national security interests and the procurement and use of military power—in the decline of mass atrocities in East Asia. It suggests that power politics made an important, but not the singularly most important, contribution. The chapter has three parts. First, it explores how conventional power politics contributed to the decline of mass atrocities in East Asia. Although not central to the overall story, once they were established, the balance of power and both conventional and nuclear deterrence played a role in limiting the further escalation of potential conflicts. Second, it examines the limits of power politics. Third, it points to specific security practices that were more consequential, including the development of omnidirectional security relations, a tendency to avoid destabilizing competition, de-polarization, and the enmeshing of great powers in the region’s norms


Author(s):  
Friedrich Beiderbeck

This chapter examines Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s political vision for Europe, beginning with his views on the Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia. It considers how Leibniz viewed Germany’s political and cultural structures and his support for the Reich, along with his thoughts on order, security, and law. It also discusses Leibniz’s modern notion of state and his ideas of territorial power, diplomacy, and international politics; his views on France’s foreign policy under Louis XIV and the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1713/14); and his dispute with Abbé de Saint Pierre over peace and balance of power in Europe. Finally, the chapter looks at Leibniz’s pronouncements on denominational issues and church politics, particularly the presence of Protestants and Catholics in Germany, and his arguments with regards to the House of Hanover and the role played by Great Britain in power politics as a counterbalance to French hegemony.


Author(s):  
Matteo Legrenzi ◽  
F. Gregory Gause

This chapter examines the international politics of the Gulf region, with particular emphasis on the security challenges confronting the Gulf states. It begins with an analysis of the policies of Iraq and Saudi Arabia as well as the United States’s increased involvement, focusing on the issues of regime security, political identity, and balance-of-power politics as they emerged during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 and the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and also from the Saudis’ alliance decisions in the face of those wars and the Iraq War of 2003. It also discusses Iran’s role, its nuclear programme, and relations with the Arab Gulf states and concludes with some remarks on the significance of the negotiations between Iran and the so-called P5+1, along with the ramifications of the Saudi–Iran rivalry for the international politics of the Gulf and the balance of power in the entire region.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul W. Schroeder

Students of international politics do not need to be told of the unsatisfactory state of balance of power theory. The problems are well known: the ambiguous nature of the concept and the numerous ways it has been defined, the various distinct and partly contradictory meanings given to it in practice and the divergent purposes it serves (description, analysis, prescription, and propaganda); and the apparent failure of attempts clearly to define balance of power as a system and specify its operating rules. Not surprisingly, some scholars have become sceptical about the balance of power ‘system’ and a few have even denied that balance of power politics prevailed in the nineteenth century. None of the methods generally used seems to promise much help. These have included studying the views and theories of balance of power held by individual publicists, theorists, and statesmen, making case studies of the balance of power in certain limited periods, analysing events and policies within an assumed balance of power framework, or constructing theoretical analyses comparing the supposed system of balance of power to other systems. Undoubtedly a method for operationalizing the study of the balance of power would be very valuable, and efforts to do this have yielded useful information. But the obstacles to establishing reliable indices of power and status and the problems of quantifying alignments and co-operation-conflict ratios in international affairs are formidable indeed.


2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Latha Varadarajan

How do we understand the relationship between ‘national security’ and a global capitalist economy? I argue in this article that liberal constructivist scholars have tended to ignore the constitutive effects of the global economy in the process of distancing themselves from ‘materialist ontologies’ and ‘rationalist epistemologies’. I contend that an important aspect of state identities is that they are dynamic and are historically constituted in and through a relationship to global capital. Only by paying close attention to this fluctuating terrain, can one make sense of the security practices of nation-states. In the latter half of the article, I illustrate my argument with an analysis of the Indian nuclear tests of 1998.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 608-618
Author(s):  
Ross A. Kennedy

This article analyzes Woodrow Wilson's view of the First World War's implications for U.S. national security and the way in which he related the balance of power between the belligerents at different points in time to his diplomatic objectives. It approaches this topic, which is a subject of much debate among historians, by comparing Wilson's view of the war from late 1914 to early 1915 with that of his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, and by examining how those perceptions shaped the response of the two leaders to the sinking of theLusitania. Bryan and Wilson both wanted the United States to stay out of the war, both wanted the United States to mediate an end to it, and both of them saw mediation as a doorway to reforming international politics. Unlike Bryan, however, Wilson saw Germany as a potential threat to the United States and paid close attention to the balance of power between the Allies and Central Powers; he specifically believed that the Allies were likely to win the war. These views led Wilson to reject Bryan's advice to de-escalate theLusitaniacrisis and to adopt a much more confrontational policy toward Germany, one of the most consequential decisions Wilson made in the neutrality period.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas U. Berger

For decades Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany have gone to extraordinary lengths to cultivate as low a profile as possible on defense and national security policy matters. However, since the Gulf War, the Federal Republic has come under growing pressure from its allies to assume a greater international security role. Slowly, reluctantly it has acceded to these demands, albeit at the expense of considerable internal angst and turmoil. At the same time, German decision makers have sought to preserve as much as possible the old approach to security policy. Consequently, the long-standing German norms eschewing the use of military force have been gradually displaced, although not wholly replaced, by norms of multilateralism. Rather than a dramatic break with the past, the Federal Republic's actions in Kosovo and Afghanistan can be seen as the culmination of a series of incremental steps that had begun a decade ago.To substantiate these claims this paper will first briefly outline the origins of the Cold German national security practices and the peculiar constellation of domestic and international factors that shaped them. It will then consider in what ways these factors have both changed, and not changed, since the end of the Cold War and sketch the trajectory along which German defense and national security policies have evolved since 1991. Finally, the paper briefly examines the Federal Republic's response to the Kosovo and Afghan crises before offering some general conclusions about the likely future evolution of German security policy.


Author(s):  
Arthur Eckstein

Ancient Greek city-states existed in a world that was essentially bereft of international law. This lack of international law had profound effects on international relations. The anarchic environment encouraged the development of heavily militarized and diplomatically aggressive societies. The prevalence of such societies, combined with the absence of any overarching authority over them, made wars between polities common. Faced with a conflict of interest with another polity, every government independently decided what constituted justice for itself, and—in the absence of international law--all governments had to be ready to use violence or the threat of violence to enforce that view of justice. Hellenic intellectuals—most famously Thucydides, but including Aristotle and Demosthenes--reacted to the anarchy by hypothesizing that interstate relations were determined above all by relations of power. Thucydides expressed this view of power-politics in international life most clearly in what is called the Melian Dialogue (Thuc. 5.84-116). This essay also emphasizes Thucydides’ analysis of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1.23), and underlines the nature of what he considered “the truest cause” (1.23.6) of that devastating conflict, demonstrating that the shift in the balance of power (ibid.) expressed itself in the specific “quarrels and disputes” of 1.23.5, so that there is no contradiction between the two Thucydidean explanations.


Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry

The end of the Cold War was a “big bang” reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the world wars in 1919 and 1945. But what do states that win wars do with their newfound power, and how do they use it to build order? This book examines postwar settlements in modern history, arguing that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power. The book explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions—both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power—has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit “constitutional” characteristics. Blending comparative politics with international relations, and history with theory, the book will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today.


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