Time-inconsistent discounting and the Friedman rule: roles of non-unitary discounting

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takeo Hori ◽  
Koichi Futagami ◽  
Shoko Morimoto

Abstract We examine the optimality of the Friedman rule by considering recent development of behavioral economics. We construct a simple macroeconomic model where agents discount consumption and leisure at different rates. We also consider a standard exponential discounting model and a hyperbolic discounting model, by assuming that the same discounting applies to both consumption and leisure. Money is introduced via a cash-in-advance constraint. Although the three models are observationally equivalent, they provide different policy implications. The Friedman rule is optimal in the latter two models, while it is not optimal in the first model if agents discount consumption is at a higher rate than leisure.

Author(s):  
Kerem Tomak

In this chapter we attempt to build a bridge between mobile commerce and the emerging field of behavioral economics. We first provide examples from mobile commerce and link them to behavioral economics. We then build a stylized model to assess the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the profit-maximizing behavior of a monopolist firm. We find that the monopolist makes lower profits compared to exponential discounting consumers for low levels of (positive) network externalities. As the network externalities increase, first-period prices increase, second period prices decrease and the profits increase in equilibrium.


Author(s):  
Laura Blow ◽  
Martin Browning ◽  
Ian Crawford

Abstract This paper provides a revealed preference characterisation of quasi-hyperbolic discounting which is designed to be applied to readily-available expenditure surveys. We describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the leading forms of the model and also study the consequences of the restrictions on preferences popularly used in empirical lifecycle consumption models. Using data from a household consumption panel dataset we explore the prevalence of time-inconsistent behaviour. The quasi-hyperbolic model provides a significantly more successful account of behaviour than the alternatives considered. We estimate the joint distribution of time preferences and the distribution of discount functions at various time horizons.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lynne Salvador Daway-Ducanes

Abstract This paper analyses the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a higher retirement age within a dynamic overlapping generations framework, wherein exponential discounting and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting agents coexist in ‘mixed economies’. The transitional dynamics of economic aggregates depend on the proportion of QHD agents, and the extent to which reducing the social security tax rate mitigates crowding-out effects on savings and enables both lower pension contributions and higher pension benefits. Welfare impacts across agent types and cohorts differ accordingly: QHD agents employ the higher retirement age as a commitment mechanism to mitigate the adverse welfare implications of present-biasedness.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiangyu Cui ◽  
Duan Li ◽  
Yun Shi

When a stochastic decision problem is time inconsistent, the decision maker would be puzzled by his conflicting decisions optimally derived from his time-varying preferences at different time instants (with different time horizons). While the long-run self (LR) of the decision maker pursues the long-term optimality, the short-run selves (SRs) of the decision maker at different time instants bow to short-term temptations. While the literature began to recognize the importance to strike a balance between LR's and SRs' interests, the existing results are not applicable to situations where the decision maker's preferences involve non-expectation operators. We propose an operable unified two-tier dual-self game model with commitment by punishment, which can cope with general time inconsistent stochastic decision problems with both expectation and non-expectation operators in the objective function. By attaching punishment terms to both the preferences of LR and SRs which quantitatively evaluate the internal conflict among different selves, our game model aligns the interests of the LR and SRs to a certain degree. The equilibrium strategy, termed strategy of self-coordination, achieves some degree of internal harmony among various selves. We successfully apply the model to the investment and consumption problem with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the dynamic mean-variance portfolio selection problem.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-190
Author(s):  
Mehrab Kiarsi

PurposeThe paper includes characterizing Ramsey policy in a cash-in-advance monetary model, under flexible and sticky prices, and with different fiscal instruments.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analytically and numerically characterizes the dynamic properties of Ramsey allocations. The author computes dynamics by solving second-order approximations to the Ramsey planner’s policy functions around a non-stochastic Ramsey steady state.FindingsThe Friedman rule is not mainly optimal in a cash-in-advance model with distorting taxes. The Ramsey-optimal policy with both taxes on income and consumption calls for a high inflation rate that is extremely volatile, despite the fact that changing prices is costly.Practical implicationsThe optimality of zero nominal interest rate under flexible prices in monetary models is not mainly the case and quite depends on the preferences. The optimality of a zero inflation rate under sticky prices also very much depends on the assumed set of fiscal instruments.Originality/valueThe non-optimality of the Friedman rule under flexible prices is quite new. Moreover, studying the optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with a rich set of fiscal instruments is also quite original.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shou Chen ◽  
Shengpeng Xiang ◽  
Hongbo He

Abstract We study the intertemporal consumption and portfolio rules in the model with the general hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility. The equivalent approximation approach is employed to obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, and a remarkable property is shown: portfolio rules are independent of the discount function. Moreover, both the consumption and portfolio rates are non-increasing functions of wealth. Particularly illustrative cases examined in detail are the models with the most adopted discount functions, including exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting. Explicit solutions for intertemporal decisions are found for these special cases, revealing that individual’s time preferences affect the consumption rules only. Moreover, the time-consistent consumption rate under hyperbolic discounting is larger than its counterpart under exponential discounting.


Author(s):  
Tullio Jappelli ◽  
Luigi Pistaferri

In the real world many facts appear to conflict with the assum ptions of the standard life-cycle model and its main hypotheses. The mental accounting model challenges the assumption that resources are fungible. Substantial evidence produced by psychology, laboratory experiments, and empirical studies points out that people do not make time-consistent decisions, leading to the analysis of time-inconsistent preferences and hyperbolic discounting, a model in which rational agents make time-inconsistent decisions. A third critique is that people are in fact not fully informed about financial opportunities (the equity premium, say, or the virtue of diversification). In this chapter we review the literature on financial sophistication. A final departure from the standard approach explicitly models another important fact of life, namely, that our own choices are affected by the choices of other consumers, owing to social preferences.


Author(s):  
Anna Jaśkiewicz ◽  
Andrzej S. Nowak

AbstractWe study Markov decision processes with Borel state spaces under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This type of discounting nicely models human behaviour, which is time-inconsistent in the long run. The decision maker has preferences changing in time. Therefore, the standard approach based on the Bellman optimality principle fails. Within a dynamic game-theoretic framework, we prove the existence of randomised stationary Markov perfect equilibria for a large class of Markov decision processes with transitions having a density function. We also show that randomisation can be restricted to two actions in every state of the process. Moreover, we prove that under some conditions, this equilibrium can be replaced by a deterministic one. For models with countable state spaces, we establish the existence of deterministic Markov perfect equilibria. Many examples are given to illustrate our results, including a portfolio selection model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean T. Jamison ◽  
Julian Jamison

This paper introduces the concepts of amount and speed of a discounting procedure in order to generate well-characterized families of procedures for use in social project evaluation. Exponential discounting sequesters the concepts of amount and speed into a single parameter that needs to be disaggregated in order to characterize nonconstant rate procedures. The inverse of the present value of a unit stream of benefits provides a natural measure of the amount a procedure discounts the future. We propose geometrical and time horizon based measures of how rapidly a discounting procedure acquires its ultimate present value, and we prove these to be the same. This provides an unambiguous measure of the speed of discounting, a measure whose values lie between 0 (slow) and 2 (fast). Exponential discounting has a speed of 1. A commonly proposed approach to aggregating individual discounting procedures into a social one for project evaluation averages the individual discount functions. We point to serious shortcoming with this approach and propose an alternative for which the amount and time horizon of the social procedure are the averages of the amounts and time horizons of the individual procedures. We further show that the social procedure will in general be slower than the average of the speeds of the individual procedures. For potential applications in social project evaluation we characterize three families of two-parameter discounting procedures – hyperbolic, gamma, and Weibull – in terms of their discount functions, their discount rate functions, their amounts, their speeds and their time horizons. (The appendix characterizes additional families, including the quasi-hyperbolic one.) A one parameter version of hyperbolic discounting, d(t) = (1+rt)-2, has amount r and speed 0, and this procedure is our candidate for use in social project evaluation, although additional empirical work will be needed to fully justify a one-parameter simplification of more general procedures.


Author(s):  
Liviana Andreea Niminet

Behavioral are crucial for understanding both the consumer’s attitude and firms’ attitude as well as for understanding the market outcomes. The past ten years brought a lot of attention from researchers and policy-makers on the behavioral economics issue. Classical, traditional economic models rely on the assumptions of rationality and ordered preferences. Behavioral economics explores interactions between demand and supply including information framing, the use of heuristics in decision-making and time-inconsistent preferences. The research on behavioral economics has led to an extensive debate about the relative merits of both traditional and behavioral economics. First of all we propose to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of behavioral economics versus traditional economics on a very sensitive issue: the competition policy. Then we address market issues that can be solved by means of behavioral economics afterwards turning out attention to the remedies of behavioral economics and ,last but not least, the United Kingdom successful model on the matter of competition policy.


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