The classical monetary theory on bank liquidity and finance

2019 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 692-709
Author(s):  
Laurent Le Maux

Abstract This article investigates the classical monetary theory on bank liquidity and finance and especially the contribution of Thomas Tooke, John Stuart Mill and John Fullarton at the light of the debate on the Great Recession. These authors show how financial markets and banking system may collapse altogether after a rise of values in certain classes of securities or real estate markets. And they come to the view that competition between commercial banks creates the appearance of market discipline, while the expectation of scarcity in some specific markets leads to a speculative process, which in turn destabilizes the banking system and triggers the need for the lender of last resort.

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. 538-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoffer Koch ◽  
Gary Richardson ◽  
Patrick Van Horn

In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.


Author(s):  
Abraham L. Newman ◽  
Elliot Posner

Chapter 6 examines the long-term effects of international soft law on policy in the United States since 2008. The extent and type of post-crisis US cooperation with foreign jurisdictions have varied considerably with far-reaching ramifications for international financial markets. Focusing on the international interaction of reforms in banking and derivatives, the chapter uses the book’s approach to understand US regulation in the wake of the Great Recession. The authors attribute seemingly random variation in the US relationship to foreign regulation and markets to differences in pre-crisis international soft law. Here, the existence (or absence) of robust soft law and standard-creating institutions determines the resources available to policy entrepreneurs as well as their orientation and attitudes toward international cooperation. Soft law plays a central role in the evolution of US regulatory reform and its interface with the rest of the world.


2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 2049-2086 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Andolfatto ◽  
Aleksander Berentsen ◽  
Fernando M Martin

Abstract The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997, Journal of Political Economy105, 928–956) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005, Journal of Political Economy113, 463–484) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Núñez

This article concerns itself with financial traders in Spain who have been diagnosed with gambling disorder. It analyzes what I call the clinical economy of speculation, in which the category of problem gambler is repurposed to draw new lines around proper financial trading. In exploring the expansion of post–financial crisis regulatory mechanisms for credit and debt, as well as widening inequalities across the field of investment, I depict how both traders and clinicians become invested in medicalizing trading as gambling disorder. My theorizing interrogates whether and why common speculative practices are seen as sick and unsafe when everyday people, instead of banks and other financial institutions, perform them. I argue that the pathologized trader is an attempt to regulate, at the individual level, the increasing use of borrowed capital to make financial profits. The commodification of debt, however, is not a gender-neutral development. Female traders pay a greater price for venturing into the heights of finance. This focus on gender brings into view the redefinition of credit and debt within the domain of trading, and shows the role of debt-fueled financial speculation in the expansion of financial markets. These ethnographic findings are particularly relevant in a country like Spain, where the Great Recession has bred more new millionaires than ever before, even as the smaller fish of the economy are being medicalized and sometimes even incarcerated.


Author(s):  
Fariborz Moshirian ◽  
Eliza Wu

This chapter focuses on the Australian and New Zealand (NZ) banking industry. Australian and New Zealand banks have undergone significant growth and challenges in the past decade. Australian banks weathered the Great Recession from 2008 and still recorded strong profits and minimal losses while other global banks failed internationally. To understand why this might be, we examine the composition of the closely integrated banking sectors in Australia and NZ, their respective performance, capital levels, and some defining regulatory reforms that have particularly shaped the Australian banking system since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

Universal banks arose in the U.S. during two periods in the past century—the 1920s and the late 1990s. On both occasions, universal banks in the U.S. and Europe promoted intense boom-and-bust cycles that led to global calamities—the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the Great Recession of 2007–09. Universal banks received extensive bailouts on both sides of the Atlantic during both crises. Three core features of universal banks cause them to generate destructive boom-and-bust cycles. First, pervasive conflicts of interest prevent them from acting as objective lenders or as impartial investment advisers. Second, bonus-driven cultures encourage their insiders to take speculative risks to produce short-term profits. Third, their ability to convert loans into asset-backed securities allows them to package risky loans into securities sold as purportedly “safe” investments to poorly informed investors. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 broke up universal banks and established structural buffers that prevented spillovers of risk between the banking system and other financial sectors. The U.S. avoided systemic financial crises after World War II until Glass-Steagall was undermined by regulators and ultimately repealed by Congress. Congress failed to adopt similar structural reforms after the Great Recession. As a result, universal banks continue to dominate our financial markets and pose unacceptable systemic dangers. We urgently need a new Glass-Steagall Act to break up universal banks again and restore a more stable and resilient financial system.


Author(s):  
Gustavo S. Cortes ◽  
Renato L. Marcondes

This chapter analyzes the origins and development of the Brazilian banking system from colonial times to the present day. It begins with a description of the first credit relationships before the existence of banks in colonial Brazil, followed by a discussion of the difficulties faced by the first banks established in the imperial period. It then presents a detailed discussion of domestic and foreign banks during the First Republican, and the key institutional changes that occurred during the Great Depression of the 1930s and the military regime after 1964. Later, it covers banking activities in the hyperinflation period up to the country’s stabilization in 1994. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the recent period and how the banking system endured the Great Recession of 2008–2010 and the recent Brazilian fiscal crisis that began in 2014.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Streeck

Abstract Rising public debt has been widespread in democratic-capitalist political economies since the 1970s, generally accompanied among other things by weak economic growth, rising unemployment, increasing inequality, growing tax resistance, and declining political participation. Following an initial period of fiscal consolidation in the 1990s, public debt took an unprecedented leap in reponse to the Great Recession. Renewed consolidation efforts, under the pressure of ‘financial markets’, point to a general decline in state expenditure, particularly discretionary and investment expenditure, and of extensive retrenchment and privatization of state functions.


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