Rising Powers and the Risks of War

Author(s):  
Stephen M. Walt

For realist theory, major shifts in the balance of power are a potent source of conflict and war. The main exception, which does not disprove the rule, is the United States. Realists believe China’s continued rise will lead to greater security competition between the United States and China and a heightened danger of war. China will try to reduce the US security presence in Asia, leading to competition for allies and influence. In the near term, most Asian states will balance Chinese power by aligning with Washington, but this process will not take place smoothly. Instead, America’s Asian alliances will face dilemmas of collective action, and uncertainty about alliances will tempt China to play “divide-and-rule” and lead to recurring crises. Realist theory cannot tell us the date when serious trouble will arise or the circumstances under which it will occur. But it warns that the potential for trouble is growing.

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-204
Author(s):  
D. B. Grafov

Qatar lobbied its interests in the US in order to ease tensions with the Gulf c tries which declared a blockade on Qatar in June 2017. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt accused Qatar of supporting terrorism, demanded to break off all ties with Iran and to close the Turkish military base on its territory. The article analyses the lobbying campaign against the blockade. It uses the facts and data disclosed by the consulting and lobbying firms according to “The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938” and “The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995”. Three main conclusions are drawn: 1) The US is not interested in settlement of dispute through the support of one party. The White House prefers the “divide and rule” strategy. 2) There is little chance of successful lobbying in the US for any state that cooperates with Iran. 3) The balance-of-power approach in analysing of the development of Qatari-Saudi crisis shows that attempt of the both parties to “buck-pass” by one superpower is uneffisient. The reason is that both Qatar and Saudi coalition act like US's clients. Although Qatar is not as powerful as its rivals, but it uses the “defensive realism” strategy, that allows it to disrupt aggressive efforts and increase the costs of the Saudi coalition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Troy STANGARONE

The origins of the US–China trade war predate the Trump administration’s aggressive stance and have their roots in the economic impact of China’s entry into the WTO and China’s economic practices. The recently concluded phase one deal provides each side a chance to cool the tensions, but the politics in the United States likely preclude a full resolution in the near term. Another consequence of the trade war is the acceleration of production shifts out of China to Southeast Asia, but these opportunities are accompanied by greater US scrutiny of trade with the region.


Subject The US intelligence community in a year after purported reforms. Significance On December 29, an agreement between the United States, Japan and South Korea to share intelligence on North Korea went into effect. This ended a year in which the US intelligence community was the subject of broad domestic public scrutiny in the light of continued fallout from former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden's leaks to a Senate report on the CIA's use of torture. The White House's support for reforms has been watched by tech and telecoms businesses that have lost considerable revenue from reputational damage as a result of the growing awareness of requirements on them of US intelligence activities. Impacts The Obama administration will rely on the US intelligence community as its main counterterrorist instrument. A Republican Congress will be less likely to support intelligence reforms, though only marginally so. There is no indication that the balance of power on intelligence issues between the executive and legislative branches has shifted.


Subject PROSPECTS 2018: Global economy Significance Global GDP growth is likely to edge higher in 2018 as trade, investment and employment expand. However, monetary policy is gradually tightening, fiscal expansion is limited and there is little chance of a repeat of the surprise boost from trade seen in 2017 or a recovery in productivity. Inflation may remain obdurately low in the United States, Japan and the euro-area but not sufficiently to deter the US Federal Reserve (Fed) and the ECB from gently reeling in their bond-buying programmes. Modestly higher commodity prices should support economic recovery in resource producers. Impacts The timing of elections in the United States, Canada and Mexico may prolong the NAFTA trade talks into 2019 or beyond. China will battle any US attempts to constrain its innovation and access to technology, which it sees as key to its rebalancing. Technological progress and more open markets exacerbate the unpredictability of jobs and wages, but policy will increasingly address this. Automation means the job intensive low-cost industrial growth engine is now less effective; developing countries must consider new models. A better balance of power between multinationals, international organisations and governments will be key to global tax cooperation.


Subject Indian policy on Afghanistan. Significance India features prominently in the US strategy on Afghanistan articulated by President Donald Trump in August 2017. The United States views India as a 'strategic partner' and wants it to support the Afghan state. US support for Kabul fits with India's desire for a more even balance of power between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Impacts Pakistan will blame India and Afghanistan for its domestic insurgency problems. Islamabad will try to make a reduced Indian presence a condition for better relations with Kabul. Russia and China will watch India's actions warily as they position themselves closer to Pakistan.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-173
Author(s):  
Leandro Wolpert dos Santos

O objetivo deste artigo consiste em retratar um dos principais debates intelectuais que produziu cisões no pensamento diplomático brasileiro a partir dos anos 90, especialmente durante os governos Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) e Lula da Silva (2003-2010), a saber: o tipo de relacionamento a ser estabelecido com os Estados Unidos. Para tanto, mostraremos de que forma este debate se manifestou, as correntes de pensamento por ele engendradas no interior do Itamaraty, o conjunto de crenças e percepções que sustentaram tais correntes no período em estudo bem como as estratégias de política externa delas oriundas. Os resultados da pesquisa apontam que, neste período, duas tendências se mostraram dominantes no Itamaraty, embora em momentos distintos. A primeira, que damos o nome de acomodacionista, teria predominado durante a administração Cardoso e defendia uma posição de maior aproximação aos EUA, no marco de uma estratégia de acomodação à ordem internacional liderada pela potência hegemônica. A segunda corrente, que chamamos de revisionista, teria ganho proeminência na administração Lula, e preconizava maior autonomia frente à potência hegemônica, com quem o relacionamento brasileiro devia se sustentar na igualdade irrestrita, dentro de uma lógica de equilíbrio de poder. Essa posição de distância relativa frente os EUA se enquadrava em uma estratégia de “multipolarização” ou desconcentração do poder mundial e de revisionismo da ordem internacional vigente. O desenvolvimento da pesquisa ancorou-se fundamentalmente na investigação de discursos, entrevistas, depoimentos, livros e artigos das principais autoridades a frente do Itamaraty (chanceleres e embaixadores) no período em estudo. Palavras-chave: Pensamento Diplomático; Política Externa Brasileira; Estados Unidos.     Abstract: The objective of this article is to portray one of the main intellectual debates that produced divisions in Brazilian diplomatic thought starting in the 1990s, especially during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula da Silva (2003-2010) governments, namely: the kind of relationship to be established with the United States. To do so, we will show how this debate manifested itself, the currents of thought generated by it within the Itamaraty, the set of beliefs and perceptions that underpinned these currents in the period under study as well as the foreign policy strategies that came from them. The results of the research indicate that, during this period, two tendencies were dominant in Itamaraty, although at different moments. The first, which we call the accommodationist, would have predominated during the Cardoso administration and advocated a position of greater approximation to the United States, within the framework of a strategy of accommodation to the international order led by the hegemonic power. The second current of thought, which we call revisionist, would have gained prominence in the Lula administration, and advocated greater autonomy against the hegemonic power, with whom the Brazilian relationship should be based on unrestricted equality, within a balance of power logic. This relative distance from the US was part of a strategy of "multi-polarization" or deconcentration of world power and revisionism of the current international order. The development of the research was fundamentally based on the investigation of speeches, interviews, testimonies, books and articles of the main authorities in front of the Itamaraty (chancellors and ambassadors) during the period of study. Keywords: Diplomatic Thought; Brazilian Foreign Policy; United States.     Recebido em: agosto/2017 Aprovado em: abril/2018.


2020 ◽  
pp. 181-205
Author(s):  
Francine R. Frankel

The US policy of collective security against the Soviet Union led to the pursuit of the Middle East Defense Organization, which was undermined by Nehru’s success in persuading Egypt to follow his example of remaining nonaligned. Nehru failed, however, to prevent the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, which tilted the balance of power in the subcontinent away from India—although Mountbatten weighed in to provide advanced British aircraft and averted an incipient deal between New Delhi and Moscow. Subsequently, Nehru was confirmed in his belief that the United States was determined to build up Pakistan and build- down India.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-81
Author(s):  
TAKU TAMAKI

AbstractA series of Six-Party Talks involving the United States, China, Japan, South and North Korea, and Russia resulted in the emergence of a narrative of a ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’. Given the prevalence of nuclear weapons amidst Sino-American rivalry, the area is hardly ‘nuclear-free’. Instead, the phrase has evolved into a common signifier for the US and China, suggesting that, despite their rivalries, the North Korean nuclear issue can be detrimental for both – a rare convergence of interests in an often sensitive bilateral relationship. This article provides a Constructivist perspective to this particular aspect of Sino-American balance of power by taking the language of ‘nuclear-free’ seriously, recasting the phrase as borne of both mutual scepticism, as well as convergent interests, over the Korean Peninsula.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. K. Pasha

The signing of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5 + 1 countries (i.e., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) heralds a new US foreign policy approach in the Middle East. Amidst growing signs of declining geopolitical influence in the region, the United States chose to end its three-decade-old tension with Iran. This has alarmed its traditional regional allies and partners, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. While Israel had advocated a “military option” to stop Iranian nuclear ambitions and took the matters to the US Congress, Saudi Arabia preferred a less confrontationist approach due to its dependence upon the United States for security. Its reactions and the recent foreign policy choices underscore its anxiety over growing Iranian influence as well as its “interventionist” policy stoking instability in many Gulf and Arab states. In foreseeable future, both Saudi Arabia and Iran would have work for rapprochement and be content with their spheres of influence and continue depending on the United States to maintain stability and balance of power in the region.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria do Céu de Pinho Ferreira Pinto

When the Arab Spring broke out, the United States was in a quandary over how to handle the crisis in its attempt to balance its moral obligations and ideals without undercutting its strategic interests and those of its close allies. Flaws in US diplomatic approach have contributed to one of the most serious foreign policy crisis for a US administration to date with consequential upheaval and erosion of the US-built balance of power. The reactions and policy responses of the Obama administration highlight the difficulties in grasping with the new reality in the Middle East and in enunciating a policy platform that could combine American interests and values.


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