Philosophy of Social Sciences

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Elster
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Holistic Approaches ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Status ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
Object Of Study ◽  
Causal Laws

This chapter addresses problems and themes in the social sciences. Social sciences are understood specifically as sciences that have (or should have) the following minimal characteristics: their object of study is human behavior and they follow a certain number of methodological principles, including a marked effort towards analytical clarity; the investigation of causal explanations through the formulation of causal laws or at least causal mechanisms; and a subscription to a form of methodological individualism, if an amended one, which puts at the heart of social science the notion of choice. We discuss three principal themes. The first raises the question of the status of laws in the social sciences and, in particular, that of “consequence laws,” otherwise known as functionalist explanations. The second theme takes up methodological individualism, as compared to holistic approaches. The last theme concerns hypotheses of rationality and self-interested motivations, which increasingly figure in social scientific explanations.

Social science as apologia

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102199096
Author(s):  
Federico Brandmayr
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Beliefs And Practices ◽  
Political Implications ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of ◽  
Social Scientific

The social sciences are predominantly seen by their practitioners as critical endeavours, which should inform criticism of harmful institutions, beliefs and practices. Accordingly, political attacks on the social sciences are often interpreted as revealing an unwillingness to accept criticism and an acquiescence with the status quo. But this dominant view of the political implications of social scientific knowledge misses the fact that people can also be outraged by what they see as its apologetic potential, namely that it provides excuses or justifications for people doing bad things, preventing them from being rightfully blamed and punished. This introduction to the special issue sketches the long history of debates about the exculpatory and justificatory consequences of social science and lays the foundations for a theory of social scientific apologia by examining three main aspects: what social and cognitive processes motivate this type of accusation, how social theorists respond to it and whether different contexts of circulation of ideas affect how these controversies unfold.

scholarly journals Methodological individualism as opposed to methodological holism. History, relevancy and the implications of the (insoluble?) debate on the explanatory capacity and scientific status of sociocultural anthropology

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Nina Kulenović
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Strong Correlation ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Social Sciences And Humanities ◽  
The Social ◽  
Scientific Status ◽  
The Status ◽  
Methodological Holism

The paper is part of wider research into the status of explanation in the debate on the scientific status of anthropology – wherein one of the key assumptions is that there is a strong correlation between theoretical and methodological structures which would make them inseparable, and that explanation or explanatory potential, is the point of convergence which can be used to test for the possibility of separating theoretical and methodological structures in the first place. To test this idea, a line of debate between methodological holism and methodological individualism – one of the longest running and most complex debates in the social sciences and humanities – was considered. The historical background of the debate has been highlighted, and its relevancy and implications in the controversy about the explanatory capacity and scientific status of sociocultural anthropology.

scholarly journals Ontology, Methodological Individualism, and the Foundations of the Social Sciences

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1377-1389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Sugden
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Review Essay ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
New Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Scientific

This is a review essay based on a critical assessment of The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences by Brian Epstein. Epstein argues that models in the social sciences are inadequate because they are based on a false ontology of methodological individualism, and proposes a new model of social ontology. I examine this model and point to flaws in it. More generally, I argue against Epstein's methodological approach, which treats social ontology as prior to social scientific modeling and as certifying the “building blocks” that modelers then use. I argue that modelers can legitimately shape the building blocks for their own models. (JEL A10, B40)

The Rhetorical Construction of "the Teacher"

1991 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 417-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Nespor ◽  
Liz Barber
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Critical Literacy ◽  
Harvard Educational Review ◽  
Rhetorical Strategies ◽  
Rhetorical Structure ◽  
Rhetorical Construction ◽  
The Social ◽  
Object Of Study ◽  
Textual Strategies

Authors in the field of education inevitably use rhetorical strategies that embody particular,and often implicit, theoretical, epistemological, and political positions. In this article, Jan Nespor and Liz Barber critically examine the rhetorical structure of a 1987 article published in the Harvard Educational Review — Lee S. Shulman's "Knowledge and Teaching:Foundations of the New Reform." The authors examine various textual strategies — such as"the phenomenological hook," "appropriating a constituency," and "moving on" — that Shulman used to construct "the teacher" as an object of study. Through a detailed analysis of this widely cited article, Nespor and Barber address broader issues of representation and power in the social sciences, and conclude with a call for "a more 'critical literacy' among the readers and writers of research texts."

Stabilizing American Society: Kenneth Boulding and the Integration of the Social Sciences, 1943–1980

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Fontaine
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
World War ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Main Determinant ◽  
Disciplinary Boundaries ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
American Society ◽  
The Right

ArgumentFor more than thirty years after World War II, the unconventional economist Kenneth E. Boulding (1910–1993) was a fervent advocate of the integration of the social sciences. Building on common general principles from various fields, notably economics, political science, and sociology, Boulding claimed that an integrated social science in which mental images were recognized as the main determinant of human behavior would allow for a better understanding of society. Boulding's approach culminated in the social triangle, a view of society as comprised of three main social organizers – exchange, threat, and love – combined in varying proportions. According to this view, the problems of American society were caused by an unbalanced combination of these three organizers. The goal of integrated social scientific knowledge was therefore to help policy makers achieve the “right” proportions of exchange, threat, and love that would lead to social stabilization. Though he was hopeful that cross-disciplinary exchanges would overcome the shortcomings of too narrow specialization, Boulding found that rather than being the locus of a peaceful and mutually beneficial exchange, disciplinary boundaries were often the occasion of conflict and miscommunication.

School Notes: Committee on Historical Studies

1987 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-236
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Research ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Processes Of Change ◽  
Graduate Faculty ◽  
New School ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Historical Moment

The Committee on Historical Studies was established in the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in 1984. The Graduate Faculty has long emphasized the contribution of history to the social sciences. Committee on Historical Studies (CHS) courses offer students the opportunity to utilize social scientific concepts and theories in the study of the past. The program is based on the conviction that the world changes constantly but changes systematically, with each historical moment setting the opportunities and limiting the potentialities of the next. Systematic historical analysis, however, is not merely a diverting luxury. Nor is it simply a means of assembling cases for present-oriented models of human behavior. It is a prerequisite to any sound understanding of processes of change and of structures large or small.

scholarly journals Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-278
Author(s):  
Torjus Midtgarden
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Life Experience ◽  
Physical Nature ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
The Social ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Pragmatism

Charles Peirce’s classification of the sciences was designed shortly after the turn of the twentieth century. The classification has two main sources of inspiration: Comte’s science classification and Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Peirce’s classification, like that of Comte, is hierarchically organised in that the more general and abstract sciences provide principles for the less general and more concrete sciences. However, Peirce includes and assigns a superordinate role to philosophical disciplines which analyse and provide logical, methodological and ontological principles for the specialised sciences, and which are based on everyday life experience. Moreover, Peirce recognises two main branches of specialised empirical science: the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the social sciences, the humanities and psychology on the other. While both branches share logical and methodological principles, they are based on different ontological principles in studying physical nature and the human mind and its products, respectively. Peirce’s most basic philosophical discipline, phenomenology, transforms his early engagement with Kant. Peirce’s classification of aesthetics, ethics and logic as normative sub-disciplines of philosophy relate to his philosophical pragmatism. Yet his more overarching division between theoretical (philosophical and specialised) sciences and practical sciences may be seen as problematic. Taking Peirce’s historical account of scientific developments into consideration, however, I argue that his science classification and its emphasis on the interdependencies between the sciences could be seen as sustaining and supporting interdisciplinarity and interaction across fields of research, even across the divide between theoretical and practical sciences.

scholarly journals Hayek, las ciencias y la praxeología

2017 ◽  
pp. 129-152
Author(s):  
Luis Luque Santoro
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Formal Theory ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Social ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Complex Phenomena

This paper includes the main conclusions driven from a thorough com-pilation and interpretation of F.A. Hayek’s most relevant views on the subjects of philosophy of science, epistemology and methodology regarding social scien-ces. The dialogue that Hayek seems to establish between sciences and methods is particularly highlighted. This dialogue might be summarized in two ways: a «bottom-up» connection, by offering an alternative justification for methodologi-cal dualism and the proper methodological principles for the social sciences, from the perspetive of the natural sciences methodological paradigm in which Hayek frames his human mind theory in his work The Sensory Order; and a «top-down» connection, by concluding with respect to the complex phenomena theo-ries of natural sciences that there exist common methodological challenges with the social sciences, which require in both cases to take into account methodolo-gical differences not covered under the orthodox mainstream methodological paradigm. In this sense an interpretation of Hayek’s methodological approxima-tion to economics as an applied or empirical social science is proposed; which intends to offer explanations about concrete reality, as a necessary complement of Mises praxeology which instead only focuses on pure and formal theory. Keywords: Hayek; Philosophy of Science; Methodology; Praxeology; Pure Logic of Choice. JEL Classification: A12, A14, B41, B53. Resumen: En este trabajo se presentan las principales conclusiones de una detenida compilación e interpretación de los planteamientos más importantes de F.A. Hayek sobre temas de filosofía de la ciencia, epistemología y metodo - logía de las ciencias sociales. En particular se resalta el diálogo que Hayek parece plantear entre ciencias y métodos y que se concretaría en dos senti-dos: en una conexión «por abajo», justificando el dualismo metodológico y los principios metodológicos adecuados para las ciencias sociales, desde el paradigma metodológico de las ciencias naturales en el que elabora su teoría sobre la mente humana en El Orden Sensorial; y en una conexión «por arriba» al concluir respecto a las teorías sobre fenómenos complejos de las ciencias naturales la existencia de retos comunes con los que también se enfrentan las ciencias sociales y que requieren dar cabida en ambos casos a diferencias metodológicas no previstas según el criterio ortodoxo dominante. En este último sentido, se propone una interpretación de la aproximación metodoló-gica de Hayek para la economía como una ciencia social aplicada o empí-rica que tiene como objetivo ofrecer explicaciones de la realidad, como el complemento necesario a la praxeología misesiana centrada en la teoría pura formal. Palabras clave: Hayek; Filosofía de la Ciencia; Metodología; Praxeología; Lógica Pura de la Elección. Clasificación JEL: A12 (Relación de la economía con otras disciplinas); A14 (Sociología de la economía); B41 (Metodología económica); B53 (Escuela aus-triaca).

scholarly journals Political Disagreement and Minimal Epistocracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam F. Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Political Knowledge ◽  
Body Of Knowledge ◽  
Political Disagreement ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Crucial Assumption

Despite their many virtues, democracies suffer from well-known problems with high levels of voter ignorance. Such ignorance, one might think, leads democracies to occasionally produce bad outcomes. Proponents of epistocracy claim that allocating comparatively greater amounts of political power to citizens who possess more politically relevant knowledge may help us to mitigate the bad effects of voter ignorance. In a recent paper, Julian Reiss challenges a crucial assumption underlying the case for epistocracy. Central to any defence of epistocracy is the conviction that we can identify a body of political knowledge which, when possessed in greater amounts by voters, leads to substantively better outcomes than when voters lack such knowledge. But it is not possible to identify such a body of knowledge. There is simply far too much controversy in the social sciences, and this controversy prevents us from definitively saying of some citizens that they possess more politically relevant knowledge than others. Call this the Argument from Political Disagreement. In this paper I respond to the Argument from Political Disagreement. First, I argue that Reiss conflates social-scientific knowledge with politically relevant knowledge. Even if there were no uncontroversial social-scientific knowledge, there is much uncontroversial politically relevant knowledge. Second, I argue that there is some uncontroversial social-scientific knowledge. While Reiss correctly notes that there is much controversy in the social sciences, not every issue is controversial. The non-social-scientific politically relevant knowledge and the uncontroversial social-scientific knowledge together constitute the minimal body of knowledge which epistocrats need to make their case. 

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document