scholarly journals Hayek, las ciencias y la praxeología

2017 ◽  
pp. 129-152
Author(s):  
Luis Luque Santoro
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Formal Theory ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Social ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Complex Phenomena

This paper includes the main conclusions driven from a thorough com-pilation and interpretation of F.A. Hayek’s most relevant views on the subjects of philosophy of science, epistemology and methodology regarding social scien-ces. The dialogue that Hayek seems to establish between sciences and methods is particularly highlighted. This dialogue might be summarized in two ways: a «bottom-up» connection, by offering an alternative justification for methodologi-cal dualism and the proper methodological principles for the social sciences, from the perspetive of the natural sciences methodological paradigm in which Hayek frames his human mind theory in his work The Sensory Order; and a «top-down» connection, by concluding with respect to the complex phenomena theo-ries of natural sciences that there exist common methodological challenges with the social sciences, which require in both cases to take into account methodolo-gical differences not covered under the orthodox mainstream methodological paradigm. In this sense an interpretation of Hayek’s methodological approxima-tion to economics as an applied or empirical social science is proposed; which intends to offer explanations about concrete reality, as a necessary complement of Mises praxeology which instead only focuses on pure and formal theory. Keywords: Hayek; Philosophy of Science; Methodology; Praxeology; Pure Logic of Choice. JEL Classification: A12, A14, B41, B53. Resumen: En este trabajo se presentan las principales conclusiones de una detenida compilación e interpretación de los planteamientos más importantes de F.A. Hayek sobre temas de filosofía de la ciencia, epistemología y metodo - logía de las ciencias sociales. En particular se resalta el diálogo que Hayek parece plantear entre ciencias y métodos y que se concretaría en dos senti-dos: en una conexión «por abajo», justificando el dualismo metodológico y los principios metodológicos adecuados para las ciencias sociales, desde el paradigma metodológico de las ciencias naturales en el que elabora su teoría sobre la mente humana en El Orden Sensorial; y en una conexión «por arriba» al concluir respecto a las teorías sobre fenómenos complejos de las ciencias naturales la existencia de retos comunes con los que también se enfrentan las ciencias sociales y que requieren dar cabida en ambos casos a diferencias metodológicas no previstas según el criterio ortodoxo dominante. En este último sentido, se propone una interpretación de la aproximación metodoló-gica de Hayek para la economía como una ciencia social aplicada o empí-rica que tiene como objetivo ofrecer explicaciones de la realidad, como el complemento necesario a la praxeología misesiana centrada en la teoría pura formal. Palabras clave: Hayek; Filosofía de la Ciencia; Metodología; Praxeología; Lógica Pura de la Elección. Clasificación JEL: A12 (Relación de la economía con otras disciplinas); A14 (Sociología de la economía); B41 (Metodología económica); B53 (Escuela aus-triaca).

scholarly journals Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-278
Author(s):  
Torjus Midtgarden
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Life Experience ◽  
Physical Nature ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
The Social ◽  
Methodological Principles ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Pragmatism

Charles Peirce’s classification of the sciences was designed shortly after the turn of the twentieth century. The classification has two main sources of inspiration: Comte’s science classification and Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Peirce’s classification, like that of Comte, is hierarchically organised in that the more general and abstract sciences provide principles for the less general and more concrete sciences. However, Peirce includes and assigns a superordinate role to philosophical disciplines which analyse and provide logical, methodological and ontological principles for the specialised sciences, and which are based on everyday life experience. Moreover, Peirce recognises two main branches of specialised empirical science: the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the social sciences, the humanities and psychology on the other. While both branches share logical and methodological principles, they are based on different ontological principles in studying physical nature and the human mind and its products, respectively. Peirce’s most basic philosophical discipline, phenomenology, transforms his early engagement with Kant. Peirce’s classification of aesthetics, ethics and logic as normative sub-disciplines of philosophy relate to his philosophical pragmatism. Yet his more overarching division between theoretical (philosophical and specialised) sciences and practical sciences may be seen as problematic. Taking Peirce’s historical account of scientific developments into consideration, however, I argue that his science classification and its emphasis on the interdependencies between the sciences could be seen as sustaining and supporting interdisciplinarity and interaction across fields of research, even across the divide between theoretical and practical sciences.

Social science, methodology of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Research Design ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Physical Science ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Special Importance ◽  
The Social

Each of the sciences, the physical, biological, social and behavioural, have emerged from philosophy in a process that began in the time of Euclid and Plato. These sciences have left a legacy to philosophy of problems that they have been unable to deal with, either as nascent or as mature disciplines. Some of these problems are common to all sciences, some restricted to one of the four general divisions mentioned above, and some of these philosophical problems bear on only one or another of the special sciences. If the natural sciences have been of concern to philosophers longer than the social sciences, this is simply because the former are older disciplines. It is only in the last century that the social sciences have emerged as distinct subjects in their currently recognizable state. Some of the problems in the philosophy of social science are older than these disciplines, in part because these problems have their origins in nineteenth-century philosophy of history. Of course the full flowering of the philosophy of science dates from the emergence of the logical positivists in the 1920s. Although the logical positivists’ philosophy of science has often been accused of being satisfied with a one-sided diet of physics, in fact their interest in the social sciences was at least as great as their interest in physical science. Indeed, as the pre-eminent arena for the application of prescriptions drawn from the study of physics, social science always held a place of special importance for philosophers of science. Even those who reject the role of prescription from the philosophy of physics, cannot deny the relevance of epistemology and metaphysics for the social sciences. Scientific change may be the result of many factors, only some of them cognitive. However, scientific advance is driven by the interaction of data and theory. Data controls the theories we adopt and the direction in which we refine them. Theory directs and constrains both the sort of experiments that are done to collect data and the apparatus with which they are undertaken: research design is driven by theory, and so is methodological prescription. But what drives research design in disciplines that are only in their infancy, or in which for some other reason, there is a theoretical vacuum? In the absence of theory how does the scientist decide on what the discipline is trying to explain, what its standards of explanatory adequacy are, and what counts as the data that will help decide between theories? In such cases there are only two things scientists have to go on: successful theories and methods in other disciplines which are thought to be relevant to the nascent discipline, and the epistemology and metaphysics which underwrites the relevance of these theories and methods. This makes philosophy of special importance to the social sciences. The role of philosophy in guiding research in a theoretical vacuum makes the most fundamental question of the philosophy of science whether the social sciences can, do, or should employ to a greater or lesser degree the same methods as those of the natural sciences? Note that this question presupposes that we have already accurately identified the methods of natural science. If we have not yet done so, the question becomes largely academic. For many philosophers of social science the question of what the methods of natural science are was long answered by the logical positivist philosophy of physical science. And the increasing adoption of such methods by empirical, mathematical, and experimental social scientists raised a second central question for philosophers: why had these methods so apparently successful in natural science been apparently far less successful when self-consciously adapted to the research agendas of the several social sciences? One traditional answer begins with the assumption that human behaviour or action and its consequences are simply not amenable to scientific study, because they are the results of free will, or less radically, because the significant kinds or categories into which social events must be classed are unique in a way that makes non-trivial general theories about them impossible. These answers immediately raise some of the most difficult problems of metaphysics and epistemology: the nature of the mind, the thesis of determinism, and the analysis of causation. Even less radical explanations for the differences between social and natural sciences raise these fundamental questions of philosophy. Once the consensus on the adequacy of a positivist philosophy of natural science gave way in the late 1960s, these central questions of the philosophy of social science became far more difficult ones to answer. Not only was the benchmark of what counts as science lost, but the measure of progress became so obscure that it was no longer uncontroversial to claim that the social sciences’ rate of progress was any different from that of natural science.

Philosophy of Science Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities: Introduction

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-326
Author(s):  
Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla ◽  
Alexander Gebharter ◽  
Gerhard Schurz
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Social

scholarly journals Research Design – Composition, Configuration and Interdependencies

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
Peter Kastberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Research Design ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Integrative View ◽  
The Social ◽  
Abstract Level ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Point Of Departure ◽  
Knowledge Communication

In this essay I will present an integrative view on research design. I will introduce what Itake to be the skeleton components of any research design within the social sciences, i.e.the elements of research question, philosophy of science, methodology, method and data.With this as my point of departure I will go on to focus on a presentation, a discussionand an evaluation of a new appreciation of the interdependencies of the elements in theresearch design. An appreciation that favors a relational rather than an atomistic outlookand which gives rise to an ecological conceptualization of research design. A research design,in other words, which promotes plasticity and fluidity over adherence to static protocol.And which, at the same time, does not relinquish control over project-relevant, multifaceteddecision-making processes – and their respective interdependencies – but which deliberateseach and every one of them. The aim of the paper is twofold. At a more abstract level, itaims at paving the way for establishing a reflexive approach to research design which, in turn,would be in tune with the tenets of the field of Organizational Knowledge Communication(e.g. Kastberg, 2014). At a more concrete level, it aims at presenting an idea of researchdesign which would – hopefully – be an inspiration to (young) scholars.

scholarly journals La epistemología de la Escuela Austriaca de economía (la fundamental aportación de F. A. Hayek a la teoría del conocimiento)

2021 ◽  
pp. 253-303
Author(s):  
César Meseguer
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Austrian School ◽  
Levels Of Abstraction ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Outstanding Representative

The exact process of the human brain and mind information and development is still, in many ways, a true mystery. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the evolutionary process enabled the brain and mind to progress from the most basic and instinctive aspects to evermore advanced levels of abstraction, which permitted the generation of increasingly complex abilities and elaborate language. But, how do we believe that the human mind works? How are we able to acquire knowledge and to transmit it? What are the appropriate methods to try and get close to the «real» world that surrounds us? The Austrian School of Economics has made some very interesting contributions to this subject, not only with regards to epistemology but also in the social sciences, mainly thanks to the contribution of the school’s most outstanding representative, F.A. Hayek. The main goal of the present work is to try and make the importance of Hayek’s contribution known, as well as to examine its derived consequences for epistemology and social science methodologies in general, and the consequences for Economics and Law in particular. Key Words: Epistemology, evolution, methodology, ontology, knowledge, sci-ence, method, reason, Austrian School. JEL Classification: B40, B41, B49, B52, B53. Resumen: El proceso exacto de formación y desarrollo del cerebro humano y de la mente es todavía en muchos aspectos un auténtico misterio. No obstante, parece claro que el proceso evolutivo permitió ir pasando desde los aspectos más básicos e instintivos, hasta niveles cada vez más elevados de abstracción, que permitieron la generación de habilidades complejas y de un lenguaje cada vez más elaborado. Pero ¿cómo creemos que funciona la mente huma-na? ¿Cómo somos capaces de adquirir conocimientos y transmitirlos? ¿Cuáles son los métodos adecuados para tratar de acercarnos a la «verdad» del mun-do que nos rodea? Sobre estas materias, la Escuela Austriaca de Economía, ha realizado aportaciones muy interesantes, tanto en epistemología, como en metodología de las ciencias sociales, fundamentalmente gracias a la contribu-ción de su representante más destacado, F. A. Hayek. El objetivo principal de este trabajo es tratar de dar a conocer la gran importancia de esa contribu-ción, así como las consecuencias que de ella se derivan para la epistemología y la metodología de las ciencias sociales en general, y para la Economía y el Derecho en particular. Palabras clave: Epistemología, evolutivo, metodología, ontología, conocimien-to, ciencia, modelo, razón, Escuela Austriaca. Clasificación JEL: B40, B41, B49, B52, B53.

scholarly journals Czy socjologowie są w stanie budować maszyny społeczne? Rekonceptualizacja różnicy między przyrodoznawstwem a naukami społecznymi

2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-44
Author(s):  
Łukasz Afeltowicz ◽  
Krzysztof Pietrowicz
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Science And Technology Studies ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Traditional Philosophy ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Difference

The last three decades have witnessed a dynamic development of science and technology studies, which have shown science in a way completely different from that presented by the traditional philosophy of science and methodology of social sciences. The authors accept that the findings of those studies concerning the mechanisms of functioning of science are correct and attempt to address again the problem of the difference between those disciplines and the social sciences. Their analysis concerns: the role and importance of laboratories in the social sciences; the “transition” of social phenomena to those laboratories; the possibility of popularization by the social sciences of technological solutions prepared by those laboratories; an incorrect approach to experiment and the acceptance of false ideas of the function of natural sciences by social scientists.

Defending the Difference

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
True Nature ◽  
Natural Entities ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
Methodological Difference ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One

Dreyfus argues that there is a basic methodological difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences, a difference that derives from the different goals and practices of each. He goes on to argue that being a realist about natural entities is compatible with pluralism or, as he calls it, “plural realism.” If intelligibility is always grounded in our practices, Dreyfus points out, then there is no point of view from which one can ask about or provide an answer to the one true nature of ultimate reality. But that is consistent with believing that the natural sciences can still reveal the way the world is independent of our theories and practices.

Guide to Africa Bibliography

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. xxix-xxx
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Development Studies ◽  
Environmental Sciences ◽  
African Government ◽  
The Social ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Cover Material

This bibliography records publications on Africa of interest to students of Africa, principally in the social and environmental sciences, development studies, humanities and arts. Some items from the medical, biological and natural sciences are included. The criterion used is potential relevance to a reader from a social sciences/arts background. The whole continent and associated islands are covered, with selective coverage of the diaspora. This volume aims to cover material published in 2019 together with items from earlier years not previously listed. The editor is always very glad to hear of any items omitted so that they may be included in future volumes. He would be particularly pleased to receive notification of new periodicals, print or online. African government publications and works of creative literature are not normally listed.

Assessing Contemporary Crises: Aligning Safety Science and Security Studies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bibi van den Berg ◽  
Ruth Prins ◽  
Sanneke Kuipers
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Everyday Life ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Security Studies ◽  
Nation States ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
Safety Science ◽  
Key Topics

Security and safety are key topics of concern in the globalized and interconnected world. While the terms “safety” and “security” are often used interchangeably in everyday life, in academia, security is mostly studied in the social sciences, while safety is predominantly studied in the natural sciences, engineering, and medicine. However, developments and incidents that negatively affect society increasingly contain both safety and security aspects. Therefore, an integrated perspective on security and safety is beneficial. Such a perspective studies hazardous and harmful events and phenomena in the full breadth of their complexity—including the cause of the event, the target that is harmed, and whether the harm is direct or indirect. This leads to a richer understanding of the nature of incidents and the effects they may have on individuals, collectives, societies, nation-states, and the world at large.

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