Ocean Pilgrimage and Ocean Plastics

2021 ◽  
pp. 113-120
Author(s):  
Marion Grau

This short chapter focuses on some of the innovations and attendant new modes of engaging in the pilgrimage system. Coastal multimodal pilgrimages offer alternative and innovative forms of pilgrimage in the Norwegian pilgrimage system. This form of pilgrimage was recently reconstructed in a mode that combines historical coastal sites with contemporary multimodal transport. A recent form of activist pilgrimage features ecumenical church communities expressing pilgrimage concern for climate action in the run-up to the Paris Agreement negotiations and thereafter. Subsequently, artists in the Diocese of Borg began building support to create and build a new interreligious site for climate pilgrims, the Cathedral of Hope in Fredrikstad, constructed as a movable, floating barge that draws people from various backgrounds to foster respect for the ocean in the fight against ocean plastics.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  

As one of the leading development partners for Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group) is fully committed to lead by example on climate change action. Since the signing of the Paris Agreement, the IDB Group has provided over $20 billion in Climate Finance, amounting to about 60% of all Climate Finance to the region from Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).


Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (17) ◽  
pp. 5567
Author(s):  
Pedro R. R. Rochedo ◽  
Panagiotis Fragkos ◽  
Rafael Garaffa ◽  
Lilia Caiado Couto ◽  
Luiz Bernardo Baptista ◽  
...  

Emissions pathways after COVID-19 will be shaped by how governments’ economic responses translate into infrastructure expansion, energy use, investment planning and societal changes. As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, most governments worldwide launched recovery packages aiming to boost their economies, support employment and enhance their competitiveness. Climate action is pledged to be embedded in most of these packages, but with sharp differences across countries. This paper provides novel evidence on the energy system and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions implications of post-COVID-19 recovery packages by assessing the gap between pledged recovery packages and the actual investment needs of the energy transition to reach the Paris Agreement goals. Using two well-established Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) and analysing various scenarios combining recovery packages and climate policies, we conclude that currently planned recovery from COVID-19 is not enough to enhance societal responses to climate urgency and that it should be significantly upscaled and prolonged to ensure compatibility with the Paris Agreement goals.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joeri Rogelj ◽  
Daniel Huppmann ◽  
Volker Krey ◽  
Keywan Riahi ◽  
Leon Clarke ◽  
...  

<p>To understand how global warming can be kept well-below 2°C and even 1.5°C, climate policy uses scenarios that describe how society could transform in order to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. Such scenario are typically created with integrated assessment models that include a representation of the economy, and the energy, land-use, and industrial system. However, current climate change scenarios have a key weakness in that they typically focus on reaching specific climate goals in 2100 only. <br><br>This choice results in risky pathways that delay action and seemingly inevitably rely on large quantities of carbon-dioxide removal after mid-century. Here we propose a framework that more closely reflects the intentions of the UN Paris Agreement. It focusses on reaching a peak in global warming with either stabilisation or reversal thereafter. This approach provides a critical extension of the widely used Shared Socioecononomic Pathways (SSP) framework and reveals a more diverse picture: an inevitable transition period of aggressive near-term climate action to reach carbon neutrality can be followed by a variety of long-term states. It allows policymakers to explicitly consider near-term climate strategies in the context of intergenerational equity and long-term sustainability.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jen Iris Allan

After a decade of negotiation, countries adopted a new, legally binding agreement on climate change. Excitement for a new era in the climate regime is palpable among pundits and policy makers alike. But such enthusiasm largely overlooks that most of the Paris Agreement’s provisions represent continuity with existing climate policy, not a break with the past. This forum argues that the Paris Agreement is a dangerous form of incrementalism in two ways. First, it repackages existing rules that have already proven inadequate to reduce emissions and improve resilience. Second, state and nonstate actors celebrate the Agreement as a solution, conferring legitimacy on its rules; I suggest that, beyond the strong desire to avoid failure, developing countries and nongovernmental organizations accepted the Paris Agreement to secure the participation of the United States and to uphold previous agreements. Given the reification of existing rules, the ratchet-up mechanism and nonstate actors offer the last remaining hopes in global efforts to catalyze climate action on a scale necessary to safeguard the climate.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan E. Hultman ◽  
Leon Clarke ◽  
Carla Frisch ◽  
Kevin Kennedy ◽  
Haewon McJeon ◽  
...  

Abstract Approaches that root national climate strategies in local actions will be essential for all countries as they develop new nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. The potential impact of climate action from non-national actors in delivering higher global ambition is significant. Sub-national action in the United States provides a test for how such actions can accelerate emissions reductions. We aggregated U.S. state, city, and business commitments within an integrated assessment model to assess how a national climate strategy can be built upon non-state actions. We find that existing commitments alone could reduce emissions 25% below 2005 levels by 2030, and that enhancing actions by these actors could reduce emissions up to 37%. We show how these actions can provide a stepped-up basis for additional federal action to reduce emissions by 49%—consistent with 1.5 °C. Our analysis demonstrates sub-national actions can lead to substantial reductions and support increased national action.


2016 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 330-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vikrom Mathur ◽  
Aniruddh Mohan

Global climate policy till date has focused on building consensus around a differentiated roadmap for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Equally important yet receiving less attention is the need to support adaptation of the most vulnerable communities to the increasingly severe impacts of climatic changes. The Paris Agreement, negotiated at the 21st COP in December 2015, ‘stitches up’ national contributions on adaptation and mitigation into a global agreement. This article first reviews the adaptation components of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) submitted by developed, emerging and least developed nations. Second, we examine how adaptation and the related themes of loss and damage have been dealt with in the Paris Agreement in terms of: global goal, legal form, review mechanisms and financing arrangements. Finally, we look at the possibility of evolving new arrangements and opportunities for strengthening global response to adaptation by drawing on references to human rights and climate justice in the Paris Agreement. We contend that the global response cannot be relegated to action by individual nations—partly and loosely supported by global financial and technological flows. The Paris Agreement has made significant steps in raising the importance of adaptation vis-à-vis mitigation in climate action but a lot of work remains to be done. In a sense, the top-down elements of adaptation action reflect long held negotiating positions and the skepticism of developed nations with respect to adaptation. For the post-Paris climate regime to be legitimate and earn the trust of developing nations, it must focus equally on adaptation and mitigation and address the special needs of vulnerable communities across the world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-160
Author(s):  
Charlotte Streck ◽  
Moritz von Unger ◽  
Sandra Greiner

The 25th session of the Conference of the Parties (cop-25) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc) became the longest cop on record – but yielded few results. It appears that four years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, enthusiasm has waned and political bargaining and bean-counting have taken over. Countries, for even the slightest chance to keep temperatures ‘well below’ 2 degrees Celsius, must do much more than they have previously committed to and accelerate the shift towards a zero-carbon economy. However, the conference largely failed to heed the rallying cry of the Chilean presidency. The flagship decisions (grouped under the banner “Chile-Madrid Time for Action”) neither produced new commitments – enhancing ambition or finance for developing countries – nor new rules that would nudge countries closer to the climate action targets needed. The leftover pieces from last year’s negotiations of the “Paris Rulebook” were also not resolved, in particular the unfinished decisions on Article 6 on market- and non-market mechanisms. The procrastination shows that the new architecture of the Paris Agreement, while addressing several of the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, suffers from its own weaknesses. The meager results of Madrid give reason to pause and reflect on the conditions that may hold countries back from fully embracing the Paris Agreement, but also to consider the future and nature of carbon markets and what is making the issue so difficult to resolve.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Charlotte Streck

The 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change abandons the Kyoto Protocol’s paradigm of binding emissions targets and relies instead on countries’ voluntary contributions. However, the Paris Agreement encourages not only governments but also sub-national governments, corporations and civil society to contribute to reaching ambitious climate goals. In a transition from the regulated architecture of the Kyoto Protocol to the open system of the Paris Agreement, the Agreement seeks to integrate non-state actors into the treaty-based climate regime. In 2014 the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Peru and France created the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (and launched the Global Climate Action portal). In December 2019, this portal recorded more than twenty thousand climate-commitments of private and public non-state entities, making the non-state venues of international climate meetings decisively more exciting than the formal negotiation space. This level engagement and governments’ response to it raises a flurry of questions in relation to the evolving nature of the climate regime and climate change governance, including the role of private actors as standard setters and the lack of accountability mechanisms for non-state actions. This paper takes these developments as occasion to discuss the changing role of private actors in the climate regime.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050002
Author(s):  
MARÍA VICTORIA ROMÁN ◽  
IÑAKI ARTO ◽  
ALBERTO ANSUATEGI ◽  
IBON GALARRAGA

The Paris Agreement states that from 2020 developed countries will mobilize at least USD 100 billion per year to support climate action in developing countries. The attainment of this objective involves decisions by donor countries about the channel and destination of climate finance disbursements. This paper explores how the spending conditions associated to different disbursement options can affect the opportunities for donors to expand their exports. In particular, using a Multiregional Input-Output Model, it finds that donors have an economic incentive for choosing bilateral channels that enable to tie aid to the detriment of multilateral ones, such as the Green Climate Fund. On the other hand, local content requirements imposed by recipient countries do not substantially affect donors’ exports, since they do not reduce intermediate exports, which represent a relevant share of the total exports generated by the mitigation and adaptation actions analysed.


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