Contract Law Without Foundations
In recent times, the philosophy of contract law has been dominated by the ‘promise theory’, according to which the morality of promise provides a ‘blueprint’ for the structure, shape, and content that contract law rules and doctrines should take. The promise theory is an example of what this book calls a ‘foundationalist’ theory of an area of law, according to which areas of law reflect or are underlain by particular moral principles or sets of such principles. The book argues that the promise theory is false, by considering contract law from the point of view of its theory, rules, and doctrines and broader political context. The book claims that ‘top-down’ theories of contract law such as the promise theory and its bitter rival the economic analysis of law seriously mishandle legal doctrine by ignoring or underplaying the irreducible plurality of values that shape contract law. The book defends the role of this multiplicity of values in forging contract doctrine, by developing from the ‘ground-up’ a radical and distinctly republican reinterpretation of the field.